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ABSTRACT 
Governments are striving to develop more effective legislation to protect the 
environment, likewise, global challenges, including climate change, overshadow and 
dominate our thinking about long-term strategies. As a result, leaders from the UK's 
public and private sectors alike reconsider the relationships between organisations, 
government and society. The main way in which organisations drive change is by means 
of innovation, and in fact, new thinking and innovation have become paramount when 
preparing for challenging economic times. Therefore, the time is opportune to consider 
the role of innovation, and in fact, new data was collected through a national survey on 
environmental best practise measures in cooperation with the Chartered Management 
Institute (CMI) and the Institute of Engineering and Technology (IET). Quantitative 
(questionnaires) and qualitative (In-depth interviews) data were collected and results 
were clustered in distinct response patterns highlighting the sector-specific innovation 
process. To analyse the drivers of (Eco)-Innovation, particularly Regulation, influencing the 
direction, speed and radicalness of Innovation, the Technology Policy Diffusion (TPD) 
model has been developed. The model encapsulates the dynamic interaction between 
(Eco)-Innovation and Regulation, reflecting present innovation patterns within the UK's 
public and private sector and its implications. The model was applied by four case 
studies, representing UK public and private sectors, to better understand the innovation 
diffusion process and to provide policy makers with a framework to design Regulation 
that spurs (Eco)-Innovation. 
Research showed that despite claims to give high priority to Eco-Innovation, most 
organisations are hindered by a lack of incentives to innovate. There is a difference of 
opinion over regulation as a driver for innovation, which underlines the ambiguity of 
Regulation being a driver and barrier in equal measure. This justifies the need for 
"smarter", more transparent, Regulation that promotes innovation and providing stronger 
incentives to comply. However, the research also revealed that the prevailing belief of a 
less innovative and less strategic public sector cannot be held up anymore. This 
underpins the need for sector-specific regulation that, in turn, accounts for sector- 
specific innovation approaches. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
As recent as a decade ago, the environmental agenda was still regarded by many UK 
organisations as, at best, a fringe issue representing additional cost rather than an 
opportunity to add value. Very few UK executives would have placed their confidence 
in environmentalism as an issue affecting their day-to-day decision-making process. 
Even fewer would have seen it as a core factor in adding value to their business 
processes. Surprisingly almost all of them identified environmental innovation being a 
part of the solution on the long and challenging journey towards sustainability which 
was highly praised by all EU governments as discussed in the Lisbon strategy' a decade 
ago (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
Environmental technologies also known as "eco-innovations" have the potential to 
sidestep the classic economic dilemma between growth and environmental 
improvement by offering cost-effective solutions to environmental issues on one hand 
as well as export opportunities on the other. Environmental innovations consist of new 
or modified processes, techniques, practices, systems and products to avoid or reduce 
environmental harms. Eco-innovations may be developed with or without the explicit 
aim of reducing environmental harm. They also may be motivated by the usual business 
goals such as reducing costs or enhancing product quality (Rennings, 2000; Beise and 
Rennings, 2001). Many eco-innovations combine an environmental benefit with a 
benefit for the company or user. Eco-innovations produce positive spillovers in both, 
the innovation and diffusion phase. Positive spillovers of R&D activities can be usually 
identified for all kinds of innovations. The peculiarity of eco-innovations is that positive 
spillovers appear also in the diffusion phase due to a smaller amount of external costs 
compared to competing goods and services on the market. This peculiarity of eco- 
innovations has been called the double externality problem (Rennings, 1998; 2000). 
The importance of eco-innovations is widely acknowledged (Horbach, 2007), as 
endorsed by the Lisbon Strategy, but its dynamics are as yet not fully understood as well 
as government's role in the process. The need for sustainability to be at the heart of our 
thinking about economic development became particularly important in respect to a 
rapid growth among nations seeking to gain benefits of economic development, 
' The Lisbon Strategy is an action and development plan for the European Union with the distinct aim to make the EU "the most 
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with innovation as the 
motor for economic change 
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arguably a privilege of the industrialised world. Organisations also operate within 
increasing regulatory activity at national and international levels where tighter regulation 
more and more prompts them to avoid national regulations. Those activities are likely 
to increase and were subject to debate in Copenhagen in December 2009. In the UK, 
climate change has moved to the centre of political debate in an unprecedented way 
(OECD, 2008). For instance the UK now has a Department for Energy and Climate 
Change and it is putting in place legal targets to cut carbon emissions, with five-year 
carbon budgets placing markers along the way. Many high-carbon businesses are already 
participants in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme while many more large UK 
organisations will be affected by the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (formerly known 
as the Carbon Reduction Commitment) which comes into force in 2010. It is time, 
therefore, for organisations to craft corporate strategies that address this phenomenon. 
From that perspective, engaging with this agenda is not only an ethical imperative; it 
also makes sound business sense (Rennings, et al., 2004). Climate change poses real risks 
and opportunities that organisations must begin planning for today, or risk losing 
ground to more forward-thinking competitors which was identified in the "Lean and 
Green" report published by the Chartered Management Institute in 2009 (Please also 
refer to footnote 2). As a matter of fact sustainability related issues are indeed not new 
anymore but the overwhelming evidence that in fact forces us to substantially change 
our lifestyles and the way we used to do business in a so called "business as usual 
scenario" became more apparent than ever before. Sustainability has therefore to lie in 
the heart of our thinking to allow for this change to happen even though the 
fundamental challenge of sustainability goes beyond environmentalism (Clayton and 
Radcliffe, 1997). Although sustainability is well received particularly among younger 
generation the question how to achieve this change became more and more apparent. 
Politicians within the EU tend to support this venture by emphasising the importance 
of innovation especially in regards to eco-innovation but fail to design unambiguous 
regulation with the aim to spur eco-innovation by providing strong incentives for all 
industry sectors (Horbach, 2007). In order for this to happen policy-makers need to 
understand how innovation evolves with a strong emphasis on the diffusion process of 
innovation that will allow them in return to design appealing regulation with the 
underlying notion to spur innovation. 
Hence, a new approach is needed which embodies radical systematic change. For 
instance, The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) 
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argues that innovation can be at the centre of the transformation of the UK economy 
and therefore defines innovation as the ability to use knowledge to create value in the 
economy and in society through new products, processes and services and in general 
new ways of doing things that will allow for a rising productivity and quality 
improvement. Radical, breakthrough innovation as well as incremental improvements 
and/or novel deployment of technology enables and drives further stages of economic 
and technological change in a positive reciprocating way (Clayton, 2004; Horbach, 2007, 
Frondel, et al, 2004; Bernauer, 2006). 
It is argued that in a globalised economy the ability of nations and regions to innovate 
consistently in order to avoid falling behind competitors is crucial even though 
innovation does not always emerge spontaneously (OECD, 2005). It is argued that the 
pace of technological change is likely to be further accelerated by the process of 
globalisation (Clayton, 2004). With the global economy slowly recovering from the 
magnitude of a deep recession, it is becoming evident that this crisis will be remembered 
as having changed our world forever. Business as usual therefore can not be an option 
anymore not just due to economic and credit conditions that have changed dramatically 
over the last months, but also because there is a growing realisation that we need to 
innovate to create new solutions for a new world economy. At the same time, the 
global economy has become more inter-connected. It is no longer possible to craft a 
solution for one country or region while neglecting global interconnectedness. What 
used to work, as a short-term fix, will no longer be good enough for long-term 
solutions. A global challenge such as climate change has to radically influence our 
thinking about long-term solutions (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). Leaders from both public 
and private sectors are being challenged to rethink the interactions between 
organisations, government and society at large that justifies once again the need for 
innovation. 
The scale and scope of challenges to come is so large that no one organisation or single 
country can solve them all. Even the developed world has realised that it requires the 
cooperation of emerging nations to create innovative solutions for global challenges'. 
Likewise, corporate decision makers realise that they need to work collaboratively with 
their business partners, customers and governments to innovate successfully. As a result 
2 NESTA Policy Report 03, (2009), Attacking the recession: setting the agenda for a new economy How a more innovative economy 
can beat the recession: a three-point Plan for the UK 
3 INSEAD Report (2009), "Are you innovation ready? ", Potting your journey on the Innovation Readiness Model 
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innovation ecosystems4 that range from public and private sectors to citizens and 
societies have to be formed. But how well do organisations understand what really 
drives innovation within their organisations? Do organisations understand government's 
role within the innovation process? Or do private and public organisations leave 
innovation largely to chance - not possessing even basic measures to identify and 
manage innovation? Are there different approaches towards innovation within private 
and public sector and how important is regulation as a potential driver? These questions 
are the focus of this research project and will be discussed in the subsequent chapters 
that provide the basis for a model that aims to highlight the interaction of innovation 
and various diffusion factors which are internal as well as external factors having a direct 
impact on the innovation process. The diffusion factors accordingly drive as well as 
hamper innovation depending on the level, rate and direction of innovation. 
4A network of interdependent organisations typically motivated to cooperate on innovation for commercial, academic or altruistic 
gains. Other critical components are clearly conscious human creations and are obviously subject to change; these include rules that 
protect intellectual property and the regulations and incentives that structure capital, labour, financial and consumer markets. Public 
policy can improve innovation-led growth by strengthening links within the system (Wessner, 2007). 
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1.1 Defining technological evolution 
When one wants to study innovation its cause as well as its impact it is crucial to 
understand the concept of technological evolution. Various schemes have been 
designed to explain the dynamics of technological evolution. Sahal (1981) introduced 
the concept of technological guideposts which refers to major technological advances 
that are capable of setting a direction to be followed by more incremental innovations. 
Within this approach, technological guideposts are chosen among various alternatives 
basically by chance. Dosi (1988a; 1988b) examined the same phenomenon with the 
concepts of technological paradigms and technological trajectories. A technological 
paradigm is defined as "a model or a pattern of solution of chosen technological 
problems, based on selected principles derived from natural sciences and on selected 
material technologies" (Dosi, 1982, p. 152). Hence, the paradigm is what initiates as well 
as drives technological change. Technological trajectories mark the patterns of progress 
followed by the new technology introduced by a new subsequent paradigm. Both Dosi 
and Sahal relate to Clark's notion of design hierarchies (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). In 
order to allow for radical change to happen prevailing paradigms need to be challenged 
and, if necessary, destroyed to induce new paradigms that catch the Zeitgeist and by 
doing so sets the basis for change to happen. 
Technological evolution of an industry or sector therefore relates to the process of 
interaction between the design of products, processes and services incorporating the 
new technology and customer preferences. The organisation's choice of an essential 
technological concept sets the agenda for technological development; customers' 
preferences determine the hierarchy of technological problems to be solved. As a result 
of the interplay between technological and market based counterparts a dominant 
design within a technological domain emerges. Various scholars have examined the 
concept of dominant design in different ways. 
For instance Sahal (1985) adopted a rather simplistic approach of dominant design as a 
single architecture that establishes dominance in a product class. Anderson and 
Tushman (1990) introduced a quantitative definition of dominant design, in an attempt 
to ease its identification they suggest that a design is dominant if it acquires more than 
50% market share. Other scholars see dominant design as the outcome of an 
evolutionary process in a technological area. Utterback and Suarez (1993) define a 
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dominant design being "the creative synthesis of the available technology and the 
existing knowledge about customer preferences". However, it is argued here that a 
dominant design develops when one or both occur: (a) alternative design has 
acknowledged defeat directly or indirectly as the close competitor; (b) a design has 
achieved a considerable advantage over rival designs in terms of market share and the 
latest market trends clearly suggest that this advantage is extending (Suarez, 2004). Even 
though the underlying concept does not change, it is interesting to see how the 
emergence of a dominant design has been acknowledged being highly complex due to 
the actors involved (Berkhout, et al, 2004; Berkhout, 2005). If one limits the process of 
interplay to only technological aspects of design and customer preferences, more recent 
investigations (Berkhout, 2006) have tested the theoretical and empirical relevance of 
other actors like institutions, competitors, supply chain, etc. However, another approach 
often related to technological evolution is technological disruptiveness (Christensen, 
1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Abernathy and Clark, 1985). According to 
(Christensen, 1997) disruptive new technologies are technological discontinuities sharing 
the following characteristics: 
  Products incorporating the disruptive technology underperform on the attributes 
mainstream customers value at the time of their introduction; 
  The mainstream customers do not value the new features offered by the 
technological innovation at the time of their introduction; 
  Products incorporating the disruptive technology typically are more simple and 
cheaper than existing products; 
  At the time of its introduction, the technological innovation appeals to a low-end, 
price-sensitive customer segment, thus limiting the profit potential for incumbents; 
  Over time, further developments improve the technological innovation's 
performance on the attributes mainstream customers value to a level where products 
incorporating the technological innovation begin to attract more of these customers 
Disruptive new technologies are desirable for all those above reasons. Their supremacy, 
however, make them very difficult to regulate. Policy-makers have to come up with a 
sensitive approach to tie those in the regulatory design process. The research will assess 
the existing regulatory instruments (Chapter 4) and their ability to drive innovation in 
order to find the most appropriate combinations that have this distinct feature. Leaving 
aside the distinct supremacy of disruptive technologies over conventional, less 
disruptive technologies and well established products, processes and services the time of 
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market entry is, as pointed out, very crucial as even a superior technology can fail when 
the time of market entry will not allow the crucial diffusion. Whether a specific 
technology can be classified as innovation depends solely on its ability to diffuse. 
1.2 Socio-technical change and innovation 
Socio-technical systems and technological transactions have been much debated in 
regard to both eco-innovation and sustainability (e. g. Geels, et al., 2004; Berkhout et at., 
2004; Elzen et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2005). The opportunities and pressures for eco- 
innovation are not only sector-specific but also for each socio-technical regime that 
exists around specific system-based functions in society (Berkhout, 2006). For this 
research two separate yet similar notions were studied about technological change at the 
systems level: technology cycles and technological transitions. The subsequent 
Technological Policy Diffusion (TPD), which consists of concentric diffusion cycles, is 
based on those concepts (please also refer to Chapter 3). 
Technological cycles have been extensively discussed in management literature to 
interpret the emergence of eco-innovation. The cycles typically comprise of four phases: 
Technological discontinuities, fermentation, dominance, and eras of incremental change 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Discontinuities alongside the dominant design events 
initiate the transitions. A dominant design refers, for example, to a large-scale power 
plant dominating the organisation of the electricity system in many countries or a 
distinct shape of a car, which induces a new design era. Tushman and Smith (2002) 
argue that rival technologies compete with each other and with existing technological 
regimes during fermentation, whereas the selection of a dominant design is followed by 
a period of incremental and architectural change. 
Technological discontinuities fostering the fermentation stage and the emergence of 
more radical innovation have been acknowledged to be relatively low (Tushman and 
Smith, 2002). When technological discontinuities do occur, they make room for 
transitions from one dominant regime and its network of actors, institutions, norms and 
assumptions to another. The invention and diffusion of automobiles and mobile 
telephones are typical examples of discontinuous changes. 
In the fermentation phase, dominant technological designs chosen from a variety of 
alternatives emerge from a negotiated logic enlivened by actors with interests in 
competing technical regimes rather than technical logic (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 
1994). This can also be seen as a struggle between alternative technological trajectories 
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which are initiated and triggered by competitors, alliances and regulation (Tushman and 
Smith, 2002). After a dominant design has changed, the subsequent technological 
change is driven by the logic of the chosen technology (Tushman and Smith, 2002). The 
dominant design of the paper production in forest use affects the extent to which 
alternative uses of wood are maintained and developed. Three dominant designs 
influencing the Finish pulp and paper industry serve as an example to exemplify how 
discontinuities in one dominant design could influence the other design. 
Socio-technical 
system of forest 
use 
Socio-technical 
system of 
papermaking 
Socio-technical system 
of information 
provision 
Current 
dominant 
design 
Alternative 
dominant 
design 
Pulp and paper 
manufacture 
...... i........ Electricity & 
fuel production 
Woodbridge 
from pine, 
spruce & birch 
I 
Fibre from 
acacia, 
eucalyptus etc. 
Paper-based, 
supplemented 
by electronics 
I 
Electronic - 
based 
Figure 1: Dominant Design Principles (Kivimaa, 2008) 
The horizontal two-way arrows show that the dominant designs surrounding the pulp 
and paper industry are interdependent. The vertical arrow indicates potential rivals to 
the current dominant designs. If a new dominant design emerges, it also affects the 
stability of the other dominant designs and may change them. Furthermore, alternative 
dominant designs that permanently challenge existing design principles also "renew", if 
effective enough, prevailing design principles exemplified in Figure 1. Industrial renewal 
through innovation streams and strategic change determines the possible emergence of 
more incremental or even radical innovations, and may also determine the extent to 
which environmental regulation interact with eco-innovation (please also refer to 
Chapter 4.5/4.6). The idea of technological transition is more recent than technology 
cycles and relates to policy studies. Technological transitions have been defined by 
Geels (2002: 1257) "as major technological transformations in the way societal functions . Tuch as 
transportation, communication, feeding are fulfilled'. Technological transitions do not only 
comprise of technological changes but also induce elements such as user practices, 
regulation, industrial networks, infrastructure and symbolic meaning. In the case of 
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energy generation, a technological transition would imply a transition in the whole 
system of energy supply and consumption including the regulatory systems and 
networks of different actors behind it, rather than dealing with single issues, such as air 
pollution, with new technologies, which refers to the notion of discontinuous change in 
technological cycles (Smith and Sterling, 2006). (Please also refer to "lock-in"-effects on 
page 11). 
The technological transition approach analyses the emergence of new paradigms while 
the technology cycles does not specifically focus on which factors causes from on phase 
to another. However, technological transition has been accused focussing merely on 
emerging technologies from the niche level (e. g. Berkhout et at., 2004). Current 
regulation is often considered being a barrier to transitions, since regulation are usually 
tuned to an already existing regime with specific characteristics (Elzen and Wieczorek, 
2005). Cognitive, normative and formal rules were identified by Geels (2004), which 
influence people's behaviour and drag changes away from existing systems. Generally, 
the sets of rules of different social groups, which have an impact on technological 
trajectories comprising of engineers, users, policy makers, suppliers, scientist, banks and 
NGOs, create socio-technical regimes to support the existing technological path (Geels, 
2002). Although environmental regulation combined with other factors may hamper 
transitions and therefore support more incremental change, they also have the potential 
to create pressure for system-level change which is the very basis for radical innovation 
(e. g. Smith, et al, 2005). It is therefore indispensable to figure out when regulation is 
likely to have a stabilising effect on one side and when it is likely to trigger radical 
change and, by doing so, which factors underpin the process. Although transitions are 
characterised by non-linear behaviour, technological change has been believed to be 
gradual and believed to last between 25-50 years (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005). However, 
some transitions such as the shift to a mobile phone society have emerged much faster. 
As a matter of fact, both technology cycles and technological transitions are somehow 
undecided on what essentially induces a shift in the socio-technical regime whereas a 
regime shift may be considered as a mere incremental change in inputs for a higher level 
regimes such as the organisation of industrial production as a whole (Berkhout et al., 
2004). 
While technology cycles pursue changes in dominant design principle and the networks 
of organisations, i. e. the transitions, as something erratic and therefore uncontrollable 
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some scholars (e. g. Kemp and Loorbach, 2005; Kemp and Rotmans, 2004) believe that 
transitions could be spurred by regulation in the form of "transition management", 
based on experiments initiated at niche-level with a clear and precise vision that can 
consequently result in wider changes in the level of socio-technical regimes. The 
direction and speed of a transition can be influenced by diffusion factors and the 
prospect of an emerging transition can be increased while transitions as such cannot be 
controlled (Berkhout, 2002). This phenomenon is of greater importance as it builds the 
underlying idea of interacting diffusion factors that will be described in Chapter 6. 
Niches provide important settings that are less susceptible to prevailing market 
pressures (Smith and Sterling, 2008). Expectations of performance are relatively 
independent from conventional criteria. Radical innovations that carry systemic 
implications typically need this kind of space to develop, improve and enrol support 
(Horbach, 2007). However, it has been argued that the niche-based model of transitions 
is rather limited as it does not account for other sources which can induce change 
(Berkhout et al., 2004). Social aspirations, infrequently comprehensible in a way that 
could lead to technological innovation are more likely to gain influence through marco- 
level, where the main channel into market as well as regulatory signals promoting 
innovation (Berkhout et al., 2004). In effect, the nature of transformations will depend 
on the contexts in which they emerge (Smith et al., 2005) as well as much innovation 
does occur along the path of the development trajectory part due to the fact that the 
trajectory defines the scope of the problem. 
In respect of the above discussion on technological change, path dependency has been 
considered as something that drives change in socio-technical systems in specific 
directions and limits other kinds of solutions (Teece et a., 1997). Path dependencies 
correspond to technology cycles and technological transition literatures, in which it 
relates to technology, notions and practices that enhance the robustness and, by doing 
so, support change without deviating too much from existing systems (Smith et al., 
2005). Path dependency also varies across different societies, nations, business sectors, 
organisations and technologies (Smith et al., 2005; Hollingsworth, 2006). 
In other words, path dependency shows that actions taken today shape the future and 
therefore do not hamper but direct innovation as such. Consequently, the focus 
therefore needs to be on process and product innovation with the ability to eliminate 
waste and reduce emissions. If this style of innovation can be induced, or if it is 
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motivated by the competitive advantage that maybe gained through associated cost 
savings, so goes the argument, environmentally-driven innovations (eco-innovation) will 
substitute for innovation in abatement technologies (Chapter 3 will further explain the 
implications of eco-innovation in this context). While intuitively appealing, there are a 
number of limitations with this framing of eco-innovation analysis. First, a focus on 
discrete, micro-level changes in technology is liable to miss dynamics across the wider 
technological system that may be more significant. Second, these studies facing a major 
definitional problem in distinguishing between a "clean" and a "dirty" technology. The 
definition usually appears to rest on claims made by technology suppliers and producers. 
Typically, a single dimension of environmental performance is highlighted, with little 
account taken of the broader systems impacts that a new "clean" technology may have. 
Third, the emphasis on discrete technologies leads to a focus on new investment and 
substitution of one technology for another and a lack of attention to processes of 
incremental innovation (Berkhout, et at., 2004). In many technological systems 
incremental change is extremely significant, especially since capital turnover rates are 
slow (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1995). 
It defines easier conditions for those innovations to occur which support the dominant 
technological design or the dominant socio-technical system emerging from the past. 
This implies that more radical or discontinuous innovations can have considerable 
barriers in path-dependent systems (Markard and Truffer, 2008). The phenomenon of 
technology lock-in also refers to the path dependency which explains technology 
adoption processes and industry evolution as it implies that once a specific product, 
process or service has been implemented, the likelihood of considering different 
technologies is rather low as an alternative may be prohibitive gaffe et al., 2002). Kemp 
(2004) distinguishes between three types of lock-in: 
  Sectors are locked into particular technologies, which lead companies to focus their 
attention to (non-disruptive) incremental innovation; 
  Policy is locked into fragmented approaches which somehow have to be aligned to 
SD goals; 
  Societies are locked into energy sources and combustion technologies, patterns of 
consumption that are material intensive and produce large amounts greenhouse 
gasses (Carbon lock-in). 
When considering incremental change of technology cycles, the dominant design shows 
a technology lock-in, which continues until technological discontinuity is triggered. The 
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existing technological pathways also require different options for actors to influence the 
path in order to innovate (diffusion factors). This could partly explain the context 
specific effects that environmental regulation has on innovation. Technological 
pathways and the levels of innovation from incremental to radical, breakthrough 
innovation are of great importance as they induce the subsequent innovation levels 
(Chapter 3) within the TPD model. 
1.3 Green and Competitive 
The subsequent sub-chapter competition is, in the strict sense, outside the scope of the 
research but does matter if one wants to understand one of the most powerful driving 
forces of eco-innovation. 
The ongoing conflict between environmental protection and an organisations' business 
performance has been traditionally challenged due to ever-growing demands by 
organisations to protect the natural environment. The increase of capital as well as 
labour cost, redirect boardroom attention and last but not least tease out more 
investment (Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 1995). It is essential to create incentives even 
though an enhanced environmental performance might imply a higher demand for more 
environmental protection which prompts organisations to move to other countries 
where lenient environmental standards are in place (Ashford, 1993; Wallace, 1995). 
Palmer et al. (1995) argue that tight environmental regulation make the polluting 
organisation worse off even if the organisation is able to invest and implement a new, 
more affective abatement technology if this technology was not worth investing in 
before, its gains will not be enough to raise the organisation's profits after the 
environmental standards are raised, either. The well-debated Porter Hypothesis (further 
explained in Chapter 4) claims the opposite, and advocates strict environmental 
regulation to spur innovation by given organisations clear incentives to innovate 
(Bemauer, 2006; Huber, 2008). A popular example here are a stricter CO2 standards in 
the EU that force EU car makers to develop relevant technologies. As a consequence 
these organisations will be ahead of competitors outside the EU, which in rum, leads to 
a national as well as regional competitive advantage. 
Recent years have witnessed accelerating rates of change in consumer tastes and a 
shortening of product life cycles (Jackson, 2006). This has made effective new product 
development (NPD) increasingly crucial to corporate success (Calantone et al., 1995). 
More and more research shows the ever-growing importance of NPD in a variety of 
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organisations and across several disciplines, including marketing, technology, 
organisational theory, and engineering (OECD, 2007a; Technopolis, 2008b, 
Technopolis, 2008a; UNU-MERIT, 2008). Effective NPD develop products whose 
major characteristic and additional features meet the needs of customers as well as 
internal and external stakeholders. Government and consumer groups may press for 
increased product safety, while customers demand ease of use and low prices (Lovins, 
2008). 
In some sectors such as the car industry, environmental considerations have had a 
fundamental effect on product development processes to develop more energy-efficient 
and even low/zero-emission vehicles (Thornton, 1999; Nieuwenhuis, et al, 2006). It can 
be observed that a large proportion of new product introductions involve products 
marketed at least partly on the basis of their environmental performance. Stricter 
regulations as well as consumer scepticism have led to a reduction in such introductions 
according to Speer (1997). The challenge of responding appropriately to concern about 
the natural environment has changed many aspects of the way organisations operate and 
has become an pivotal part of purchasing, marketing, and corporate strategy 
(Shrivastava and Hart, 1994). Environmental responsiveness was traditionally 
considered to involve compliance, cost, and trade-offs with other strategic corporate 
goals, it is now being posed as an opportunity rather than a burden (Pujari, et al., 2003). 
Although the "win win" logic of being "green and competitive" (Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995a) is disputed by others (e. g., Walley and Whitehead, 1994), the literature 
points to external benefits that arise from environmental improvement, including. 
  increased sales (Fierman, 1991); 
  improved customer feedback (Frankel, 1992); 
  closeness to customers (Dean et al., 1995); 
  enhanced competitiveness (Miles and Munilla, 1993; Porter and van der 
Linde, 1995b; Triebswetter, 2007; Triebswetter, et al., 2007); 
  improved corporate image (Engleberg, 1992; Kolk, 2000). 
The above benefits that can be achieved by improving the environmental performance 
of organisations were largely confirmed from organisations that were participating in the 
questionnaire survey. The results are discussed in Chapter 5. Moreover, the findings 
indicate that all of the rather desirable conditions can be caused by sustainable 
innovation. 
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1.4 Research Aims and Objectives 
The previous sub-chapters outlined the importance of a highly innovate society to deal 
with future challenges by preserving the natural environment without having to 
compromise traditional corporate goals like growth, corporate image and 
competitiveness. In order for this to come true, the all-dominant process of diffusion of 
innovation has to become more effective and more transparent by developing an 
understanding of diffusion-context factors that depend on the level and direction of 
innovation. 
The aim of this research is therefore to study the interaction between eco-innovation 
and regulation by examining the diffusion factors of eco-innovation which allows in 
turn better understanding of how regulation drives or hampers eco-innovation. A model 
developed to show those interactions aims to contribute to the understanding of how 
regulations have to be designed in order to spur eco-innovation. The research will 
examine the sector-specific innovation drivers and barriers that will initiate the 
subsequent discussion about the diffusion factors. The Technological Policy Diffusion 
(TPD) model aims to highlight the interactions of drivers and barrier, here called 
diffusion factors, and, by doing so, provide a more transparent model for policy-makers 
to get a better understanding of the underlying complexity of the innovation diffusion 
process. This, in turn, serves policy-makers as a guidline to design more effective 
regulation by providing greater incentives to comply and innovate, thereby eliminating 
the possibility for organisations to go by-pass their regulatory obligations. With regard 
to the aim of this research project the specific objectives followed by the corresponding 
research questions are listed below: 
Research Objective 1: To identify where regulators made a significant contribution in 
order to promote eco-innovation and by doing so investigating the role of regulation 
within the innovation process in a sector-specific context. 
Given the ambiguity of regulations and their resulting effects on eco-innovation the 
research aims to analyse sector-specific (UK's private and public sector) approaches to 
regulation to aid more tailored regulation to in turn spur eco-innovation in the specific 
sectors. In order to enable more effective regulatory compliance, the research 
investigates the main incentives responsible for organisational compliance or denial in 
terms of the by-passing of regulation. Therefore the specific research questions to 
characterise and better understand sector-specific regulation are: 
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1.1 What are the sector-sped c approaches towards environmental regulation and how do they 
der? 
1.2 What are the main incentives to comply, with them? 
Research Objective 2: To specify the main drivers and barriers for eco-innovation in a 
sector-specific context. 
The analysis of drivers and barriers of eco-innovation within different sectors will help a 
better understanding of how to spur eco-innovation in a sector-specific way by 
discussing the driving factors for organisations to improve their eco-innovation as well 
as what barriers are hampering organisations towards such activities. Therefore, the 
specific research questions are: 
2.1 What are the d erences between the public and private sector approach towards eco-innovation? 
2.2 What are the distinct drivers and barriers for eco-innovation with the public and private 
sectors? 
Research Objective 3: To clarify the role of government in the promotion of eco- 
innovation within industry sectors (facilitator or inhibitor). It is indisputable that 
governments have a pivotal part to play in order to trigger eco-innovation within 
various industries. The underlying core question here is to analyse when and how 
governments should interfere in the process to initiate change. 
3.1 Which role should a government adopt to promote environmental innovation within industry? 
The following section briefly outlines the chosen research methodology to address the 
above research question to achieve the project aim and objectives. 
1.4.1 Overview of Research Methodology 
Given the nature of the conducted research, it was chosen to apply a multi-strategy 
research approach for the collection of data and analysis, consisting of, quantitative and 
qualitative methods. After the analysis of the literature review, a model was developed 
to mirror the interaction of eco-innovation and regulation with a focus on the diffusion 
factors. 12 preliminary interviews were conducted within various industry sectors and 
stakeholders to explore drivers and barriers of eco-innovation to strengthen the model 
in its theoretical approach as well as to further develop the diffusion cycles that 
highlight how various factors turn into drivers and barriers of innovation depending on 
the level and rate respectively. A questionnaire was selected to be the primary tool for 
data collection. Given the large sample size of 20,000 send out questionnaires send out 
with 1500 responses, it was decided to conduct 10 follow-up interviews to explore the 
role of various diffusion factors that appeared to be different in private and public 
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sector in greater depth. All three data sources aim to test and revise the model for its 
validation that will take place in the case studies (Chapter 6). 
1.4.2 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised in six chapters, as outlined in the following (Table 1), after the 
introduction: Chapter 2 outlines the research methodology based on the research 
objectives and questions identified from the literature review. It will account for the 
selection of both quantitative and qualitative data. The nexus between the data 
collection and analysing methods will be discussed in detail. Chapter 3 will revisit the 
innovation process and its historical development to the point of the emergence of eco- 
Table 1: Chapter Outline 
Literature Review 
Data Analysis and Discussion using 3 
sets of data: 
Questionnaire Survey 
12 semi structured expert interviews 
10 semi structured follow up interviews 
Chapter 1: 
Introduction of the Project 
Chapter 2: 
Methodology 
Chapter 3: 
Innovation Process 
Chapter 4: 
Environmental Regulation 
Chapter 5: 
Drivers and Barriers of Eco-Innovation 
Chapter 6: 
Case Studies - Eco Innovation in the 
Public and Private Sector 
Chapter 7: 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
innovation. It will illustrate the diffusion process of innovation by introducing Jänicke's 
Model. Finally a new TPD model V,. o, derived from the literature, 
is suggested to 
illustrate the highly dynamic interactions of innovation and regulation with an emphasis 
on the diffusion process. Chapter 4 presents an overview of traditional regulatory 
instruments that were partly successful to promote innovation in the past but given the 
unique nature of sustainable development and the need for more radical change 
outlined in the introduction, might not be the most appropriate instrument to meet 
future regulatory challenges. For this reason "smart" regulations are introduced to 
demonstrate how specifically tailored regulation drives eco-innovation within industry 
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sectors by providing strong incentives for organisations to meet their regulatory 
obligations. Examples of already implemented "smart" regulations will be presented and 
analysed to identify the elements responsible for driving eco-innovation. Those 
successfully implemented "smart" regulation provide an alternative to prevailing 
regulatory instruments such as Command and Control, Market Based Regulation as well 
as Voluntary Agreements. Finally the second version of the TPD model V2.0, which 
reflects the results of 12 expert's interviews and by doing so adds further robustness by 
defining and implementing the six most frequent diffusion factors which were 
additionally supported by the survey findings. 
Chapter 5 outlines diffusion factors of eco-innovation, taken from the questionnaire 
results. By doing so the major diffusion factors for eco-innovation will be identified to 
refine the model, and launch version V3.0 which will account for those by allocating 
innovating organisations into two clusters. Findings resulting from this process will be 
allocated into "pro"- and "anti" regulation clusters to further discuss the driving 
potential of regulation to discuss the governance of innovation policy. 
Chapter 6 will then apply the final version of the TPD model V3. o to four case studies 
from the UK's private and public sector to test and validate the model in terms of its 
sector-specific applicability. The model demonstrates the sector-specific innovation 
approaches due to varying diffusion factors (drivers/barriers) that depending on their 
dominance determine the direction, speed and radicalness of the subsequent diffusion. 
The case studies then allow to provide a better understanding of how future regulation 
have to be designed in order spur eco-innovation in specific industry sectors. 
the final chapter 7 will conclude the thesis, summarising briefly the previous chapters, 
the questionnaire survey and interviews. Recommendations for both private and public 
sector organisations as well as governments will be presented to support the overall 
contribution of the thesis. Finally, directions for future research within this area are 
recommended. 
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CHAPTER 2: Methodology 
21 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the data collection methods and data analysis techniques that 
were applied for this research project. It will discuss the chosen methods and outline 
how the multi-strategy research approach, comprising of questionnaire survey and 
interviews are in line with the research objectives presented in Chapter 1. This 
contributes to the verification and validation of findings that were generated by 
different data-collection techniques from different data sources by triangulating data and 
methodologies. 
22 Data Collection Methods. Theory Building 
The aims and objectives, presented in Chapter 1, indicate that the project is aimed at the 
interaction of eco-innovation and regulation with an emphasis on the sector-specific 
diffusion factors. Given the nature of the research objectives it was necessary to gather 
data from a large and rather diverse sample so that a quantitative method (questionnaire 
survey) has been decided for providing answers to research objectives 1,2 and 3. In 
addition, qualitative interviews are considered to be an appropriate complementary 
method for research objectives 2 and 3 as this approach allows exploring in depth and 
therefore provides more insights about the eco-innovation diffusion factors which show 
different characteristics when looking at the UK's private and public sector. These will 
be further explained in the subsequent sections. The following (Figure 1) illustrates the 
methods applied to achieve the previously (Chapter 1) outlined objectives. 
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Research Objectives 
Identifying regulators 
contribution in order to 
promote innovation in a 
sector-specific context 
4) Specifying the main drivers 
and barriers for eco-innovation 
in a sector-specific context 
Clarifying which role a 
government should ideally 
have in order to promote eco- 
innovation within industry 
sectors (facilitator or 
inhibitor) 
Figure 2: Research Methodology 
2.2.1 Quantitative Methods 
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The aim of this research project is to investigate the nexus between eco-innovation and 
regulation with an emphasis on the diffusion factors which depend on the innovator 
type, the degree and direction of innovation as well as the applied sector. The project 
needed a data collection method that is diverse and rich enough to perform statistical 
analysis to draw relevant as well as meaningful conclusions. In this respect the 
questionnaire survey was chosen as the major data collection tool as it is (Bailey, 1997): 
1. Relatively low cost and faster method to collect the data from large sample sizes and 
geographically separated respondents; 
2. Evaluating responses to a certain degree of standardisation and allows statistical 
hypothesis testing. 
Further advantages over other methods are the absence of interviewer effects, faster to 
administer and the convenience for respondents (Bailey, 1997). However, like any other 
method, questionnaires have disadvantages, such as limited nature or responses that can 
be given to a relatively low response rate and the possibility of selection and self- 
selection bias in the responses. As self-selection bias in the responses implies potential 
respondents with an affiliation to the research area are more likely to reply than those 
who might not have an interest in research at all (Bailey, 1997). 
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2.2.1.1 Questionnaire 
The "Greening Management Survey" questionnaire was designed in cooperation with 
the Chartered Management Institute (CMI) and the Institution of Engineering and 
Technology (IET) and a total of 20 000 were sent out to members of those two 
professional bodies. It comprised 9 sections and aimed to examine general attitudes 
towards the environment, questions about how to create an energy efficient workplace, 
drivers and barriers of environmental practice, eco-innovation, environmental 
regulation, managing the organisation's carbon footprint, environmental best practice 
resources and examples. These questions were elaborated with the CMI & IET in order 
to investigate what and how organisations account for their environmental impact if 
they do, and whether this is implemented in the organisation's core business strategy. 
Most of the survey data was explored, researched and published in a relevant CMI 
report. The innovation related data from the survey has not been analysed for that 
survey as it was entirely for this PhD research, which was recognised as such by the 
CMI & IET. As a consequence the CMI & IET data and the data used for this research 
is therefore separate from each other, even though core context of the participating 
organisations are outlined and examined here as well using the CMI specific part of the 
data. 
Eco-innovation was identified to be the most important instrument to trigger 
sustainable development for which reason it was strategically placed in the centre part of 
the questionnaire as it was agreed on testing the organisation's overall approach towards 
sustainability first before gaining a deeper understanding of why organisations innovate, 
if they do, in the first place. For the majority of the questionnaire statements, the five- 
point Likert-type scale was applied because data coding is considered to be simple and 
straight forward and it particularly lends itself to statistical analysis. Given the 
circumstances in which the questionnaire was compiled a pilot run was decided against 
as both CMI and IET assured the contribution of their members on this survey. Both 
professional bodies, CMI and IET, influence and experience in these matters helped in 
planning ad designing the questionnaire, which was then distributed among 15 000 
members of the CNII and 5000 members of the IET with a result of 1 500 responses in 
total. The following (Table 2) shows the status of organisations, sectors, organisations 
size as well as the management level of respondents and their location. 
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Table 2: Organisation Sample 
Base: 1500 % % 
Status of organisation Organisation size 
Public sector 35 None 5 
Public limited company 18 1-50 16 
Private limited company 29 51-250 12 
Charity/not for profit 10 251-1,000 15 
Partnership 3 Over 1,000 50 
Owner managed/sole trader 2 
Sector Management level 
Manufacturing, Production & Engineering 15 Junior manager 16 
Electricity, Gas & Water 4 Junior engineer 2 
Construction 3 Middle manager 31 
Transport & Logistics 4 Senior manager 27 
Telecommunication & Post; Creative & Media 6 Senior engineer 5 
Finance & Insurance 3 Director 17 
Consultancy, Legal & Accountancy Services, 12 
Sales & Marketing/Advertising Location 
Education 10 East of England 6 
Health & Social Care 9 London 14 
Local Government, Fire & Rescue; Police & 26 East Midlands 5 
Defence; Justice & Security West Midlands 10 
Other 7 South East 15 
South West 12 
North East 4 
North West 8 
Yorkshire & the Humber 6 
Northern Ireland 2 
Scotland 8 
Wales 4 
Other 4 
The participating organisations were organised by their status, sector-affiliation, size and 
location. Additional information was provided about the management-level of 
respondents. The majority of participating organisations can be either found in the 
public sector followed by the private sector with a few representing charities/not for 
profit organisations, partnerships or sole traders. The organisations were allocated to 15 
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sectors according to the SIC codes 5 of which were not able to take the 3% barrier and 
were therefore combined in one joint-sector (Other). This classification was crucial in 
order to being able to compare different sectors in regard to their innovation drive as 
well as their attitude towards regulation. More than half of the participating 
organisations have more than 1000 employees followed by a number of medium 
organisations. As a matter of fact just 5% of organisations registered less than 50 
employees. In term of the geographical distribution it appears that the slight majority of 
participating organisation were located in Greater London, South East and the South 
West of the country whereas the rest of the organisation is evenly distributed all over 
the UK as this was a truly national survey. More than half or the respondents were 
either middle or senior management with another 17% directors and a minority of 
junior engineers with 2%. 
2.2.2 Qualitative Methods 
Qualitative methods were used to amend the primarily used quantitative data collected 
through the questionnaire survey to better understand the highly dynamic interaction 
between eco-innovation and regulation with an emphasis on the diffusion factors. 
In order to gain deeper insights into the diffusion process of eco-innovation and to 
understand the part-dependency of factors, it was necessary to conduct sets of 
interviews with experts representing a sector respectively. When applying qualitative 
methods the interview is the most common applied method, as it allows "deeper 
insights" into the reasoning of specific actions (Bryman, 2004). When asking open- 
ended questions and by giving the respondents opportunities to independently answer 
according to their own opinion one can have a more precise and clear picture of an 
interviewee's position and opinions on the object under study (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 
2002). This was particularly helpful when refining the already existing TPD model V1"0 
into V20 which presents deeper insights through the applied diffusion factors. 
The further review of documentary sources of data in connection with interviews is an 
important feature in regard to the forthcoming data triangulation Qick, 1979). The 
following sub-section explains the selection process for interview partners and the 
interview format. 
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2.2.2.1 Selection of Interviewees 
When looking for appropriate interview partners for the first set of interviews the 
theoretical sampling approach (Bryman, 2004) was employed to identify the most 
suitable interviewees that are likely to have deep insights in the object under study. This 
approach entails sampling interviewees until the categories achieve theoretical saturation 
and selecting further interviewees on the basis of the emerging theoretical focus. The 
approach is an iterative method - that is, one in which there is a movement backwards 
and forwards between sampling and theoretical reflection. The major benefit of 
theoretical sampling is due to the emphasis on using theoretical data reflection as an 
indicator whether more data is needed. It therefore places a premium on theorising 
rather than the statistical adequacy of a sample, which may be a limited guide to sample 
selection in many instances (Strauss, 1987). 
As identified in the literature review (Chapter 3,4) the following stakeholders have the 
potential to directly or indirectly contribute to the discussion on what are the most 
important drivers as well as barriers for eco-innovation and were therefore chosen for 
the first set of interviews: environmental governmental departments, consultancies and 
multinational corporations. A minimum of four interviews as a basis for the TPD model 
refinement was conducted in each stakeholder group. The selection of the individual 
stakeholder for each category was done on the basis of their action and knowledge in 
the eco-innovation field and their engagement with the industries on environmental 
issues. 
The second set of interviews was conducted as follow-up interviews to the 
questionnaire survey with respondents that kindly indicated their willingness to 
participate in those. 131 respondents out of a total of 1 500 responses volunteered 
taking part in a follow-up interview. In order to allow for both a rather general as well as 
a sector and organisation specific opinion, whilst remaining a manageable sample, 10 
interview partners were chosen according to their sector affiliation, organisation size 
and location. 
2.2.2.2 Interview Questions 
Interviews have been chosen as the secondary research method in order to complement 
and triangulate the quantitative data gathered through the questionnaire survey. Semi- 
structured in-depth interviews are considered to be helpful in order to understand the 
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connection between the variables in exploratory studies. In order to achieve a high 
degree of validity, the gathered data is compared and cross-checked as follows: 
1. Answers from respondents against each other; 
2. Interview data against background information on the actor organisation (i. e. policy 
documents and literature review); 
3. Interview data against previous research available in the literature. 
Appendix III and Appendix IV show the interview schedule. As part of the interview 
preparation, relevant background information on each organisation's environmental 
activities was collected. Interview questions were carefully designed to avoid interviewer 
bias. Given the dynamic nature of in-depth interviewing the structure and wording of 
the questions was changed accordingly. The funnelling technique was used in both sets 
of interviews to sequence the order of questions by beginning with broad and general 
questions before the more specific and complex questions were asked (Bailey, 1997). 
The purpose of the first initial set of interviews was to identify the organisations' 
motivation to innovate and whether this was stimulated by strict environmental 
regulation. Results taken from those interviews were used to revise the TPD model V,. o 
in its initial (theoretical) stage in order to induce the next, more sophisticated TPD 
model V20, which illustrated deeper insights regarding the nexus between eco- 
innovation and regulation. The second set of interviews (follow-up interviews) was 
used to further refine the model to make it more applicable and robust as well as to 
reflect the survey findings. The resulting TPD model V3_0 was then tested and evaluated 
in four case studies to verify and validate the model (Chapter 6) to allow for meaningful 
and justified conclusions to be drawn. 
2.2.3 Multi-strategy research approach 
Johnson and Turner (2003) suggest a fundamental principle of mixed research in that 
researchers should collect multiple data using various strategies, approaches, and 
methods in that respect that the resulting mixture or combination is likely to result in 
complementary strengths and no overlapping weaknesses (also see Brewer & Hunter, 
1989). Given the complexity of the research field it was decided early on to adopt a 
mixed methodology approach to research. 
The use of a multi-strategy research approach which is also known as triangulation (data 
and methodology) therefore produces a more complete picture of the object under 
study (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2002) and by doing so minimises the degree of specificity 
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of certain methods to particular bodies or knowledge (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
Data as well as methodological triangulation also helps verify and validate the gathered 
data by testing the consistency of findings collected with various data gathering methods 
as well as data sources within the same method (Burns, 2000). Effective use of this 
principle is a major source of justification for mixed methods research because the 
product will be superior to mono-method studies. The major strentgh that clearly 
advocate a mixed-strategy research approach were identified by Johnson et al. (2004) are 
as follows: 
1. Can answer a broader and more complete range of research questions because the 
researcher is not confined to a single method or approach; 
2. A researcher can use the strengths of an additional method to overcome the 
weaknesses in another method by using both in a research study; 
3. Can add insights and understanding that might be missed when only a single method 
is used; 
4. Qualitative and quantitative research used together produce more complete 
knowledge necessary to inform theory and practice. 
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2.3 Data Validation and Triangulation 
Triangulation is a well-accepted approach in social science research to enhance the 
research validity (Burns, 2000). According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998) the following 
three types of triangulation are identified to be the most appropriate ones for this 
research project. 
  Data Triangulation: Use of variety of data sources in a study; 
  Methodological Triangulation: Use of multiple methods to study a single 
problem; 
  Theory Triangulation: Use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of 
data. 
When adopting a multi-strategy research approach for data collection as well as data 
analysis, the data and methodological triangulation contributes to verify and validate by 
testing the consistency of the results generated by various data collection methods as 
well as different data sources within the same method. The questionnaire survey was 
carried out as the main data source with the underlying notion of generating quantifiable 
and reliable data, which can be summarised in a larger population. When deploying 
questionnaires the possibility of self-selection bias in responses is always given. 
However, the data analysis (see Chapter 5) has revealed significant variability in terms of 
the drivers and barriers of eco-innovation within organisations in both public and 
private sector. Therefore the potential bias is not considered to be a major obstacle in 
this research. As a matter of fact qualitative methods were adopted to provide additional 
robustness and to validating, further (deeper) examination and replenishing the findings 
of the quantitative analysis as well as to account for a potential methodological bias. 
Equally, the lack of objectivity in collecting and interpreting of qualitative data is levelled 
by the objectivity of the quantitative approach. The qualitative data that was gathered 
though interviews (see Appendices III) was triangulated though a qualitative content 
analysis of corporate documents such as environmental reports and governmental best 
practice guidelines (Chapter 3 and 4) as well as data collected though questionnaires 
(please refer to Appendix I). Additionally interviews (Appendix IV) were conducted 
with industry, regulatory and professional bodies and other influential organisations 
within the UK to investigate the complexity of eco-innovation from various angles. 
26 
2.4 Data Analysis Methods: Theory Testing 
Collecting date through different quantitative (questionnaire survey) and qualitative (two 
sets of interviews) methods requires different approaches of analysis. Quantitative data 
requires statistical methods whereas data generated with qualitative methods in the form 
of words requires a different form of analysis that allows the researcher to grasp a 
deeper understanding of the issues related to the object under study. The content 
analysis provides this feature and was therefore chosen to provide meaningful answers. 
The following (Table 3) provides an overview of the applied methods used in this 
research project to analyse the quantitative as well as qualitative data. The subsequent 
sub-chapter argues how these methods are appropriate for addressing the following 
research objectives. 
Table 3: Research Methods 
Research Data Collection Appropriate 
Objectives Research Question Methods Analysis Methods 
What is the sector- 
Identifying regulators specific approach 
towards environmental Factor and Cluster contribution in order 
to romote innovation re tion? 
Analysis 
p 
in a sector-specific 
What is the impact of ANOVA 
context regulation on the rate 
and direction of eco- 
innovation? 
What are the 
differences between the Questionnaire Survey 
public and private 
Specifying the main sector approach 
Factor and Cluster 
drivers and barriers for towards eco- 
Analysis 
eco-innovati i 
innovation? ANOVA 
on na 
sector-specific context 
What are the distinct Cross tabulation 
drivers and barriers for 
eco-innovation within 
the public and private 
sector? 
Clarifying which role a 
government should ich role should a ideally have in order to government adopt to promote eco- 2 sets of Interviews Qualitative Content 
innovation within 
promote eco - 
innovation within and reports 
Analysis 
industry sectors industry? 
(facilitator or inhibitor). 
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2.4.1 Quantitative Analysis 
The questionnaire focussed on environmental best practice and the greening of 
management within the UK's private and public sector. A considerable number of 
questions were asked to address the research question about drivers and barriers for 
eco-innovation, organisations' specific innovation strategy as well as the role of 
regulation as a potential driver or barrier for eco-innovation. The factor analysis was 
identified as the most suitable statistical method in order to reduce the volume of data. 
The cluster analysis then allocates resulting factors into clusters that represent the 
organisations' eco-innovation strategy respectively Qeswani, et al., 2008). Thus 
organisations could be classified to validate the theoretical framework presented in the 
TPD model V3.0. These statistical tools, which were conducted using SPSS are discussed 
below. 
2.4.1.1 Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a multivariate statistical method aimed at defining the underlying 
structure in a data matrix. It does so by examining the structure of the interrelations 
(correlations) among a vast number of variables by defining a series of common 
underlying dimensions, also known as factors (Hair, et al., 2006). Factors are thought to 
reflect underlying processes which have created the correlation among variables 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2006). Data reduction can be achieved by calculating scores for 
each underlying dimensions and substituting them for the original variables. In 
parsimoniously describing data, it defines the underlying structure among the variables 
in the analysis. As there were no prior constraints on the factor analysis conducted for 
this research project, the approach was purely exploratory. Numerous techniques for 
factor extraction and factor rotation are available within SPSS whereas the Principle 
Components Analysis (PCA) is the most common way to extract factors and the very 
objective was to reduce the vast number of variables down to a small and handy number 
of components, while the latter is more useful in detecting structure in regard to the 
relationship between variables. (Hair, et ad., 2006). In the PCA, factors are obtained by 
weighing each variable differently. In order to allow for a degree of response between 
the variable factor loadings are introduced. These loadings warrant the correlation of 
each variable and the factor, therefore higher loadings make the variable representative 
of the factor. Factor loadings are the means of interpreting the role each variable plays 
in defining each factor (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2006). 
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Correlation coefficients tend to be less reliable when estimated from small samples. 
Therefore, it is important that the sample size is large enough therefore correlations are 
reliably estimated (Hair, et al., 2006). The required sample size also depends on the 
magnitude of population correlations and number of factors: if there are strong 
correlations and a few, distinct factors, a smaller sample size is adequate. Comrey and 
Lee (1992) give as a guide sample of 50 as very poor, 100 as poor, 200 as fair, 300 as 
good, 500 as very good and 1000 as excellent. Given the 1500 responses, the sample 
size is believed to build a solid foundation for a sophisticated and meaningful analysis. 
To account for the reliability of the resulting factors as a degree of consistency between 
multiple measurements of variables the objective is to ensure that responses are not too 
varied across time periods so that a measurement taken from any point in time is 
reliable. The rationale for internal consistency it that the individual items or indicators of 
the scale should all be measuring the same construct and thus be highly intercorrelated 
(Churchill, 1979). In this research project Crombach's alpha reliability was calculated in 
order to provide information about the relationships among variables in each factor. 
The higher the alpha (correlation) value, the greater is the internal consistency among 
members. Generally, lower limit for Cronbach's alpha is . 70 a 
figure above which 
suggests good internal consistency among variables in each factor within exploratory 
research is assure (Hair, et al., 2006). 
In Chapter 5, factor analysis was applied to group the identified drivers and barriers that 
mirror an organisation's approach to eco-innovation - both managerial and operational 
- with respect to the underlying business strategy. The factor cost analysis on drivers 
and barriers provided interesting results even though it was not able to unequally 
attribute case memberships for factors. For this reason the cluster analysis was 
conducted to tie in with those findings to allow for a better understanding. 
2.4.1.2 Cluster Analysis 
While the factor analysis compresses variables that represent activities as well as 
attitudes into a set of fewer combined variables, cluster analysis classifies objects such as 
organisations with a specific strategy (Hair, et al., 2006). A two-step cluster was applied 
to find an appropriate number of clusters based on organisation's approaches towards 
eco-innovation. Two-step cluster analysis was chosen as it is designed for large datasets 
with n variables, since hierarchical clustering does not scale efficiently when n is very 
large with 1500 cases (Hair, et al., 2006). The Centroid Method was taken to examine 
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the similarities between the two emerging clusters by taking the distance between the 
cluster centroids whereas cluster centroids are the mean values of the observations on 
the variables in the cluster. Within this hierarchical method, every time individuals are 
grouped, a new centroid is computed. Cluster centroids migrate as cluster mergers take 
place (Hair, et al., 2006). The undeniable advantage of this method is that it is less 
affected by outliers comparing to other hierarchical methods. 
2.4.1.3 Cross tabulations 
Cross-tabulations (crosstabs) were used to analyze relationships between variables. This 
allows to explore the relationship between variables by examining the intersections of 
categories of each of the variables involved (Hair, et at., 2006). The purpose of using 
crosstabs was to observe whether statistically significant differences occurred when 
applying the two emerged clusters on organisations size and status as well as 
management level of respondents. 
2.4.1.4 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
ANOVA is an appropriate statistical tool for comparing the means of usually more than 
two groups. In most cases, is it used to investigate whether the emerging mean 
dependent variable scores differ significantly (Tabachnick and Fidel, 2006). The key 
statistic in ANOVA is the F-test of difference or group means, testing if the means of 
the groups formed by values of the independent variable (or combinations of values for 
multiple independent variables) are diverse enough not to have occurred by chance 
(ibid). A significant F-ratio, which is shown in ANOVA result tables with "sig" value 
less than 0.05, indicates that there is a significant difference in the mean score between 
the groups. One way ANOVA was used to examine differences in drivers and barriers 
for eco-innovation as well as to compare the general attitude towards environmental 
regulation among a variety of different stakeholder (Chapter 5). The post-hoc 
comparison method (Tukey) was used to indicate which particular two groups have the 
significant differences in their mean. 
2.4.2 Qualitative Analysis 
"Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted' Albert 
Einstein 
Qualitative analysis involves a continual interplay between theory and analysis. By 
analyzing the qualitative data the emphasis was to discover patterns such as changes 
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over time or possible causal links between the given variables. The following four-step 
approach by Marshall and Rossman (1999) was taken as a guideline of how to approach 
qualitative data: 
1. Organising and arranging the data; 
2. Creating categories, themes and pattern; 
3. Testing the emergent understanding; and 
4. Searching for alternative explanations. 
For organising and collecting data by themes, issues and concepts the recorded 
interviews were transcribed. The process of identifying appropriate themes and creating 
categories involved to detect patterns apparent in the setting and expressed by 
interviewees. The iterant analysis of the interview results generated pattern, themes and 
ideas, which were then used to allocate respondents in clusters which again represent 
one specific view. 
The interviews were organised in two groups: Organisations with strategic reasons to 
innovate and organisations that innovate according to their incurred factor-costs. A 
further subdivision covered internal as well as external factors involved. The initial 12 
interviews were conducted the results of which fed into the TPD-Model V,. 0 and marks 
the basis for TPD-Model V2.0. Responses were allocated to clusters (Industry, 
Consultancy, and Governmental Department) where they were organised by questions 
and themes concurrently. In order to achieve a high degree of validity, the gathered data 
was transcribed, compared and cross-checked as follows: 
1. Answers from respondents against each other; 
2. Interview data against background information on the actor organisation (i. e. policy 
documents and literature review); 
3. Interview data against previous research available in the literature. 
The 10 follow-up interviews are targeted on the following case studies as well as to 
further refine the model into TPD-Model V3.0 that is then used to describe the four 
cases individually by illustrating the respective innovation activities. 
2.4.2.1 Case Studies 
The case study approach is applied here as it is considered to be the most appropriate 
tool for analysing the innovation process under the prevailing regulatory circumstances 
and to discuss and evaluate the refined TPD-model V3.0 in "real-word" cases. Anderson 
(1993) sees case studies being concerned with how and why things happen, allowing the 
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investigation of contextual realities and the differences between what was initially 
described in the model and what actually occurred which will set the foundation for 
validating the model. Four out of ten potential cases were to remain a manageable 
sample chosen representing the energy, logistic, hospitality and public service sector 
with one case study each to shed light on the sector-specific eco-innovation pattern that 
occur in both private and public sector. 
The following points aim to justify the applicability of the case study strategy in this 
research project: 
  The research will analyse actions in their real live context, over which the researcher 
has limited control, as the selected organisations are quite large and therefore rather 
difficult to influence in the short-term; 
  Case studies enable the researcher to gain an holistic view of a certain phenomenon 
or series of events; 
  Case study allows direct evaluation by assessing outcomes. This strategy turns out to 
be even more effective if rival theories Qänicke's diffusion model vs. TPD-Model 
V3.0) are developed; 
  Another advantage is that case study can be useful in capturing the emergent and 
immanent properties of life in organizations and the ebb and flow of organizational 
activity, especially where it is changing very fast. 
The research will follow the recommendation of Yin (1994) presented in four 
subsequent stages: 
1. Design the case study; 
2. Conduct the case study; 
3. Analyze the case study evidence; 
4. Develop the conclusions, recommendations and implications. 
A more philosophical justification of the case study research strategy underpins the 
argument about the methodological merits of this type of research strategy, or indeed, 
any type of qualitative research strategy. The dividing line between the methodological 
and epistemological arguments is indistinct, yet not perfectly correlated (MacDonald 
and Walker, 1997). The model was validated by applying four case studies from the 
UK's private and public sector, which are believed to provide a solid even though not 
sufficient basis. The four organisations were carefully chosen on the basis of their 
sector, size and corporate strategy. They classify into two public sector organisations as 
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well as two private sector organisations. Interviews were conducted with their 
sustainability officers to gain deep insights of their environmental strategy with an 
emphasis on their motivation to innovate. The results are then deployed into the TPD 
model V3.0 in order to test and validate it which allows drawing final sector-specific 
conclusions. 
The need for triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the 
processes. In case studies, this could be done by using multiple sources of data 
(questionnaire survey, interviews and reports) (Yin, 1994). 
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25 Conclusion 
The chapter outlined the methodological approach applied in this research project. The 
chosen sectors for this study were the energy, logistic, hospitality and public service 
sector with one case study each to shed light on the sector-specific eco-innovation 
strategies that occur in both private and public sectors. 
The previous literature review produced research objectives that needed a research 
strategy so that a mixed methodological strategy was chosen to compensate for the 
limitations of each method and to allow for a deeper analysis and understanding of the 
collected data. The research accounts for the strengths and weaknesses of each method 
by evaluating them respectively in order to allow for the optimal application. 
A national survey (20000 members of both professional bodies CMI and IET), justifies 
the large sample size. A questionnaire survey was chosen as an appropriate primary 
method to gather data. In depth interview, prior and after the questionnaire survey, with 
industries, professional bodies, governmental departments and other stakeholders were 
carried out to validate the survey results by triangulation as well as investigate the 
research question in more depth, particularly those that relate to the diffusion factors of 
sector-specific eco-innovation. 
Given the size of the questionnaire and to better understand the linkages among 
variables it was necessary to reduce the data to simplify the subsequent analysis which 
was achieved by applying the factor analysis. Both factor and cluster analysis are 
techniques to define the underlying structure among the variables in the analysis and to 
(within the Cluster Analysis) allocate those structured variables into groups according to 
response patterns to allow for a deeper understanding of the motivation for 
organisations in both private and public sector to innovate. Those two approaches 
combined with findings from both series of interviews (12 initial plus 10 follow-up 
interviews) were chosen to provide answers to research objectives 1 and 2. 
Cross-tabs were used to examine the nexus between variables. This allows exploring the 
relationship between variables by examining the intersections of categories of each of 
the variables involved and by doing so allowed to observe whether statistically 
significant differences occurred when applying the resulting clusters on organisations 
size and status. This approach was selected to provide answers to research objective 3. 
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The response rate in this research project was low but given the relatively low response 
rate in similar environmental management surveys it is still considered to be sufficient 
due to a big sample size. Additionally, the existing possibility of self-selection bias in the 
responses has to be pointed out, i. e. potential respondents, which are more interested in 
the area under study, are more likely to reply than those who do not feel affiliated to it. 
However, the potential presence of this bias is not considered be an issue within this 
research project as the analysis in Chapter 5 reveals significant variability in the strategic 
behaviour of organisations which is an indicator that a potentially existing bias can not 
be considered to be strong. The four cases, chosen to validate the TPD model V3.0, may 
not be enough to validate the model it its final stage, but can illustrate its applicability 
and use at the organisational level. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Innovation Process 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the importance of innovation as an important 
means towards sustainability as well as to highlight the fairly new emerging eco- 
innovation approach, as it will be shown, that differs from normal innovation. 
Moreover, this chapter aims to underpin the role of innovation towards sustainability 
and by doing so underlines the need to better understand the subsequent diffusion 
process. 
The subsequent sub-chapters examine the economics of eco-innovation as well as 
governments role in promoting it. The basis for the relevant, and less understood, 
process of the diffusion of innovation will be set in another sub-chapter to allow for the 
discussion of diffusion factors in (Chapter 5). Jänicke's policy diffusion model is used to 
highlight the interactions of innovation and regulation and therefore justifies the 
emergence of a more transparent TPD model V10 that sheds light on the highly complex 
diffusion process. 
3.1 Introduction; A brlefhistory ofinnovation 
Classical economists like David Ricardo and Karl Marx discussed in depth issues 
concerning technological and institutional change. However, the very first systematic 
attempt to understand the processes of innovation was the work of Joseph Schumpeter 
in the first half of the twentieth century. It was him who identified three stages of the 
innovation process - invention, innovation and diffusion - an over-simplistic (Foxon, 
2003) classification, which is still widely used even though it does not underpin the 
highly complex innovation process particularly in respect to a multi-level diffusion 
process. 
Innovation processes toward sustainability, also known as eco-innovations, have 
received increasing attention during the last decade (Rennings et al, 2008). As a matter 
of fact existing theoretical and methodological approaches still do not fully address 
these issues in detail or with sufficient empirical support and therefore future research 
still needs to improve the general understanding of the innovation processes towards 
sustainability in its different dimensions, complex feedback mechanisms and 
interrelations. 
36 
The traditional understanding of innovation as defined in the "Oslo Manual" of the 
OECD (2005) distinguishes principally between process, product and organisational 
innovation: 
  Process Innovations occur whenever a given amount of outputs (good, services) can 
be produced with less input. 
  Product Innovations requires improvements to existing goods (or services) or the 
development of new goods. Product innovation in machinery in one firm often turns 
out to be a process innovation in another firm. 
  Organisational Innovation includes new forms of management, e. g. total quality 
management. 
Innovation inducing radical technological change is not considered to be a new 
phenomenon in fact, it is as old as mankind itself (Fagerberg, 2002; 2003). However, 
despite its undeniable importance to meet further, rather challenging, sustainability 
targets, innovation has not always received the attention it deserves from both 
entrepreneurs and policy makers. 
The Lisbon European Councils decided to make Europe "the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world" by the year 2010 by strongly 
positioning competitiveness at the heart of the European political agenda, the 
reinvigorated "Lisbon process" aims at making Europe a more attractive place to invest, 
by stimulating entrepreneurial initiatives and by doing so creating a productive 
environment where innovation can develop and improve economic growth 
substantially. According to this agenda, this shortcoming of innovation is now being 
accounted for and policy makers aim to rapidly boost the economy by creating an 
innovation-friendly environment. In fact, research on the role of economics for 
innovation and socio-technical change has grown substantially in the last decade, 
particularly within the social sciences with a trend towards cross-disciplinarity. An 
important distinction has to be made between invention and innovation' as both terms 
are occasionally mixed up. Invention is considered to be the very first appearance of an 
idea or concept for a novel product or process or service. Innovation is the first attempt 
I In October 2006, the European Commission adopted a decision on establishing Competitiveness and Innovation framework 
Programme (CIP) for the period 2007-2013. The program provides a coherent framework for all Community actions implemented 
in the field of entrepreneurship, SMEs, industrial competitiveness, innovation, ICT development and use, environmental 
technologies and intelligent energy. 
6A consistent use of the terms invention and innovation might be to reserve these for the first time occurrence of the idea/concept 
and commercialization, respectively (Dosi, 1998a). In practice it may not always that trivial as people may very well come up with 
the same idea independently of each other. 
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to commercialise this idea or concept. Invention and innovation are closely linked due 
to the fact that it is hard to distinguish one from another as one does not know whether 
the invention will diffuse and therefore transform into an innovation. However, there is 
a considerable lag of time between those two phenomena. According to Rogers (1995) a 
lag of several decades or more is not unusual at all. Such lags tend to reflect the different 
requirements for creating ideas and concepts and their implementation. Hence, 
inventions can be deployed anywhere whereas innovations occur essentially in 
organisations in the commercial area (Rosenberg, 1982). This prevailing argument was 
challenged and even undermined in places as public sector organisations showed highly 
innovative activities, which will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In order to convert an invention into an innovation an organisation normally needs to 
draw from its knowledge-based resources to combine several different methods to 
identify and bundle their capabilities and skills (Fagerberg, et al., 2002). The innovating 
organisation may require production knowledge, facilities, market knowledge, a 
considered or distribution channel as well as adequate financial resources. It follows that 
the role of the innovator', e. g., the person or organizational unit responsible for 
combining the factors necessary (what the innovation-theorist Joseph Schumpeter (see 
box below) called the "entrepreneur"), may be quite different from that of the inventor. 
Some or all of the pre-conditions for commercialisation, which are not established yet, 
may also cause a considerable lag between invention and innovation. The need may not 
be given yet or it may be not possible to produce and/or market because some vital 
input and/or complementary factors are not yet available. Hence, many inventions 
require complementary supporting inventions and innovations to be able to diffuse 
given the inconvenient truth the diffusion of innovation is, as can be proved, a 
continuous process (Rogers, 2003). The car we know today is radically improved 
compared to its first appearance and commercialisation due to a vast number of 
different innovations that incrementally contributed making the car faster, safer and 
more convenient (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2003; 2004). 
' In the literature on diffusion theory it is common to characterize any adopter of a new technology, product or service an innovator 
which then leads to a distinction between different types of innovators, depending on how quick they are in adopting the 
innovation, and a discussion of which factors might possibly explain such differences (Rogers, 1995). 
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THE INNOVATION THEORIST JOSEPH SCHUMPETER 
Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) is one of the most original and influential social scientists of the 20th 
century. Growing up in Vienna in the last quarter of the 19th century and having studied law and 
economics he was working as an academic for most of his life, but also tried his luck as politician 
(Austrian Finance Minister in the (socialist government), and as a banker (although without much 
success). He became ordinary professor at the University of Bonn in 1925 and later on at Harvard 
University in 1932 where he remained until his death. Schumpeter published several books and academic 
papers such as "Theory of Economic Development", published in 1911 and, in a revised edition in 1934. 
Among his most well known later works are "Business Cycles" in two volumes from 1939, "Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy" (1942) and the posthumously published "History of Economic Analysis" 
(1954). 
Very early Schumpeter developed an original and novel approach with an emphasis on the role of 
innovation in economics inducing socio-technical change. Schumpeter became famous when he started 
arguing that it was not sufficient, to study the economy through static lenses, focusing on the distribution 
of given resources across different ends. He pointed out that economic development had to be seen as a 
process of qualitative change spurred by innovation, taking place in historical time. Whenever he used the 
term innovation he referred to new products, new processes, new sources of supply, the exploitation of 
new markets and in general new ways to organise and manage business. Accordingly, Schumpeter defined 
innovation as "new combinations" of already existing resources. This combination was then labelled "the 
entrepreneurial function" (to be achieved by "entrepreneurs") which he perceived being central to the 
innovation process that was mainly driven by the prevalence of inertia, or "resistance to new ways", as 
Schumpeter called it, adopted by all levels of society that entrepreneurs had to fight to proceed in their 
aims. In his early work, also referred to as "Schumpeter Mark I", Schumpeter focused mainly at individual 
entrepreneurs whereas he emphasized the importance of innovation in large organisations in later works 
(so-called "Schumpeter Mark II"), and referred to qualitative research (case-studies) as the way forwards 
for research in this particular area. 
In Schumpeter's analysis of the diffusion of innovation, he stressed the tendency for innovations to 
"cluster" in certain industries and sectors and time periods. The possible contribution of such 
"clustering" is to form so called business cycles and "long waves" in the world economy (Schumpeter, 
1939). The latter term has been a constant source of controversy ever since but has enjoyed a renaissance 
recently as his predictions were proven right particularly in times where the world faces a global recession. 
Not less controversial, and perhaps even better known, is the discussion of institutional changes under 
capitalism which was introduced by Schumpeter (and its possible endogenous transformation into 
'socialism') in the book "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943). 
Sources: Swedberg (1991), Shionoya (1997), Fagerberg (2003) 
Figure 3: The work of Joseph Schumpeter 
As a matter of fact, first appearances of nearly all significant innovations, from the 
steam engine to the airplane, were crude, unreliable versions of the devices that 
eventually diffused successfully and widely (Rosenberg, 1976; Rogers, 1995). Kline and 
Rosenberg (1986), in an influential paper, point out: 
"it is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were a well-defined, homogenous thing that could 
be identified as entering the economy at a precise date - or becoming available at a precise point in time. 
( 
.. 
) The fact is that most important innovations go through drastic changes in their lifetimes - changes 
that may, and often do, totally transform their economic sign jcance. The subsequent improvements in 
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an invention after its first introduction may be vastly, more important, economically, than the initial 
availability of the invention in its original foam" (Kline and Rosenberg 1986, p. 283) 
Thus, what is considered to be an innovation is often the result of a long and complex 
process involving many interrelated and interlocked innovation-cycles as well as 
individual inventions. 
Innovations are generally classified by "type". Schumpeter (see Figure 2) distinguished 
between five types; new products, new processes, new sources of supply, exploitation of 
new markets and new ways to organize business. However, in economics most of the 
focus has been on the first two of these (Schumpeter, 1939). Schmookler (1966) argued 
that the distinction between "product technology" and "production technology" was 
mandatory for the general understanding of this phenomenon even though the 
underlying principle of those innovation types remains the same (ibid, p. 166). These 
types were therefore defined as knowledge about how to create or improve products, 
and the latter as knowledge about how to produce them (Rogers, 1962). This applies in 
equal measures to "product innovation" and "process innovation" as those terms have 
been used to define the appearance of novel or improved products and services, and 
improvements in the modality to produce these, respectively. The argument presented 
here rests on the assumption that the economic and social impact may differ in terms of 
the clear distinction between product and process innovation. When introducing new 
products it is normally supposed to achieve a distinct positive effect on income and 
employment growth. Further it has been challenged that process innovation may have 
more a more ambiguous effect due to its cost-cutting nature (Edquist et al. 2001, ). 
However, while clearly identifiable at individual organisational level, industry or sector 
such distinctions tend to become more obscure at the level of the global economy as the 
product or service of one organisation, sector or industry may eventually be used to 
produce products or services in another8. 
The emphasis on product - and process innovation should not lead to elide other crucial 
principles of classical innovation theory. Innovation can indeed be organizational and 
managerial which, in turn, does not require a change in physical plant. Appropriate 
examples are low-cost carriers such as Ryanair, who transformed the industry business 
model by becoming a low cost carrier which was still able to maintain profits via 
s As a matter of fact many scholars go so far as to stress that the savings in costs, following a process innovation in a single 
organisation, sector or industry, by necessity will generate additional income and demand in the economy at large, which will 
"compensate" for any initial negative effects of a process innovation on overall employment. (Edquist, 2001) 
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reduced costs. Based on the Southwest low cost-low frills model, Ryanair created a 
strategy that drastically differed from the likes of British Airways, Lufthansa and Air 
France. 
Product and production technologies are inextricably linked according to Nieuwenhuis 
and Wells (2003) even in the case where a product was manufactured using a rather 
unsuitable technology before the production system is actually able to change in order 
to meet the necessary requirements. A historical example here is when Ford 
manufactured its legendary Model T, arguably the most famous and influential cars ever 
designed, of which each car was built separately in a dedicated assembly bay, using 
skilled labourers. When Edward G. Budd revolutionized the car industry by introducing 
the all-steel car body concept, which swept through the industry at a pace unrivalled for 
almost any technological innovation, it was Henry Ford who strictly neglected this 
breakthrough innovation and, by doing so, almost bankrupted his company. This, once 
again, underpins the strong link between product and production technology. 
Many of those innovation that were responsible for the remarkable economic success of 
the United States within the last century when comparing to other capitalist economies, 
were considered to be organisational innovation which involved new ways to organise 
production and distribution. Edquist (1996) suggested splitting the category of process 
innovation into "technological process innovations" and "organisational process 
innovations", the former related to new types of machinery whereas the latter refers to 
new ways to organise work (Fagerberg, 2002). However, organisational innovations are 
not restricted by new ways to organise the process of production within a given 
organisation. Organisational innovation, in Schumpeter's understanding, also involved 
arrangements across organisations such as reorganisation of entire sectors and industries 
(1934). Another approach, again based on Schumpeter's work, has been to classify 
innovations according to their perceived radicalness. From this perspective, continuous 
improvements of the type referred to earlier are often defined as "incremental" or 
"marginal" innovations9, as opposed to "radical" innovations, which tend to have a 
much more destructive character. However, this is rather difficult to delineate as many 
small, marginal innovations may lead to radical innovation as well. 
Incremental innovation can be delivered through normal competitive pressure due to 
prevailing market forces whereas radical innovation is usually accompanied by high 
When considering the sociological literature on innovation theory the term "reinvention" is often used to define improvements 
that appear when a product or service is spreading in a population of adopters (Rogers, 1995). 
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costs particularly in terms of disruption and the need to write-off sunk capital. This 
explains why radical change is often hampered by intra-firm resistance. The potential of 
radical innovations to do what can hardly be overstated as they offer great rewards in 
terms of sales, profitability and market share (Nijssen et all, 2005). Yet, many 
organisations fail to come up with radical innovations (e. g. Takayama et al., 2002) and in 
fact it is not an easy concept to define a priori. Specific research on socio-technical 
transitions drawing on historical case studies of radical innovation have led to some 
important insights (Geels, et at., 2004; Kemp 2004). 
Two distinct types of radical innovation have been identified. Anderson, et al (1990) 
characterises the first type typically by uncommon events due to a stroke of individual 
genius or luck. These innovations are usually unpredictable, as they containing an 
element of "surprise" (Utterback, 1994). The second type of radical innovation has 
been described as a long and complex process and technological innovation is 
considered being a risky venture. Developing radical technological innovations are 
generally recognised being a lengthy, complex, and highly uncertain process, filled with 
barriers and difficulties (Freeman and Soete, 1997). These two types of radical 
innovations have both been linked with a high degree of market uncertainty (Freeman, 
et al, 2007). Radical innovation does normally take a long time - typically 10 years or 
longer - to come to fruition (Fagerberg, 2002). Radical innovation in its earliest 
occurrence is generally quite crude. Whether a radical innovation will succeed almost 
always depends upon incremental improvements, refinements, and modifications; the 
development of supporting technologies; as well as organisational change and social 
learning. In this sense, radical innovation is viewed as a process, rather than as a discrete 
event (Christensen, 1997). 
Radical innovations entail a wider concept of change than is expressed through the 
introduction of an individual product, process or a new business practice that either 
weakens its new, or radically alters on existing context. Therefore a transformation in a 
domain of societal activity which embraces both production and consumption and a 
host of individuals and organisations is required. It demonstrates and uses complex 
pattern of change and is considered to illustrate the interactions between the diversity of 
societal actors. In order to boost radical innovation for sustainability a new thinking and 
new stakeholder relationships through a precise focus on key realm of social practice 
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has to be stimulated. The contribution of technology is an important part albeit it is only 
a fraction of the wider changes in social practice (Nijssen et all, 2005). 
The notion that radical change comes from actors outside the current mainstream 
mirrors work on "disruptive innovation" and "creative destruction" in the common 
management literature (Utterback, 1994; Christensen, 1997). The reviewed literature 
further stresses that organisations being successful within an existing technological 
regime typically pursue only incremental innovation within this regime, responding to 
the perceived demands of their customers. They may then fail to recognise the potential 
of a new innovation to create new opportunities and markets, which may grow and 
eventually replace those for the existing mainstream technology. 
Yet, while radical innovations are clearly very important for the future well-being of 
organizations, many companies fail to come up with radical innovations or do not have 
a systematic process engendering it. A model designed to highlight the diffusion of 
innovation with an emphasis on the diffusion factors is presented later on in this 
chapter. It shows the differences between public and private sector innovation (Chapter 
6) and by doing so highlights what circumstances (combination of diffusion factors) 
allow radical change to happen. Yet, the process by which technological breakthroughs 
and radical technological innovation take place is a central topic in the innovation 
literature. Exemplary for the amount of research in this area is the multitude of (slightly 
differing) definitions for "radical technology" (Abernathy, et al., 1985), "disruptive 
technology" (Christensen, 1997), or "revolutionary technology" (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986) to the point of "creative destruction" which was characterised by the 
early Schumpeter. Despite differences in definitions and interpretations there is a 
general agreement that "radical technology" involves novelty, change and shifts 
technological paradigms while "incremental technology" is associated with established 
technology, rather small changes and existing technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982). The 
chosen case studies (Chapter 6) will underpin the need for radical, breakthrough 
innovation in both private and public sector and provide evidence why this has not 
happened so far. 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Utterback (1994) also suggest that radical 
technology is defined as a technology that builds on a different set of engineering and 
scientific principles that firstly substitutes for the established technology, and secondly 
overturns the current competencies of the established industry. It is likely that disruptive 
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technologies, as exemplified by fuel cell vehicles as well as the VOIP technology not 
only present a challenge to organisations to understand the changing drivers of their 
customers, but also create an opportunity for the promotion of new business strategies 
which could help to make a concrete move toward a more sustainable future within the 
industry. In regards to Christensen (1997), sustaining technologies which support 
traditional business models are unlikely to allow a change to social, economic and 
environmental sustainability, whereas disruptive technologies may in the long run, turn 
out to be sustainable technologies. 
However, it is widely believed that the cumulative impact of incremental innovations is, 
at times, profound and therefore ignoring this would allow for a heavily biased view on 
long run economic and social change (Lundvall et al. 1992), even though the bulk of 
economic benefits still come from incremental rather than a more radical approach to 
innovation (Kemp, et al., 2004). Given the various incentives behind being innovative it 
is questionable whether the effected outcome that was caused by different types of 
innovators can be categorised equally into different types: Even though quite practical 
due to recent studies on clustering innovation activities in the EU member states (see 
Technopolis Report, 2008a). As a matter of fact if organisation X for the first time 
introduces a particular innovation while Y later does exactly the same, would we 
characterise both as innovators? This is a matter of convention: Schumpeter commonly 
used to reserve the term innovator for organisations X and characterised Y as an 
imitator or follower. When taking Schumpeter's own considerations into account one 
can easily argue that it would be justifiable to call Y an innovator as well, given Y is 
introducing this innovation for the first time in a new, organisational-specific, context. 
Green (1993) detected a number of "buried" innovations within organisations existing 
of environmental-benign products and processes, which did not diffuse earlier due to 
the fact that environmental concerns were not a priority at this time. This assumes that 
there may be a pool of "untapped" innovations within industry waiting for the right 
internal as well as external signals to diffuse. This leads consequently to the question 
who should ideally give this impulse in order to "kick-off' potential innovations which 
are still dozing within organisations? Furthermore how and when should government 
interfere to spur innovation by encouraging organisations to launch these in order to 
initiate the diffusion process? It is commonly acknowledged that government should 
take a strong lead by creating sustainable incentives to spur innovation within industry. 
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Chapter 5.4 discusses governments function within the innovation chain particularly in 
terms of the "right" timing to interfere and whether this is necessary in the first place. 
Beyond the issue how to trigger innovation that may already exist, it is important to 
recognise the real difficult in making a transition between different trajectories. If we 
were, for instance, to move away from conventional drive concepts towards electrical, 
fuel or hybrid vehicles we would have to change our infrastructure too as a logical 
consequence. This would particularly entail prevailing energy distribution systems and in 
almost the same manner the design of cities as those would have to provide the 
necessary equipment to recharge or refuel those vehicles. 
Hobday (2000) provides an interesting discussion of innovation carried out in the so- 
called "newly industrialising countries" in Asia. However, it can be observed that there 
is a prevailing difference between (a) commercialising an innovation through various 
diffusion channels for the very first time and (b) copying this innovation and 
introducing it in a different context and industry sector whereas the latter certainly 
entails a larger dose of imitative behaviour, or what is called "technology transfer". 
Having argued this, it certainly does not exclude the likelihood that imitation may lead 
to new innovation(s). In fact many economically significant innovations occur while a 
product or process is diffusing according to Kline and Rosenberg (1986) which 
indicated the importance to allow for a better understanding of the diffusion process 
which lies at the heart of this project. The diffusion of innovation and the factors that 
trigger it (drivers and barriers) will be identified and analysed in Chapter 5. 
3.2 Schumpeter and the idea of "Creative Destruction" 
The contemporary approach of socio-technological change can be traced back to the 
work of Schumpeter (1942), who illustrated that innovation is the hallmark of the 
modem capitalist world where entrepreneurs, purely driven by the idea of the temporary 
market force that a successful new product, process or service could offer, continually 
introduce such products, processes or services. 
These entrepreneurs are likely to celebrate increasing profits until they are outrivaled by 
successive prosperous innovators, in a continuing process that Schumpeter baptised 
"creative destruction. " Schumpeter's idea of creative destruction (1942, p. 83, his 
emphasis): The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes fm 
the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets,.... [This 
process] incessantly, revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly, destroying the old one, 
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incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essentzalfact about capitalism. 
Moreover, Schumpeter distinguished three phases in the process by which a novel, 
superior technology penetrates the marketplace. An invention establishes the first step 
of a scientifically or technically new product, process or service10. The declared aim is to 
get patented even though knowing that many of those will never make it given that 
most inventions never transform into an innovation, which is accomplished only when 
the new product or process is commercialised, that is, made available on the market also 
known as the diffusion of innovation. Once again, the diffusion process lies at the heart 
of the underlying attempt of a successful market adoption. To allow for a better 
understanding of the diffusion process, the individual diffusion factors have to be 
identified and analysed particularly when interacting and by doing so driving or 
hampering the diffusion process(Chapter 6). 
This indicates that an organisation can innovate by skipping the invention stage, if it 
detects an already existing idea that has never been commercialised, and brings a 
product, process or service based on that idea to market. The invention and innovation 
stages are commonly carried out within private sector organisations through a process 
also known as "research and development" (R&D). The cumulative economic as well as 
environmental impact of new technology from all three of these stages is known 
collectively as the process of technological change. Organisations within the public and 
private sector are gradually admitting the natural value of the environment, however, 
and are considering the environment as a dynamic system that provides a service 
(Lovins, 2000). Moreover, public and private sector organisations are increasingly 
recognising that management of resources under a policy of corporate environmental 
and social responsibility can pay stakeholder dividends and lead to competitive 
advantage. This phenomenon also known as "triple bottom line" accounting supports 
the consolidation of not only the concrete financial costs for business operations but 
also the traditionally less sensible environmental and social costs for business into the 
bottom line (Elkington, 1998). Affirming the economic theories of Schumpeter (1934), 
a number of scholars have underlined that the economy is driven by innovators who, 
through the introduction of substitution technologies and new business models, unseat 
incumbent organisations and upset the foundations of the industry (Abernathy and 
1° The Schumpeterian "trichotomy" focuses on the commercial aspects of technological change where the public sector plays an 
important role. In addition, a non-trivial amount of basic research - which one might consider being prior even to the 
invention 
stage - is carried out by private organisations (Rosenberg, 1982 
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Clark 1985; Christensen 2000). More recently, Magretta (1997), Porter and van der 
Linde (1995b), Reinhardt (1999), Hart and Milstein (1999) and Hart (1997), focused on 
the occurring challenge of sustainability as being a catalyst for a contemporary approach 
of improved competitiveness and even more radical "creative destruction, " offering 
almost unparalleled opportunity for organisations with the vision and foresight to 
recognise it. 
3.3 Eco-Innovation 
While innovation is considered to be an important tool in the quest for sustainable 
development, (eco)-innovation have received increasing attention in recent years 
(Rennings, 2000; Beise, 2001). Both theoretical and methodological approaches to 
analyse the driving forces on one side as well as the barriers for eco-innovation are 
poorly developed and results remain inconclusive (Frondel, et al., 2004; Bernauer, 2006). 
However, the term eco-innovation (briefly introduced in Chapter 1) is used in this 
research project to elaborate on three important types of changes towards sustainability: 
technological, social and institutional innovation. Moreover, the potential contribution 
of environmental and innovation economics to eco-innovation research is highlighted in 
the following sub-chapters. Three characteristics of eco-innovation are identified to be 
crucial in order to allow for an understanding where demand for eco-innovation is 
coming from: the double externality problem, the regulatory push: pull principle and the 
increasing importance of social and institutional innovation that induces the desired 
socio-technical change. The first two characteristics are largely ignored in the innovation 
literature whereas the third did not yet receive the attention it deserves (Rennings, 2000; 
Rennings, et al., 2004; Kemp, et al., 2004). 
When concentrating on innovation toward sustainability the "drive" is given by a 
general concern about direction and content of progress (Klemmer et al., 1999). Hence, 
innovation toward sustainable development has the ability to reduce environmental 
impacts and, by doing so, contributes to improving the challenging quest for a more 
sustainable future. The interdisciplinary project "Innovation Impacts of Environmental 
Policy Instruments" has introduced the term environmental innovation (short: eco- 
innovation) and defined it very broadly as follows (Klemmer et al., 1999; Markfund, 
1997). Firstly, by the effects of the innovation on the environment, and secondly, by the 
intention of the innovator to reduce the environmental impact of processes, products or 
services. 
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Eco-innovations can be developed by public and private sector organisations although 
the public sector is not particularly known for its innovativeness even though a number 
of well discussed cases may suggest otherwise. A well known case in the UK, which is 
still subject to heated debates, is London's congestion charge for motorists travelling 
within the congestion charge zone, a well-defined traffic area in London. A broad range 
of innovative payment options including text messaging from mobile phones 
underpinned the innovativeness of the Local Government to apply ground-breaking 
technologies. Moreover, survey findings further support the general ability of the public 
sector to innovate, which in turn should spark a debate about how to drive the 
innovativeness of the public sector since this example among others suggests that the 
congestion charge case is not an individual case. 
The nature of eco-innovation can be technological, organisational, social or institutional, 
as will be shown in more detail in chapter 5. Eco-innovation that is not driven by a 
conscious intention to reduce environmental burdens may nevertheless have this quality. 
An example is improved fuel efficiency in the automobile sector due to the incremental 
improvement of engines performances. According to Nieuwenhuis et al, (2004; 2006) 
large car companies have also engaged in R&D into alternative fuels and powertrain, 
recognising the challenges and seeing the profitable opportunities that 
environmentalism can present. Eco-innovation therefore drives, intentionally or 
unintentionally, sustainability and by doing so sets the course for organisations to 
overcome this rather challenging time. What therefore drives or hampers eco- 
innovation within UK's private and public sector is yet to clarify (Chapter 5) in order to 
allow policy-makers to design regulations with the distinct feature to drive eco- 
innovation and by doing so give strong incentives to comply with them. 
In addition to their environmental qualities, some researchers claim that eco- 
innovations, in spite of their diversity, have some traits in common that differentiates 
them from other types of innovations. Malaman (1996) claims that market demand for 
cleaner technology innovation is generally slack and difficult to predict. Four reasons for 
this are provided: 
1. The objective of cleaner production is lower on the agenda of firms than that of 
profit; 
2. In the introductory stage cleaner technologies may feature higher costs and inferior 
quality; 
48 
3. Information problems seem to be greater than in other cases, due to the complexity 
of environmental aspects and lack of knowledge; 
4. Environmental innovations call for more organisational and institutional changes. 
Another distinguishing factor reported is that awareness of environmental issues may 
play a role as an additional incentive to those involved in the eco-innovation process 
(OECD, 2005). The importance of staff awareness is also confirmed by an Italian study 
which shows awareness to be of medium importance for environmental innovations 
(Malaman, 1996). Awareness is less important than regulation and market factors, but 
more important than, for instance, changes in supply (ibid). The nature of eco- 
innovation and the conditions in environmentally innovating firms have, however, 
changed over time. To understand the dynamics of environmental innovation today we 
should first look back in time. 
3.3.1 Techno Push & Market Pull 
There are two principal economic approaches that dominate the academic literature of 
technology innovation towards divergent economic explanations of what drives 
technological change: technology push, on the one hand, and market pull, on the other. 
It is beyond the scope of this research project to review the literature in detail that has 
emerged around these approaches (for recent reviews, see Grubb, 2006; Stern, 2006; 
Foxon and Carbon Trust, 2003). Hence, this section broadly reviews the reason 
supporting the push and pull approach, to allow a better understanding of the potential 
impact on public policy approaches. 
When examining the technology push approach, technological change emerges mainly 
due to autonomous trends and public policy. The advocates of this opinion emphasise 
the need for government to boost the development of technologies, generally through 
publicly funded R&D programmes. The market-pull approach, on the contrary, states 
that technological change must primarily be derived from the business sector and 
depends mainly on corporate investments in response to economic incentives 
(Rennings, 1998). 
This approach relies on the adoption of regulatory initiatives or on changing the 
economics of the status quo. Organisations can respond to these limitations by 
producing innovative technologies aiming to reduce environmental impacts at a lower 
cost in order to gain the holy grail of competitive advantage. Advocates of this approach 
recognise that organisations might not be incentivised sufficiently in order to invest in 
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fundamental research as the benefits might be too uncertain (Horbach, 2007). In the 
field of low-carbon technology, both technology push and market pull affect the 
innovation cycle. Figure 4 concludes the steps associated with the innovation process. 
As a matter of fact it is entirely conceivable that the displayed arrows vary in strength 
and, by doing so, allow both government and private investors to unequally balance. 
Both private and public sector present different eco-innovation characteristics as well as 
dynamics especially since the content and the desired endstate of innovation outcome 
varies accordingly. As a consequence it can be observed that some industry sectors are 
far more innovative than others. Highly innovative industries, such as pharmaceuticals 
or electronics, face very severe competition due to product differentiation (Rennings, 
1998). Thus, organisations in these sectors have a clear motivation to innovate as they 
might be able to receive significant pay-offs in the market place. On the other hand, the 
competition within in the power generation industry, for instance, is mainly based on 
price and therefore the market pull is perceived to be weaker. Today's power generation 
sector still runs their power plants with basically the same technology that was 
developed a century ago (Grubb, 2006; Stern, 2006). 
Government 
Market Pin 
Business $ Consumers 
Product/Technology%., ' 
Investors 
Figure 4: Role of innovation chain actors (Foxon and the Carbon Trust, 2003) 
3.3.2 Double Externalities 
The double-externality problem reduces incentives for organisations to invest in eco- 
innovations. Thus, the need for regulatory measures stimulating eco-innovations can be 
explained by market failure from an economic perspective Uänicke, 2007). 
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While the need of environmental regulation is generally not questioned in 
environmental economics, the need for specific and tailored regulation for eco- 
innovation has to be justified. This section underlines the necessity of identifying the 
special characteristics of eco-innovation making it different from other innovations. 
Eco-innovations vary from conventional, well known, innovations as they allow for a 
double externality (Rennings, 2000). External benefits also known as spill-over effects 
are usually derived from fundamental R&D activities. The specific attribute of eco- 
innovation is that it develops products, processes and services which themselves involve 
external benefits. All external costs can be internalised whereas the double externality 
problem vanishes and eco-innovation could be handled like normal ones when 
considering a perfect neoclassical world. Hence, neoclassical economists may only see a 
need for a specific eco-innovation regulation, if at all, in a transition stage until the 
internalisation of external costs is achieved (Kemp, et al., 2001). 
The situation is likely to change when incomplete knowledge, inflexibility, institutional 
aspects as well as transaction costs are taken into account. In a scenario where tailored 
regulations for eco-innovation essentially cut the costs of environmental protection and 
therefore reduce the overall externalities it is likely to be more cost-efficient compared 
to a strategy of pure internalisation with unknown environmental efficiency and 
uncertain economic consequences (Horbach, 2005). Society as well as industry will need 
time to adjust with new technologies, considering the life cycle of the existing capital 
stock may substantially cut the costs of regulation designed to serve sustainability. 
Hence, a strategy seems to be desirable if it. 
1. is oriented on long term environmental targets, 
2. does not determine final prices and 
3. increases prices continuously in small steps until the environmental goal is reached 
(Rennings, 1998). 
According to Jänicke et al. (2000) innovation friendly regulation should rely on the use 
of economic incentives, act in combination, be based on strategic planning and 
formulation of targets, support eco-innovation as a process as well as consider other 
types of innovation. Innovation friendly regulations are based on dialogue and 
consensus, are decisive, proactive and ambiguous, flexible and knowledge-oriented and 
should include network management. 
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According to Mikler (2009) regulatory governance is best seen neither in terms of the 
loss of state sovereignty to markets, nor it terms of its retention by states. Moreover, it 
can neither be allocated to the public nor to the private sector. While multinational 
organisations may operate both globally and tailor their products, processes and services 
to satisfy local market conditions the products, processes and services they offer in the 
first place are much determined by the institutional framework or their home territories. 
According to the Varieties of Capitalism Approach" (VOC) organisations are 
institutionally embedded in their home states for economic, political, social, cultural and 
historic reasons whereas the cultural part is mostly underestimated particularly in regard 
to regulatory compliance. 
Moreover, innovation friendly regulation can help to reduce the costs of technological, 
institutional and social innovation particularly in the stage of invention and market 
introduction through financial backup for pilot projects. The diffusion phase helps to 
enhance the performance of eco-innovations. However, coordinated interactions 
between environmental regulation and regulation for innovation seem to be mandatory 
to achieve significant ecological impacts. Hence, for theoretical as well as practical 
reasons, the double externality problem can and should not be solved by environmental 
regulation alone. Nor can private sector organisations with an R&D investment in eco- 
innovation solve it, as long as external costs are only partially internalised. The major 
actor in eco-innovation, diffusion and application are private-sector organisations, 
therefore it should be involved at an early stage in policy formulation and, more 
specifically, in the design of regulations and enforcement mechanisms. 
3.3.3 Social and Institutional Eco-Innovation 
Changes in lifestyles and consumer behaviour are also known as social innovations 
(Scherhorn et al., 1997, p. 16). With regard to eco-innovation, the concept of sustainable 
consumption as declared in the Rio Convention '2has received increasing attention. All 
innovations regardless if they are technological, organisational or institutional in their 
nature that were able to diffuse, have to engage, to a certain extent, with peoples' values 
and lifestyles. Nonetheless organisations spend huge amounts for campaigns to 
influence people's preferences in order to sell these products (Kemp et al., 2004). Social 
" The VOC approach speaks to debates about whether the imperatives of global capitalism mean that all capitalist economies arc 
inevitably converging on a neoliberal model characterised by privatisation, deregulation and free markets. 
'2 The "Earth Summit", held in Rio in 1992 - addressed these threats, which could undermine collective efforts to eradicate poverty 
and foster sustainable development worldwide with an emphasis on sustainable innovation. 
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innovations may go hand in hand with better technologies, services and infrastructure. 
Here, it may be mandatory to identify the main obstacles in the diffusion process of 
already existing processes, services and products: institutional barriers, lack of 
infrastructure, professional marketing, knowledge, quality and comfort or distribution 
systems may lead to unfavourable cost-benefit-ratios (Rennings, 1998). 
Norgaard (1994, p. 16) argues that unsustainable development itself is a result "from 
technology outpacing changes in social organisation" and postulates that, within a co- 
evolutionary paradigm of a sustainable management of economic and ecological 
systems, "incentives and regulations must evolve with technologies". In other words 
with a growing innovativeness the regulatory standards that enable this development 
have to be aligned to stay abreast of changes. Natural resources are often seen as open 
access regimes and unsustainable use derived from inadequate institutional 
arrangements. Innovative institutional responses to issues related to sustainability cover 
local networks and agencies as well as new regimes of global governance and 
international trade (Rennings, 1998). Innovative institutions include improved decision 
making by introducing new ways of scientific assessment and public engagement. 
Hence, institutional eco-innovations are often considered being a basis for sustainable 
regulation (Freeman, 1992; Minsch, 1997). According to Freeman (1992, p. 191), these 
institutional arrangements should be achieved by a reorientation of the R&D system "so 
that these environmental objectives were given a high priority in the work of industrial, 
university and government laboratories. This reorientation would be needed to assure 
the rate and direction of technical change necessary to achieve the overall objective 
(sustainable development)", which once again underlines the important role of 
innovation towards a more sustainable future. 
The difference between the various types of innovations can therefore not seen to be 
very explicit. Collective actions of households concerning sustainable consumption 
patterns may be regarded as institutional innovations, and the creation of environmental 
awareness in organisations as social innovation. Different types of innovation are alike, 
or as Norgaard (1994) describes it, they co-evolve. Freeman (1992, p. 124) writes: 
"Successful action depends on a combination of advances in scientific understanding, 
appropriate political programs, social reforms and other institutional changes, as well as 
on the scale and direction of new investment. Organisational and social innovations 
would always have to accompany any technical innovations and some would have to 
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come first. " This principle is crucial as it sets the foundation for the subsequent 
diffusion process of innovation which implies the cognation of all types of innovation. 
3.4 Public and Private Sector Innovation 
Before the differences of eco-innovation processes within the UK's public and private 
sector are discussed it is necessary to define what this research means by the term public 
sector as a matter of fact the term "public sector" is often used indiscriminately. Further 
is has to be acknowledged that findings exclusively allude to the UK's public and private 
sector and therefore it has to be conceded that this may not be the same in other 
European countries as well as other continents. In this research project three major 
definitions taken from the Publin Report (2005) of the UK's public sector are used: 
  Legal definition: the public sector includes government organisations and 
organisations controlled by public law; 
  Financial definition: besides previously mentioned organisations, the public sector 
includes private organisations mainly funded by public means, including non-profit 
organisations providing education and health care; 
  Functional definition: in this case the pubic sector includes all organisations in the 
area of the public administration, social security, law and order, education, health 
care, and social and cultural services, irrespective of their funding source and the 
legal form of the supplier. The functionally defined public sector is not infrequently 
called "quaternary sector" in European policy debates. In this research project, the 
functional definition is used. Instead of the awkward term "quaternary sector" the 
term "public service sector" will be used in this context. " 
The innovation literature has almost entirely ignored studies of innovation that 
distinguished between the public and private sector. However, the public sector is vast 
and whatever happens in this area of the economy has major implications for the 
economy as a whole. The public sector has traditionally enabled research in both 
academia and in the private sector and was historically directly involved when public 
research projects have paved the way for the development of groundbreaking new 
technologies. It is very likely that the public sector continues in its current role as 
technical revolutions and administrative innovations must be considered by innovation 
that occurs in the public sector (Roste, 2005). 
When drawing on a very narrow definition of innovation one might be misled to believe 
that innovations would have to be transferred from the private to the public sector in 
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one way or the other. However, this might apply in many cases, but obviously, when 
allowing for a better understanding of what eco-innovation evolves, innovation can 
certainly be generated within the public sector itself (Earl, 2004; Reste, 2005). The 
existing literature that specifically focuses on public sector innovation per se is rather 
limited even though there are well-known bodies with relevant information on the 
management of change in various specific public services. Hence it is timely to 
investigate how eco-innovation is initiated and developed within the public sector and 
how it may (or may not) differ from the processes, normally referred to that occur in 
the private sector (Merritt and Merritt 1985). 
Innovators are generally considered being producers, which provide products, processes 
and services in a market context that provides a commercial incentive to innovate that 
public institutions lack (Sandford, 2002). Even in the private sector, it cannot be enough 
to illustrate innovation as being rationally based on the dynamics of markets. The sheer 
existence of a long history of public sector innovation is evidence enough that market 
competition is not the only wellspring of innovation. Earl (2002) showed that in some 
areas, public sector organisations can be more innovative than private ones which 
posses the question why public organisations innovate, when they are clearly not 
challenged by competition in the market or confront a need to expand in order to 
sustain in the market? Two schools of thought can be debated here. First, there are 
political reasons due to the fact that the public sector does not face competitive 
markets, but electoral politics. Gaining political support with the objective to perform 
better than opposing political actors as well as provision, delivery and cost of public 
services is an important domain for competition between claims of effective (potential) 
performance (Miles, 2004; Earl, 2004, Hartley, 2005). 
Second, there are personal reasons as managers within in the public sector and even 
some politicians gain satisfaction - and status among their peers - from seeing their 
knowledge applied to achieve higher levels of service. This can also be observed in 
laboratories as well as research departments of public organisations, and potential 
concepts inducing change implemented by senior management and quite often by 
external stakeholders such as consultants and suppliers of equipment and materials 
where many so called "bottom up" innovations were introduced by professional and 
lower-status workers in public services (Miles, 2004; Hartley, 2005). 
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Studies of innovation dynamics in private organisations, industries and sectors have 
proliferated over recent decades. They have given essential insights into the innovation 
dynamics, and have played an important role in social and economic change in modem 
economies. The question of public sector innovation has been rising to the surface in 
political debates more then ever before, as the capacity of health, education and social 
services to deal with the challenges of the twenty first century has been called into 
question. It is often assumed that the public sector is necessarily less innovative when 
compared with the private sector, lacking the "drive" provided by market competition 
(e. g. Tan, 2004), but this is an assertion that needs to be examined carefully given the 
results of the CMI survey results13 which, indeed, suggest otherwise. Moreover, 
competition often leads to risk aversion, which in turn underlines a substantial 
advantage of the public sector. Since the public sector differs in important aspects from 
private industry, there may be a need to adapt tools and concepts, and one may reach 
some different conclusions concerning the dynamics of innovation. 
3.5 Government's role in promotrngEco Innovation 
Governments are considered to have a key role across the innovation process as 
regulatory measures to stimulate innovation vary depending on the part of the 
innovation cycle that is being looked at (OECD, 2005). By comparison, the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skill" claims that there will be a lot of 
innovation that will happen without government involvement. The role important role 
of government within the innovation process is beyond dispute whereas the crucial 
question that yet is to be answered is how? What are therefore the most appropriate 
means to spur innovation within both public and private sectors? The following section 
will lay out the basis for this matter before Chapter 6 will shed light on potential 
measures for government to live up to the expectations in terms of governments leading 
role. 
According to the DTI Innovation Report (2003) the UK government can have a 
potential impact on innovation through three key activities namely: 
  Government's role as a customer - the UK public sector purchased £109 billion 
worth of goods and services in 2001-02; 
13 Those results will be discussed in chapter 5 
14 DIUS Annual Innovation Report (2008) 
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  Government's role as a regulator - the way it designs and implements health, 
safety, product and environmental regulations; and 
  Government's role as a source of new knowledge - in the research and 
development that it carries out, and its exploitation for wealth creation. 
The OEDC Report (2008a) on "Environmental Innovation and Global Markets" argues 
that governmental efforts have basically concentrated on the initial part of the 
innovation process so far by providing support for both basic and applied technology 
R&D even though governments are more and more supporting the development and 
diffusion of innovations that have reached the commercialisation stage. In terms of 
spurring innovation towards environmental improvements, "market pull" is too faint (as 
discussed in subchapter 3.3.1) unless governments adopt regulation and provide 
measures that increase the market value of environmental technologies (Foxon and 
Carbon Trust, 2003). When evaluating the prevailing drivers and barriers (Chapter 5) for 
eco-innovation it appears that these act rather differently in "technology-push" and 
"market-pull" situations as both scenarios cannot predict the degree of eco-innovation 
which will induce the subsequent diffusion. The previously mentioned model 
(Technology-Policy-Diffusion Model) will in its final version V3.0 highlight (Chapter 6) 
how these drivers and barriers determine the rate of diffusion, which in turn depends on 
the degree of eco-innovation. 
Cap and trade systems, for example, provide market-based incentives to support the 
diffusion of environmental technologies, such as low carbon technologies, and signal 
that innovation in this direction can ultimately expect some reward (OECD, 2007b). 
This implies that market forces are the driving factors behind the diffusion, which in 
terms of the respective factor loading, outweigh potential barriers that may occur in the 
same diffusion process. However, these measures alone do not guarantee that eco- 
innovations will succeed. Other authors also come to similar conclusions with regard to 
environmental technologies. For instance, the Environmental Innovations Advisory 
Group15, when analysing eco-innovation within the UK's environmental industry's 
sector, considers that it is the lack of credible articulated demand that is at the root of 
the relative failure of eco-innovation (EIAG, 2006). Government support for eco- 
innovation is concentrated on the early stages of R&D as this is regarded as furthest 
t5 The business-led Environmental Innovations Advisory Group (EIAG) is tasked with identifying practical measures to tackle 
barriers to innovation in the environmental industries sector, and to mobilise key stakeholders to bring about change. 
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from the market and therefore the most risky (Grubb, 2006). If this is the rationale then 
it is wrong: R&D is relatively cheap and good research always succeeds in its primary 
purpose of increasing knowledge and has very little risk attached (OECD, 2008). The 
time of maximum risk is when much larger amounts of money are spent on 
demonstrations and on scaling up but before commercial sales prove that the market 
will buy the product. In order to ensure innovation, regulation should avoid focussing 
on specific technologies, but rather be technology-neutral and by doing so innovation- 
friendly. Otherwise, inefficiencies might occur, for example when subsidies encourage 
organisations to produce technologies that might not be commercially viable, or where 
subsidies focus on few technologies ("winners"). 
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3.6 The Diffusion ofEco-Innovation 
"The studies of the diffusion of innovations, including the part played by mass communication, promise 
to provide an empirical and quantitative basis for developing more rigorous approaches to theories of 
social change". 
Melvin L. De Fleur (1966, p. 138) 
The purposes of this chapter is to review the literature on the diffusion of innovations 
that contributes to the understanding of new product, process and service adoption and 
diffusion by doing so justifies why a more sophisticated approach is needed to 
understand the fine line between various diffusion factors that depend on the degree 
(radicalness) and rate of the diffusion factors, which will set the foundation for the in- 
depth analysis in (Chapter 5). As innovation does not show any type-specific diffusion 
differences in terms of its underlying principle the conventional, well documented 
diffusion of innovation process was chosen to further explain the process that lies at the 
heart of the project. 
3.6.1 The history of Diffusion Theory 
The very beginning of diffusion theory research of innovations goes back to the 
German-Austrian and the British schools of diffusionism in anthropology and the 
French sociologist Gabriel Tarde (1903), who pioneered the S-shaped diffusion curve as 
well as the importance of opinion leaders in the process of imitation (Rogers, 1995). 
Any given area of scientific research starts with a major breakthrough or re- 
conceptualisation that delivers a new form of looking at some phenomenon (Kuhn, 
1962). But what really is diffusion? Rogers describes diffusion as "the process by which 
an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members 
of a social system" (Rogers, 2003, p. 5). 
Diffusion is a specific way of communication in which the messages contains a novel 
idea. This novelness of the underlying idea in the message content provides a special 
character to diffusion as it implies a certain degree of uncertainty. Uncertainty is the 
degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived with respect to the occurrence of 
an event and the relative probability of these alternatives. It further comprises a lack of 
predictability, structure and information whereas information is regarded to be a means 
to reduce the degree of uncertainty. This is particularly true in terms of strategies for 
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cleaner technology as the past has shown that sub-divisions of organisations were highly 
innovative whereas others actively discouraged innovation which shows that both 
tendencies can be found inside one organisation. This, as previously mentioned, 
indicates that an organisations structure is an important factor if one wants to spur the 
internal diffusion process. The consequent case studies (Chapter 6) indicate this 
phenomenon by highlighting the resulting diffusion scenarios in the TPD Model V3.0. 
Information within diffusion processes is considered to be a difference in "matter- 
energy" that affects uncertainty in a situation where a choice exists among a variety of 
alternatives (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981). Furthermore, results from national survey 
found that information was regarded to be not neutral - some sources (such as trade 
journals) were seen as credible, others (government brochures) were not, regardless of 
the actual information content. This shows that the credibility among available 
information sources vary from case to case and therefore need to be handled with the 
utmost care. 
Diffusion models generally tend to a statistical distribution which belongs to the so 
called "normal" family of curves and represent the market distribution according to 
Rogers (1962). New technologies, when they are successful in being applied and finding 
their way to the market, often follow a pattern in which the uptake starts at a low speed, 
then accelerates and slows down again when the level of saturation approaches. This 
phenomenon is reflected in the well-known S-shaped curve (Figure 5) illustrated below. 
Max 
Q 
prototypes demo niche early adopters mass application laggards saturation 
Figure 5: S-Shaped Curve 
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The acceleration in uptake is due to the technology becoming more widely known, and 
to improvements and cost reductions occurring in the course of the diffusion process 
due to economies of scale and learning effects. Cost reductions as a function of the 
accumulated production (or sales) of a particular technology can be represented by 
"learning curves" or "experience curves" (Rogers, 1995). 
The diffusion literature has clearly pointed out that innovation is not a one-directional 
as well as one-dimensional process following fixed order of subsequent steps. Instead, 
innovation should be seen as a cyclical process with interlocked diffusion cycles (see 
TPD Model V3 
O 
in Chapter 6) in which experiences with products, processes or services 
lead to changes (e. g. improvements in the new technology itself, new organisational 
routines and structures, or adaptations in behaviour). 
The prevailing method to categorise adopters was developed by Rogers (1958) and 
subsequently published. The critical parameter for adopter categorisation is, by all 
means, innovativeness, the "degree to which an individual unit of adoption is relatively 
earlier in adopting new ideas than other members of a social system" (Rogers, 2003, p 
280). Innovativeness is considered to be a factor in which an individual organisation is 
rated by having either more or less of it than other in the same system. The following 
picture shows the normal frequency distribution, divided into five adopter categories. 
The adoption of an innovation (Figure 6) follows the previously introduced S-shaped 
curve when plotted over a length of time. 
s. a 
t Innovators Early 
Adopters Early Majority Late Majority Laggards 
13.5% 34% 34% 16% 
Figure 6: Bell-Shaped Adoption Curve 
Innovators (Venturesome) are the first group of individuals likely to adopt an 
innovation. Venturesomeness can be seen as an obsession with innovators. Their 
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constant interest in new approaches to well-known problems leads those out of local 
network circles into a more fertile social network with a distinct cosmopolitan 
orientation (Rogers, 2003). 
The Early Adopters (Respect) category of individuals is considered to be the second 
fastest in regard to adopting an innovation. These individuals have the highest degree of 
opinion leadership among the other adopter categories (Rogers, 1995). In comparison to 
innovators this category is more settled and locally oriented whereas potential adopters 
are geared to early adopter in order to seek advice. 
The Early Majority (Deliberate) adopt an innovation after a varying degree of time but 
just before the average member of a system. This time of adoption is significantly longer 
comparing to innovators and early adopters but shorter than the late majority of 
adopters which positions them being an important link in the diffusion process as they 
provide interconnectedness in the system's interpersonal networks. 
The Late Majority (Sceptics) will adopt an innovation after the average member of the 
society. These individuals approach an innovation with a high degree of scepticism and 
caution and after the majority of society has adopted the innovation. Like the early 
majority, the late majority make up one third of the members of a system. Adoption 
may involve both an economic necessity as well the result of increasing peer pressures 
to the members of this category. 
The Laggards (Traditional Individuals) are the last category to adopt an innovation. 
Unlike some of the previous categories, individuals in this category show little to no 
opinion leadership. Laggards are considered being the most "localite" of all adopter 
groups in their outlook. Laggards usually refer to the past and decisions are often made 
in regard to what has been done before which explains why they predominantly interact 
with others similar traditional values. Laggards tend to be suspicious of innovation or 
generally everything that involves a certain amount of change which further justifies 
their unwillingness to adopt an innovation at an earlier stage. 
Rogers' frequency distribution of those previously described categories in terms of how 
fast consumers are to purchase new products are as follows; innovators (2.5%), opinion 
leaders or early adopters (13.5%), early majority (34%), late majority (34%), and 
laggards or late adopters (16%). This distribution is almost congruent with the survey 
results as it shows a tendency towards an early and late majority whereas the early 
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adopters as well as the laggards tend to be rather small in numbers. Rogers (1962) 
further compared the bell-shaped curve with the well-known S-shaped curve (Figure 7) 
compiled by a cumulative frequency distribution of product, process and service 
diffusion and based on the fact that the 16% line marks the cut-off point between 
innovators and opinion leaders and other consumers roughly coincides with the point 
where the S-curve starts to increase dramatically. 
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Figure 7: S-Shaped Vs. Bell-Shaped Curve 
The groundbreaking work of Rogers (1995) provides a conclusive theory, as well as the 
empirical evidence, of many aspects of innovations diffusion. One of the key elements 
drawn from his work is the role and characteristics of "opinion leaders. " which have the 
status, expertise, links to external sources of knowledge, or experience that provides 
them with information and advice regarding novel ideas to others within their 
community. Hence, opinion leadership mirrors the ability to influence others' attitudes 
and knowledge (Chatman, 1987; Valente & Davis, 1999). Rogers (1995) detected that 
diffusion amongst opinion leaders generally is crucial to the diffusion process as a 
whole. Although it is innovators who purchase products, processes or services at the 
earliest stages soon after the release, they tend to focus on products' novelty value rather 
than their essential benefits that might appeal to the majority of consumers. 
If opinion leaders observe that the innovation has been successful for innovators, they 
will be motivated to adopt. As opinion leader adoption is a key indicator that a 
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particular innovation is going to be accepted and therefore adopted by many others, 
these members are encouraged to adopt in conformity with these (Weimann, 1994). On 
the contrary, opinion leaders, who come right after innovators, tend to focus not just on 
the bare novelty value but also on available benefits that differ from innovations in the 
past. The sooner a product, process or service is adopted, the more its actual application 
differs from the application and handling scenarios that the innovators originally were 
aiming for. Consequently, it is assumed that it is the role of opinion leaders to actually 
come up with applications for products, processes or services. Effectively, it is not until 
opinion leaders come up with actual ways of using a product that it starts to find its 
place in the market (Valente, 1996; Rogers and Cartano, 1962). 
Survey results show that when comparing private and public sector innovation it was 
the public sector that diffused faster as the private sector which is due to a more 
efficient decision making process Even though innovators and opinion leaders together 
account for no more than the 16% of the overall market, whether (or not) an 
organisation has opinion leaders at the early stages of the market pretty much decides 
whether (or not) the diffusion of innovation will expand in order to reach the early and 
late majorities (Rogers, 1962). Management commitment and leadership towards the 
adoption of innovation appears to be one of the most important diffusion factors 
among others like regulation, sustainability and market forces. 
The innovation life cycle theory (which is reflected in the s-shaped curve) is effective 
and helpful in illustrating the process of eco-innovations. Roger's concept of innovation 
diffusion theory develops a better understanding of the government involvement in the 
eco-innovation process which, as mentioned earlier, does not deviate from the 
characteristics of other types of innovation as it shows the same pattern. Diffusion of 
innovations research promises to enhance the general understanding of how socio- 
technical change occurs. What is the role of technology in bringing about socio- 
technical change? One way of clarifying this is through diffusion research by conducting 
a microlevel type of study of the macrolevel issue of social change (Cantano and 
Silverberg, 2009). Eco-innovation, however, has distinct diffusion factors 
(drivers/barriers) that differ from those of conventional innovation due to their specific 
characteristic to elicit direct or indirect ecological improvements. 
The diffusion of novel, potentially breakthrough, technologies often depends upon the 
interactions between social and technical aspects (Kirsch, 2000). On the one hand, 
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communication channels and social networks play a key role in the widespread adoption 
of innovations (Cowan, 2004). Imitation effects are widely recognised as mandatory 
factors in the regards to the diffusion of innovations. On the other hand, technological 
factors such as the degree of complexity, compatibility and special features (Rogers, 
2003) directly influence the initial cost levels of innovations. High costs are mainly 
responsible to hamper the widespread diffusion of new technologies. If a new 
technology has the chance to develop first in niche markets one could then exploit cost 
reductions in these markets due to learning curve effects when it is introduced into the 
mainstream market (Cantano and Silverberg, 2009). 
Last but not least the importance of political control to govern innovation has to be 
underpinned here one more time. Government has to take a strong lead to provide a 
clear and unmistakably directions for industry. If government should decide, for 
instance, to "bail out" of a particular technology, which is still in its infancy and 
therefore does not show promising results it may be the case that this specific 
technology diffuses later in a different country under a different government. This can 
have serious consequences since a government runs the risk of missing a chance for a 
potential groundbreaking technology. In the 1960s and 70s Guyana and Jamaica 
believed that personal computers represented a threat to state power. As a logical 
consequence Jamaica imposed punitive taxes on imports, while Guyana banned them. 
This example underpins the way that authoritarian states like Jamaica and Guyana see 
innovation as a threat, which interestingly enough does not include military and 
surveillance technology. 
3.6.2 Diffusion Models 
Having outlined the underlying theory of the diffusion of innovation from its first 
occurrence to various types of adoption modes the project aims to explore the role of 
regulation as a potential driver (or not) of eco-innovation and by doing so provide 
answers to the question which role regulation has (or should have) in the diffusion 
process of eco-innovation. 
To allow for a better understanding on the nexus between environmental regulation 
(Chapter 4) and innovation the research project seeks to widen the concepts of 
innovation which are used in environment-oriented studies, while at the same time 
challenging the idea that regulation is either a straight forward mediator or inhibitor of 
innovation. This prevailing ambiguity of regulation aggravates the diffusion process 
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considerably and whether regulation converts into a driver or barrier depends on the 
combination and interaction of other diffusion factors that operate in the same 
diffusion cycle highlighted in Chapter 6. 
How can innovation be controlled and guided politically? This is no less true for eco- 
innovation. When it comes to the effects of eco-innovation, regulatory uncertainty 
appears to be even deeper. Environmental innovators, for instance, often prefer not to 
wait until a suitable policy has been passed and enacted (Jacob, 1999) but often rely 
instead on the government's recognition that a problem exists and exploit policy 
uncertainty on the early phases of policy formulation. Whereas with general innovation, 
state and politics form only one set of factors among many influencing the speed, 
direction and radicalness of action open to the potentially innovative company, eco- 
innovations benefit from the state's clearly stronger role Qänicke and Weidner, 
1997). The notion that governmental regulation and governance by means of specific 
instruments could achieve specific innovation effects have, in the light of subsequent 
empirical investigations, met with growing scepticism Qänicke, 2007). Initially this 
"instrumentalism" was criticised by empirical researchers in environmental policy; 
subsequently, however, this was relativised by representatives of the empirical 
environmental economy (Hemmelskamp, 1997). According to Jänicke (2002) it is 
theoretically possible to distinguish between the following diffusion scenarios (Figure 8), 
depending on the factors leading to the political and technological innovations: 
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Figure 8: Jänicke's Policy Diffusion Model 
1. Technology Forcing (A-*B-C-3D): An environmental innovation enforces a 
technological innovation that can only diffuse if there is policy innovation diffusion as 
well, e. g. US-Car Emission Standards. 
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2. Technological Initiative (B-A-C-)D): An existing environmental technology induces 
a policy innovation; the diffusion supports the technological diffusion, e. g. wind energy. 
3. Political Initiative (A3B-)D3C): A national environmental policy leads to 
technological innovations whose diffusion in turn encourages diffusion of the political 
innovation, e. g. Cadmium substitutes. 
4. Technological Dominance (B-*A-D9C): An innovation in environmental technology 
is successfully diffused and as a result receives political support both nationally and 
internationally, e. g. CHP technologies. 
5. Political Dominance (A-C-B), D): The environmental policy innovation diffuses, 
before the technology is actually available, this scenario is, symptomatically, very rare in 
ecological modernisation. 
6. Autonomous Dsion (B-D): Environmental technology innovation diffuses without 
political impact, e. g. incremental improvements of energy efficiency. 
The purpose of these pathways is to illustrate specific characteristics of innovations, 
divided into policy and technology induced diffusion. In addition, a closer study of the 
pathways may yield ideas as to. why certain regulation or policy initiatives here brought 
about more technology change than others. )änicke et al (2002) supports the assumption 
that autonomous emergence, diffusion of innovations in environmental technology is 
the exception rather than the rule, and that such developments usually remain limited to 
incremental increases in efficiency in companies. The reverse border-line case is 
innovation in environmental policy where politics clearly exceeds the given 
technological possibilities. The boundaries of eco-innovation are thus defined by the 
limits of technology as well as the general willingness to elicit direct or indirect 
ecological improvements. However, these boundaries could be considered as dynamic 
and can be extended by using appropriate means. For instance, research into the 
development of procedures for reducing C02 emissions, if successful, could 
substantially widen the scope for smart policies on climate change - even if only in 
terms of (incremental) end-of-pipe "measures. The variations of the interaction between 
politics and technology in any case are a central issue in research into the diffusion of 
eco-innovations, especially when it comes to selectively optimising such innovations 
Qänicke, 2005). Jänicke's approach certainly sets the basis for models aiming to highlight 
16 Methods used to remove already formed contaminants from a stream of air, water, waste, product or similar. These techniques are 
called 'end-of-pipe' as they are normally implemented as a last stage of a process before the stream is disposed of or delivered 
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the interaction of policy and technology but by doing so lacks in underlying core 
principle. 
In the subsequent Technology & Policy Diffusion Model (TPD-Model) a third rather 
dominant driver of eco-innovation, which is the economy through competition of 
rivalling organisations, is integrated. In addition the model involves four Levels of Eco- 
Design that are taken from Stevels (1997), Brezet (1997), Charter & Chick (1997) and 
Meinders & Meuffels (2001), providing a firm foundation for the dynamic interaction 
of innovation on one side affected by drivers on the other. Eco-Design is considered to 
be a new and strong driving force towards sustainability. As Stevels states, "Applied 
Eco-Design has developed strongly in the last ten years and is now solidly on the 
business map. It has changed from a subject with a limited scope and an inward green- 
looking approach to a wide field, inspiring engineering, business, consumers, and society 
as a whole" (Stevels, 2001). 
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Figure 9: Environmental benefit and sustainability index 
The above (Figure 9) aims to illustrate the relationship between time and environmental 
gain at different levels of Eco-Design. The relationship shows that higher Eco-Design 
level leads to a longer project development time and generates greater environmental 
benefits or sustainability. These levels are described in a slightly different way, 
depending on the approach, by Brezet (1997), Charter & Chick (1997), Stevels (1997), 
and Meinders & Meuffels (2001), as indicated in the (Table 4). 
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Table 4: 4-Levels of Change 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Level 4 
Charter & Chick Meinders & 
titcccls (1997) Brc, et (1997) (1997) Mcuffels (2001) 
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new products, new 
totally new product or concept. innovation. infrastructure, and a 
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prost act strnt.. cý, . fulfilling a function. 
In order to formulate the interaction of sustainability, industrial ecology and eco- 
innovation towards a sustainable innovation policymaking future the concept has to be 
made operational. 
(L, )-CHANGE-(INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS): Incremental or small, 
progressive improvements to existing products that are mainly based on common sense 
or check lists. 
(L) -CHANGE 4(RE-DESIGN or "GREEN-LIMITS"): Major re-design of existing 
products limited by the level of improvement that is technically feasible. 
(L, 
a)-CHANGE 
4(FUNCTIONAL or "PRODUCT" ALTERNATIVES that lead to 
"Green"-Innovation): New product or service alternatives based on life cycle 
assessment (LCA) and life cycle cash flow analysis (LCFA) for alternative products 
systems, also identifying weaknesses in the infrastructure of society. 
(I3b)-CHANGE (Design for the sustainable society that lead to "Green-System"- 
Innovation): Functionality completely fitting into sustainable society based on LCA and 
scenarios of alternative infrastructures of the societies. 
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In addition, each level requires a different level of information. Level 1 typically requires 
operational information and research and would therefore use so called What-if 
scenarios, widely used in Life-Cycle approaches and where generally the decision 
problem is known and based on existing data. These are often studies where specific 
changes within the present system are tested and their implications to environmental 
impacts are examined. Level 2 aims to achieve a major re-design of existing products 
limited by the level of improvement that is technically feasible. At level 3a as well as 3b 
strategic information needs to be gathered and therefore it is recommended to apply the 
Cornerstone scenario where several options are available, which ideally differ from each 
other in order to get an overall overview of the analysed field. These alternatives then 
serve as so called "Cornerstones" of the studied field. Typical results of this approach 
accentuate a potential direction of a future development and therefore the Cornerstone 
scenario approach marks a powerful tool for long term planning. 
Ehrenfeld (2001) challenged the idea of stages with orderly progression from top to 
bottom in terms of their sustainability performance and argues that this has yet to be 
configured. He further points out that the different categories are supported by three 
factors of change: the artefact, the institutional arrangement in which the artefacts are 
used, and the user's practice, respectively (see Table 5) (ibid). Institutional innovations 
involve, primarily, institutional or infrastructure changes. However, whether these 
changes lead to sustainable performance has yet to be tested (Ehrenfeld, 2001). Even 
though redesign and functional innovations, if used alone, may not be efficient enough 
to achieve a sustainable society, but proof to be much easier as they do not involve as 
many actors as opposed to system innovations. Brezet (1997) states that, "for almost all 
existing products, redesigns are possible that lead to a significant dematerialization, de- 
carbonization and detoxification at the level of individual products" (Brezet et al., 2001). 
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Table 5: Characteristics that define innovative categories Ehrenfeld (2001) 
Category Change in device 
Change in Change in user 
concept Infrastructure learning 
Process and 
"product" redesign 
None to minor None None 
Functional 
Significant None to minor Minor innovation 
Institutional None to minor Significant Significant innovation 
System innovation Significant Significant Significant 
To use system innovations for Eco Design projects is therefore not a recommendable 
strategy for organisations since it involves too many actors. The realisation of 
environmental gain (decrease of the environmental load by factors) has much larger 
consequences than can be addressed by industry as well as individual organisations. The 
"stakeholder dialogue" about this specific issue needs to be intensified and transferred 
to a higher level (Stevels, 1999). As Brezet et al (2001) argue, "If Eco Design is to be 
used regularly by organisations as a part of their business and product development 
process, it's not only necessary to create new external values (higher profits, larger own 
market, etc. ), but also to take into account the interests of suppliers and end-of-life 
actors as well as to demonstrate potential added value for the internal company 
stakeholders" (ibid). However, environmental adaptation can also be profitable, since 
there is an opportunity for cost mitigation directly related to design for environment. 
By adopting those levels of Eco-Design the interactions between innovation, policy 
instruments and a competitive economy are included in the model. It provides a 
framework of understanding the role of innovation and conceivable diffusion pathways 
within the TPD-Model V10. A three dimensional model was developed to reflect the 
highly dynamic interaction of innovation and various drivers that tend to diffuse 
according to the applied radicalness of innovation involved. The different layers of 
innovation are illustrated in "orbits" revolving around the pyramid that shows the four 
levels of Eco-Design. These "orbits" show how innovation is affected by various 
factors and how innovation is likely to diffuse according to the factors that, depending 
on the previously mentioned radicalness, turn into drivers and barriers. The different 
levels of Eco-Design are important as they illustrate the development from well- 
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established incremental to less applied radical innovation processes and their diffusion 
potential. The research seeks to particularly focus on the resilience of a) the regulatory 
pressures and b) the diffusion potential, which occur at Level 3(a-b). The model aims to 
conclude the previously elaborated themes by suggesting an approach to highlight the 
interactions of technological innovation and regulation through policy interventions by 
which the main diffusion factors became apparent. The following (Figure 10) shows the 
TPD model version V1.0. In order to understand the way drivers and barriers (diffusion 
factors) are interacting one need to imagine the 3-dimensional nature of the model 
where the diffusion cycles rotate around the pyramid to exemplify the rate, speed and 
direction of the diffusion. 
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Figure 10: TPD-Model V1. o 
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The following (Table 6) illustrates how the four levels of change differ in their 
characteristics with a range covering from weak (+) to strong affiliation (++++). 
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Time Degree of Risk & Return 
Investment Complexity 
Horizon Regulation Uncertainty Possibility 
(Li)' 0 
CHANGE N/A N/A N/A + N/A 
ars year 
(L2)- 0-5 
CHANGE + N/A + ++ + 
years 
(L, a) 0-10 CHANGE +++ +++ ++ +++ +++ 
years 
(L., ý 0-30 
CHANGE ++++ +++ ++++ ++++ ++++ 
years 
Table 6: Levels of Change over a length of time 
These levels of eco-innovation are a combination of technical, social, and institutional 
innovation and would be also suitable to advance current debates on environmental 
issues. Typical examples such as recycling, ELV-directives, eco-labels, energy reduction 
etc. build a new throughout competitive platform for new concepts that allow to meet 
the challenging regulatory future that will undoubtedly by driven by organisations' ability 
to innovate. According to CHAINET (1998) higher level of design requires changes in 
society and particular the engagement of multiple stakeholders. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter innovation has been identified as an important tool on the quest for a 
sustainability future. The importance of eco-innovation has been underpinned as well as 
clearly restrained from the characteristics of traditional innovation. The chapter revised 
the role played by innovation in long run economic scenarios and to initiate socio- 
technical change, and many of its consequences: 
Innovation is likely to cluster in certain industries/sectors, which consequently grow 
faster, leading to structural changes in production and demand and, eventually, 
organisational and institutional change. The capacity to undertake the latter is important 
for the ability to benefit from innovation. Innovation is a powerful factor explaining 
differences in performance between organisations, regions and countries. Organisations 
that carry out successful innovation do this at the expense of their less able competitors 
and by doing so gain the holy grail of competitive advantage. 
Due to these desirable consequences, policy-makers and business-leaders alike are 
concerned with how to foster innovation. Despite the large amount of research in this 
field during the past forty years, much less is known about why and how innovation 
occurs than what it leads to. Although it meanwhile well-known that innovation is an 
organisational phenomenon as most theories in regard to innovation have traditionally 
looked at it from an individualistic perspective, as exemplified by Schumpeter's 
"psychological" theory of entrepreneurial behaviour (Fagerberg 2003). Similarly, most 
work on cognition and knowledge focuses on individuals, not organisations. Roger's 
concept of innovation diffusion theory was central for the stated research aim (p. xz) to 
allow for a better understanding of the innovation diffusion factors as it identifies the 
existing actors along the innovation chain and by doing so provides insights on how to 
trigger innovation. Moreover, research on diffusion factors of innovation promises to 
improve our understanding of how social change occurs, a fundamental issue for all, 
scholars of society. What is the role of technology in bringing about social change? One 
way to find out is through diffusion research, a microlevel type of study of the 
macrolevel issue of social change. 
A model subsequent to Jänickes policy diffusion model was suggested to highlight the 
highly dynamic interactions of innovation affected by various drivers that circulate on 
interlocked diffusion cycles and affect different levels of innovation, which depend on 
the radicalness involved. Its serves as a theoretical basis for the underlying research 
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objectives and by doing so reviews driving forces in particular the role of regulation for 
innovation. The model then allows to test the diffusion factors (drivers/barriers) taken 
from the survey results to examine how those interact when applied on the same 
diffusion circle. This will in turn allow answering the research objective concerning the 
dominant drivers/barriers of eco-innovation within the UK's private and public sector 
and by doing so highlight the sector-specific eco-innovation differences. 
Regulatory activities, including policies that influence the decision making of 
organisations, may provide (or may not) incentives to innovate or hamper innovation 
activities. The role of regulation within the innovation chain will be discussed in the 
subsequent Chapter (4), which will look beyond the overly simplistic focus on whether 
or not regulation promotes or hinders environmentally beneficial innovation (eco- 
innovation). By doing so it illustrates more sophisticated ways under which particular 
kinds of regulation can spur particular kinds of eco-innovation which allows in turn 
answering which approaches towards environmental regulation do occur in the UK's 
private and public sector. 
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CHAPTER 4: Environmental Regulation 
Looking back regulation has, by some means or other, profoundly affected the diffusion 
of innovation (Kemp, 2000; Rennings 2000; Hemmelskamp et al 2000). Yet the crucial 
question under which circumstances innovation is driven or hampered by regulation 
remains inconclusive. The rather rich variety of traditional regulatory instruments which 
have successfully, to a greater or lesser extent, been spurring innovation in the past are 
challenged as a template for the future as they do not provide strong incentives to 
comply with and therefore appear to be less "fit for purpose". The chapter further aims 
to investigate which regulatory instruments, when combined, have the potential to 
smoothen the way to a more innovative private and public sector. This chapter 
examines to what extent existing regulatory instruments drive (or not) innovation and 
by doing so makes a case for a new type of innovation friendly regulation which is 
discussed in four cases illustrating an innovative regulatory approach within three 
selected EU-member states and Japan. A refined version of the TPD model V20 
concludes the chapter by highlighting the dependence of the identified diffusion factors 
when arranged in the same diffusion cycle to exemplify the existing "fine-line" that 
separates drivers from barriers. 
4.1 Introduction 
The influence of regulation on technology is complex, and depends on many factors, 
including the technology stringency of regulation, the design and instrument choice of 
the regulatory intervention and how the regulation of technology is being progressed in 
terms of their content, direction and success. Regulation is defined by its purpose to 
control human or societal behaviour by rules or restrictions. For this reason it is crucial 
to know what role regulation plays in the innovation process. In general, regulation can 
be perceived by an organisation as a constraint (to comply with or... to bypass), or as an 
opportunity (the company can go beyond the ordinary compliance of the given 
regulation) (Bascourret et al., 1999). If organisations can innovate as regulation evolves, 
they can also use the regulation to their advantage to obtain a competitive advantage 
(Hemmelskamp, 1997). It is very likely that regulation will particularly affect those 
innovations which are somehow developed as an answer to the rising awareness of 
environmental problems. Those eco-innovations in turn will have to account for this 
and meet those potentially strict standards. This is especially the case regarding the 
"sustainable" new technologies. On the other side, new technologies developed as an 
77 
alternative to growing environmental problems often have to face a regulation which is 
not suited to their diffusion, as this regulation was developed in the framework of 
existing "traditional" technologies. Therefore, the regulatory designing process must be 
strongly linked with innovation to obtain a "match" with new technology. The plan to 
impose a limit of 120 grams" of CO2 per kilometre for cars sold or imported into the 
EU by 2012 will provide an interesting case since it can be observed that EU 
manufacturer slowly approach this limit due to sheer threat of strict regulation. 
As regulation is seen as a tool to level the playing field, ensuring that one organisation 
cannot gain position by avoiding environmental investments it is crucial to know how 
individual companies are trying to take advantage of this situation in order to stay 
competitive (Kuik, 2006a; 2006b). 
In neoclassical economics, (environmental) regulation is an instrument to force 
companies to internalise external costs they would normally impose on society. 
According to Rennings (1998) its exigency in terms of market failure is beyond dispute 
in environmental economics. The instruments to be chosen in specific cases and the 
appropriate applied stringency of regulation are not specified here although, 
theoretically, the marginal regulatory cost should be equal to the material pollution cost. 
Again, it was the conventional neoclassical views that gave strict regulation a rather 
negative effect on productivity and competitiveness as it arguably leads to increased 
expenses and therefore induces boundaries for businesses originated by Palmer et al 
(1995). Neoclassical economists have criticised the "win-win" hypothesis given the 
significant compliance costs of industry, competitive disadvantages of domestic firms in 
international markets, and opportunity costs of forced environmental activities. Further 
on, they argue that regulation might motivate companies to develop eco-innovations, 
but that these efforts would produce additional opportunity costs offset only in 
extraordinary situations (see e. g., Jaffe et al., 1995; Palmer et al., 1995). Jaffe and Palmer 
(1997) found various results for the previously mentioned innovation indicators (please 
also refer to Chapter 3). Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) discovered that rises in 
pollution abatement expenditure measured by the number of successful environmental 
patent applications granted to industry marginally affect eco-innovation. Observing a 
11 Since the test procedure used for vehicle type approval is outdated, certain innovative technologies cannot demonstrate their COz, 
reducing effects under the type approval test. As an interim procedure until the test procedure is reviewed by 2014, manufacturers 
can be granted a maximum of 7g/km of emission credits on average for their fleet if they equip vehicles with innovative 
technologies, based on independently verified data. 
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theoretical model provided by Bonato and Schmutzler (2000) who derive strategic 
spillover effectsi' and organizational (principal agent problem') factors show 
environmental regulation could spur cost-reducing innovations that would not have 
been carried out without given regulation. 
The question of what drives eco-innovation and what role environmental regulation can 
or should ideally play in this regard has become even more relevant to policy and 
decision making process within the last decade. According to Bernauer (2006) 
consumption and degradation of natural resources is continuously growing and 
environmental innovations are considered an important option in terms of mitigation or 
avoidance of environmental degradation. However, worries about declining 
competitiveness of the European industry compared to their American and Asian 
competitors lead policy makers to reduce the regulatory burden on industry (Dosi, et al., 
1988b). Requate et al. (2003) provided a vast outline on the incentives for the adoption 
and implementation (including R&D) of innovation subject to environmental 
regulation. They analysed 28 different models and concluded that it seems to be unclear 
as to which regulatory instruments dominate other instruments although instruments 
which provide economic incentives generally perform better than command and control 
regulation. 
4.2 The new face of environmental regulation 
In theory, it would by all means be imaginable to spend so much on environmental 
protection that basic economic needs could not be met. However, at a certain level of 
regulatory expenditures, protecting natural environment by cleaning up the air and water 
could engage sufficient resources to challenge the provision of more fundamental 
goods, such as food and shelter (Ackerman, 2006). From there it is a short leap to the 
conclusion that the natural conflict between economy and environment actually is an 
urgent issue, requiring a sound knowledge of regulations to prevent worsening the terms 
of the trade-off. However, the latter statement only follows logically if environmental 
regulation is in fact using crucial resources, which are transferable to other, more basic 
Spillover effects are eexternalities of economic activity or processes upon those who are not directly involved in it. 
19 In political science and economics, the principal-agent problem or agency dilemma treats the difficulties that arise under 
conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent, such as the problem that the two may not 
have the same interests, while the principal is, presumably, hiring the agent to pursue the interests of the former. 
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needs. That is, the assumed urgency of the trade-off rests on the implicit assumptions 
that the costs of environmental protection are both large and fungible. Either of these 
assumptions identified by Ackerman (2006) could fail in practice: 
  The costs of environmental protection could be nonexistent, or too small to matter; 
or; 
  Reduction of regulatory costs might not produce the desired economic benefits. 
However, improvements free of charge are not the only means to avoid a trade-off 
whereas economic constraints do not necessarily become important to real decisions as 
soon as regulatory costs are greater than zero. It is perfectly feasible that small costs of 
regulation have rather small impacts on the economy whereas regulations could also 
entail costs that are too small to matter. The theoretical consensus that supports the 
belief that environmental improvement comes free of charge may disappear once costs 
become apparent, however small. General concerns about economic impacts do not 
have to arise until costs become large in some meaningful sense. 
Even when environmental regulation imposes considerable economic costs, it does not 
necessarily follow that these costs could be traded for greater private incomes and 
consumption, or for the benefits that are thought to accompany higher incomes. First, 
deregulation might not produce increased economic growth. If a regulation or other 
environmental policy has measurable economic costs, it consumes resources such as 
labour and capital that could have been used elsewhere in the economy. Regulation, 
then, can only be "traded" for whatever those resources could have produced elsewhere 
- in economic terms, the opportunity cost of those resources. 
During a recession, labour and capital are typically less than fully employed. Supplying 
more of resources that are already in surplus may not produce anything more; the short 
run opportunity cost of additional resources could be zero. On the other hand, during 
expansions such as the late 1990s, the Federal Reserve carefully controls the level of 
employment and rate of growth; making more resources available for increased growth 
might just lead the Fed to step harder on the brakes in order to maintain the 
(unchanged) target pace of expansion. Again, the short-run opportunity cost of 
additional resources could be zero. 
In the long run, the availability of resources such as labour and capital must have 
something to do with growth rates, economic opportunities, and improvements in 
health and welfare. However, the relationship is a subtler and more tenuous one than is 
often recognized. 
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Several studies (Porter and van de Linde, 1995a/b; Kemp et al., 2001; Jänicke, et al., 
2002; Vollebergh, 2007) predicted that strict environmental regulation can stimulate 
innovation (e. g. first mover advantages created by the development of new 
technologies) and that there are "win-win" opportunities through environmental 
regulation, where pollution is reduced simultaneously with an increase in productivity. 
Hence, Porter et al (1995a) argues that properly designed environmental regulation can 
trigger innovation and even may partially or more than fully offset the costs of 
complying with them - the Porter Hypothesis. Jaffe and Palmer (1995) distinguish 
between three variations of it: 
In the "weak" version, Porter declares that strict environmental regulation will spur 
innovation. The "narrow" version predicts that flexible environmental policy 
instruments such Pigovian taxes which provide companies with more targeted 
incentives to innovate, compared with traditional command and control sanctions. 
However, it remains unclear how and to what extent the choice of instruments 
essentially affects innovation gaffe, et al., 2004). In the "strong" variation, Porter claims 
that properly laid-out environmental regulation will induce innovation that will entirely 
compensate given costs of compliance. In policy circles, the thesis of a positive 
relationship between strict environmental regulation, innovation and competitiveness 
became very popular in the nineties but is still controversial, primarily because of the 
complexity of attributing specific innovations to singular stimuli, such as regulation; and 
the largely ambiguous empirical evidence so far Qänicke, 2007; Requate, 2005). 
Although qualitative case studies (e. g., Bonifant et al., 1995; Porter and van der Linde, 
1995b; 1995a; Shrivastava, 1995) rest upon rather anecdotal evidence according to 
Bernauer (2006), more sound econometric surveys have failed to provide unambiguous 
results (e. g., Jaffe et al., 1995). However, two conclusions concerning the impact of the 
Porter hypothesis can be drawn, firstly, a competitive advantage might be achieved in 
terms of strict environmental regulation, which diffuses internationally later on. If there 
has been a development of technologies in response to strict environmental standards, 
industries (not necessarily the polluting industry itself), may be able to sell and therefore 
export their technologies. Their competitive advantage may be based on learning effects 
or patent protection of their innovation. 
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Secondly, strict environmental regulation may lead to innovation in the polluting 
industry which is able to compensate for the costs of adaptation. According to Jänicke 
et al (2002) this part of the Porter hypotheses has been entitled the "free-lunch" 
hypotheses. However, uncertainties remain; as it is not quite clear what actually 
distinguishes different versions of the hypothesis, and what is the relationship between 
regulation types and innovation? Equally, why, if the Porter Hypothesis is universally 
applicable, is there evidence for so much dysfunctional and innovation-hampering 
regulation, and under which circumstances does the Porter Hypothesis work and when 
not? Finally, the Hypothesis does not consider differences in the radicalness, rate and 
direction of innovation and, moreover, does not take into account the "level playing 
field" idea of regulation which is in conflict with its universal applicability. 
Rödiger-Schluga (2004) have improved Porter's argument by offering a stepped 
theoretical illustration for the existence of previously overlooked win-win opportunities 
that could be stimulated by regulation. Further scenarios under which strict regulation 
can spur eco-innovations that fully offset compliance costs were shown by Bonato and 
Schmutzler (2000), Schmutzler et al (2001) and Mohr (2002) by applying principal-agent 
theory, bounded rationality and spillover effects. Many of these approaches are, in one 
way or another, derived from Schumpeter's hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1942), postulating 
a positive influence of market concentration and firm size on innovation. Schumpeter 
argued that market concentration reduces market uncertainty and motivates firms to 
invest in R&D. 
Most economists who consider technical change and the long-term dynamics of the 
system turn to Schumpeter, and it is intriguing that he still is almost alone among major 
twentieth-century economists to place technological change at the heart of his system, 
which then also address problems of social and institutional change (Dosi, 1988a). 
However old the interest in the debate about how to regulate towards innovation is, the 
Porter Hypothesis has undoubtedly revitalised this discussion and brought it into the 
realm of Corporate Environmental Management. However, it is probably worthwhile to 
review more fundamentally how, if any, regulation and innovation interact, which is the 
aim of the next section where the highly dynamic interactions of regulation and 
innovation are specified. However, in order to trigger more radical innovation, 
regulations by their very means have to become stricter. 
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4.3 Varieties ofRegulatoryInstruments: 
Three broad categories of environmental regulation namely direct and economic as well 
as voluntary regulation need to be evaluated as dominant driver (or not) of innovation 
in the context of the thesis. In order to allow a better understanding of how regulation 
need to be drafted to stimulate innovation by given organisations a strong incentive to 
innovate the so far prevailing types of regulation are examined in regard to their 
"innovation-friendliness". Nevertheless, the categorisation merely provides an outline 
of available environmental regulatory instruments. Further, it has to be acknowledged 
that the differences between those types are somewhat artificial due to the significant 
overlap between instruments. 
4.3.1 Direct (or Command and Control) Regulation 
Since the early 1970s, governments all over the so called industrialised world have 
reacted to the ascent of environmental degradation as well as industrial pollution with 
an immense number of environmental regulations. The most popular governmental 
answer to those issues, however, has been the implementation of "direct" or "command 
and control" regulation designed to restrict environmental damaging activities (Kagan, 
1994). 
Command and Control (CaC) regulation is assumed to have a specific environmental 
aim, for example a limit on emissions of a pollutant to water or the air, and ensuing 
penalties which deploy if this aim is not achieved. Quite frequently it has been the case 
that CaC regulation aimed to rely on application of "best available technology" (BAT) 
or related technology-based standards (Hitchens, 2001). This assumes the regulator 
defining the environmental target or standard to the extent of what is technically 
feasible at a particular point of time, in a specific sector/industry as well as in a specific 
application. Although specific technological requirements do not necessarily hamper 
innovation or lock organisations into using a particular technology, in practice they 
often have this effect (Ashford, 1993; Ashford, et al., 1996). 
The term command and control has become omnipresent in the language of policy- 
makers (mainly replacing the traditional term, "direct regulation") largely through the 
impact of neo-classical economists, who used this term to encapsulate what was known 
as the negative aspects of direct government intervention compared to the virtues of 
market mechanism (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). This development is due to the 
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debate in regard to market versus government instruments which largely took place in 
the United States where CaC regulation were treated as almost equivalent with the 
prevailing form or regulation in that jurisdiction; technology-based standards (OECD, 
1997). This is rather distressing since not all forms of direct regulation are subject to 
debates that can be levelled at technology standards. Performance based standards with 
a focus on outcomes it has to be acknowledged that those are not restrictive or rigid in 
the same way as technology standards can be. Nevertheless, the term CaC regulation has 
almost universally replaced the older term direct regulation. Therefore it is not 
surprising at all that CaC regulation takes a variety of forms due to the complexity of 
environmental problems. The most commonly used approach here are environmental 
standards (Stavins, 2007) which comprise of the establishment of uniform requirements 
on broad categories of activities to effectuate particular environmental goals. These 
normally include: ambient standards; technology-based performance standards; design 
or specification standards; environmental management standards as well as product or 
process standards whereas the technology, performance and process-based standards 
are considered to be the major standards (Anderson, et al., 2001; Ashford, 2005). CaC 
regulations have, as any other type, a variety of type specific strengths as well as 
weaknesses. The major strength of CaC regulation is its dependability (provided there is 
adequate monitoring and enforcement) which means that the behaviour expected of 
regulatees can be specified with considerable clarity which makes it relatively easy to 
identify breaches of the legal standard and to enforce the law. Thus regulators have 
specific operational parameters and, in turn, organisations themselves have a better 
understanding of their regulatory obligation Gordan, 2005). 
The rigidity of CaC regulation has been challenged as it is believed being economically 
inefficient especially when embodied in uniform technology-based standards. Latin 
(1985) argues that there are several advantages to this approach over more particularised 
and flexible instruments, including decreased information collection and evaluation 
costs, greater consistency and predictability of results, greater accessibility of decisions 
to public scrutiny and participation, increased likelihood that regulation will withstand 
judicial review, reduced opportunities for manipulative behaviour by agencies in 
response to political or bureaucratic pressures, reduced opportunities for obstructive 
behaviour by regulated parties, and decreased likelihood of social dislocation and 
"forum shopping" resulting from competitive disadvantages between geographical 
regions or between organisations in regulated industry sectors (Ashford, 1999). 
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In addition, CaC regulation is considered to be more successful in some circumstances. 
The distinct price standards that CaC regulation impose can be enforced easier against 
identifiable and accessible organisations. Against one's expectations and prevailing 
wisdom, Porters argument, as outlined in the previous sub-chapter, that strict regulation 
can stimulate technological innovation in promoting regulatory compliance and 
therefore enhance international competitiveness. In Germany, for example, strict CaC 
regulation have been credited with not only improving the productivity of existing 
organisations through technological as well as managerial improvements in addition to 
the creation of totally new pollution control industries. Organisations gained a strong 
competitive position internationally as other organisations had to catch up to Germany's 
advanced environmental standards (Porter, et al., 1995b). In 1975, the US Congress 
established Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to conserve petroleum 
and to reduce US reliance on imported oil (Gerard and Lave, 2003). It has continued to 
enjoy public support, also as a means to reduce air pollution and to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions, although it has also been criticised by economists on the grounds that the 
aforementioned goals could be achieved with other instruments at less costs (see, for 
example, NAS, 2002). 
The CAFE standards set mandatory average fuel economy standards for car 
manufacturers for passenger cars and light-duty trucks. For passenger cars, the 
standards increased from 18 US mpg (miles per US gallon) in 1978 to 27.5 US mpg2° in 
1985 and have not been raised since. For light-duty trucks 20.7 mpg has been set (Kuik, 
2006b). Compared to the European targets, the CAFE standards are not conceived to be 
very ambitious. The 140 g C02/km target from the ACEA agreement translates into a 
fuel economy standard of 5.9 1/100 km. The US CAFE standard for petrol passenger 
cars is 11.71/100 km and the light-duty truck standards for minivans, pickups and sport 
utility vehicles are even less ambitious (Kuik, 2006a). 
When highlighting the strengths of CaC regulation it is inevitably to reveal its 
corresponding weaknesses (at least in the traditional form). One of the most common 
criticisms is that CaC regulation need regulators to have substantial and exact knowledge 
of the activities and capacity of industry. When establishing BAT standards, regulators 
20 Fuel Consumption Conversions: I Mile/Imp. Gallon = 0.354 kilometers/liter (km/]); 1 kilometer/liter (km/1) = 2.825 miles/Imp. 
Gallon; 1 mile/US gallon (mpg) = 0.425 kilometers/liter (km/1); 1 kilometer/liter (km/1) = 2.352 miles/US gallon (mpg) 
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are often forced to engage in lengthy and complex information gathering processes in 
order to determine adequate pollution reduction targets (Kuik, 2006b; Hitchens, 
2001). The use of uniform standards has triggered considerable criticism although these 
are certainly not exclusive or inherent to CaC regulation. This is due to organisations 
and industry consistently drifting in the cost of reducing pollution emissions whereas 
uniform standards disable organisations to tailor their responses, even though some may 
be able to reduce pollution at much lower costs. The net effect presents an increase in 
the general cost of regulation which, indeed, presents the flip-side of the "level playing 
field" approach mentioned earlier. 
An additional problem of CaC regulation lies in the absence of incentives for 
organisations to go beyond minimum standards especially when an organisation already 
meets the required standard. The inability to motivate organisations to go beyond 
compliance, though a process of continuous improvement as well as cultural change 
presenting one of the most serious failings of CaC regulations Qoskow and 
Schmalensee, 1998; Ashford, et al., 2007) which suggest to continuously tighten the 
standards. 
Many large organisations undertake risk-reduction measures well beyond compliance to 
promote their public image and to improve their corporate risk profile according to 
(Mikler, 2009; Chinander, et al, 1997). Such "beyond-compliance" conduct is rare 
among small organisations given the relatively modest investments in environmental 
compliance. However, the central challenge here is how to motivate such organisations 
to move to a more proactive state, which in turn could be achieved by providing strong 
incentives towards a most sustainable future. Moreover, many regulated organisations 
routinely go "beyond compliance, " taking nonlegally required actions that advance 
regulatory goals. Some beyond compliance actions entail "overcompliance" with 
regulations, whereby regulated organisations build in a margin of error, much as a 
motorist may take care to drive 5 mph below the legal speed limit. Other beyond 
compliance actions advance regulatory goals in the absence of specific regulatory 
mandates in order to increase the organisation's short-term profits or its long-term 
viability (Vogel 2005; Porter & van der Linde 1995a). 
Another criticism, given existing resource constraints, is the cost and complexity of 
enforcement which may reduce effectiveness. Even though some authorities may be 
committed to enforcement, most regulatory regimes have insufficient resources to 
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observe compliance with any degree of adequacy. Finally, CaC regulation may lead to 
increasing administrative complexity and a proliferation of law due to the sheer volume 
of environmental statutes and associated regulations in industrialised countries making it 
difficult for regulators as well as industry to keep up all their obligations. When taking 
into account these imperatives, there is a growing understanding that traditional forms 
of CaC regulation have serious and complex problems whenever confronted with new 
challenges they are ill equipped to meet as they have reached the very limit of their 
efficacy in accelerating environmental degradation (Tietenberg, 2007; Stavins, 2007). 
The increasing complexity of technology do not favour CaC approaches as they do not 
provide the needed flexibility and therefore are unlikely to be an appropriate instrument 
within areas of rapid technological change. However, given the major strength of CaC 
regulation, their dependability (see previous section), they are still regarded to be useful 
when combined with other instruments. 
4.3.2 Economic (or Market Based) Regulation: 
The idea to use economic instruments to regulate behaviours was conceived by 
academics and hence for many years merely of theoretical interest; regulators, 
environmentalists, and industry alike tended to be more comfortable with more familiar 
traditional regulation (Kelman, 1983). However, in the early 1980s, the OECD 
recognised the potential of economic instruments, and started to promote the concept 
amongst policymakers. This, combined with an increasing awareness of the inevitable 
limits of traditional regulatory enforcement, has led to proliferation of economic 
instruments in western industrial states. (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). Nowadays, 
economic instruments are considered by many as the "hottest growth industry in 
environmental law" Orts (1995) describes it. Economic instruments may appear in 
diverse forms, some of which providing positive incentives whereas others provide 
negatives once. While there is no single agreed classification, Panayotou (1995) is used 
here to provide a comprehensive outline by allocated them to the following distinct 
groups: property-rights; market creation; fiscal instruments and charge systems; financial 
instruments; liability instruments; performance bonds; and deposit refund systems. 
4.3.2.1 Property-right 
When considering property-rights in respect to its regulatory affiliation the Coase 
theorem has to be mentioned as it describes the economic efficiency of an economic 
allocation or outcome in the presence of externalities. The theorem argues that when 
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trade in an externality occurs whilst having no transaction costs, bargaining will lead to 
an efficient result regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. In practice, 
obstacles to bargaining or poorly defined property rights can prevent Coasian bargaining 
(Coase, 1960). This issue might be avoided either by CaC regulation (directing people to 
a certain behaviour), or by providing a system of property-rights in a problem-solving 
way. The latter suggestion is, normally, preferred by economists due to the fact that it is 
low in administration and transaction costs and achieves the internalisation of 
externalities where an involvement of policy-makers to revisit this scenario is not 
necessary (Rose, 1986). 
4.3.2.2 Market creation 
The purpose of this approach is for government to create a market, perhaps through 
tradable pollution rights or tradable resource rights, which can be purchased or sold like 
any other commodity. This allows regulators to rely on newly-introduced economic 
incentives to reach environmental targets (Swanson, 1995). The advantage of market 
creation, in comparison with CaC regulation, lies in greater flexibility for organisations 
to tailor responses to individual circumstances. It is believed that organisations are in a 
better position than regulators to identify and specify adequate actions. Government 
maintains the control of the scheme, however, by defining the allowable emissions and 
volume of available permits, and therefore is able to set the overall level of polluting 
emissions or resource exploitations. Government has to be in a position to accomplish 
the allowable emissions of individual permits to avoid abuses by freeriders, in a similar 
way to the enforcement provision of traditional regulatory instruments. Market creation 
can be visualised as a hybrid approach between free market environmentalism and direct 
(CaC) regulation (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). 
It is, however, quite ironic that although the intellectual foundation of free market 
environmentalism has been laid largely by conservative economists, it is embraced more 
or less enthusiastically by liberal environmentalists. Cordato (1997) claims that 
environmentalists were given a means of dispensing with command-and-control 
regulation while maintaining their command-and-control ends. Whether globally or not, 
many economists, most of them conservative, have become efficiency consultants for 
the traditionally anti-free-market environmental movement. Again these economists 
have shown that the environmentalists can attain their goals more "efficiently" by 
creating suitable incentives in the market than by setting rigid rules and standards for 
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production processes (Cordato, 1997) which is the underlying idea of spurring 
innovation within the principles of market creation. 
4.3.2.3 Fiscal instruments and charge systems 
Fiscal instruments are used to encourage environmentally responsible behaviour 
through full (or partial) cost pricing of consumption or production. This approach 
introduces prices on property-rights rather than establishing these over common (or 
unpriced) resources as a different method to internalise externalities. Economic theory 
shows that fiscal instruments, particularly taxes and charges imposes less costs on 
organisations to achieve a given standard of pollution reduction than will CaC regulation 
which were designed to serve the same purpose (Baumol and Oates, 1988). As with 
market creation, taxes and charges can exploit differences in the marginal costs of 
abatement between organisations to reduce the overall cost of abatement which mirrors 
the existence of a prevailing incentive to find new and cheaper methods to reduce 
pollution or resource consumption and payment. However, many forms of taxes and 
charges have been introduced across the globe as revenue raising devices and less than 
serious environmental policy instruments (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). 
There are some circumstances where it is adequate to "get it right" first time, and where 
failure causes irreversible losses. Moreover, where prices are relatively inelastic as a 
consequence of limited input replaceability, costs may merely be transferred to final 
consumers with no subsequent environmental benefit, otherwise the volume of the tax 
or charge would have to be very large, and thus undercut the cost-effectiveness of the 
instrument. A classic example for this phenomenon which is also know as the "polluter 
pays principle" would be the very inelastic price for private vehicles petrol consumption 
due to the unavailability of alternative fuels. This explains why the price for petrol 
would need to be fairly high before consumers would substantially change their driving 
behaviour (Kuik, 2006c). 
Consequently, organisations may also not respond quickly to price signals where taxes 
or charges represent only a small proportion of outlays, costs might simply be ignored 
or not recognised. Finally, taxes and charges may be perceived as legitimizing 
environmentally harmful behaviour (Freeman and Kolstad, 2007). 
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4.3.2.4 Financial Instruments 
Financial instruments generally include revolving funds, green funds, subsidised interest 
rates and soft loans. The clear intention is to generate financial resources for 
conservation and environmental resources. Revolving loans are used by governments to 
provide funds to local governments, small businesses, or other entities, enabling them to 
initiate a variety of environmental activities. Loans are generally made at interest rates 
lower than the market can offer. Hence partly subsidising specific environmental 
ventures which cannot be justified in strict commercial terms although they are very 
desirable. Although financial instruments are widely recognised to be an effective means 
they do not adhere to the polluter pays principle (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). 
There is always the danger that such instruments may be abused due to funds that are 
used for purposes other than those intended also known as the "free-rider principle", 
emphasising the need for transparency and accountability at all stages (Fung and 
O'Rourke, 2000). 
4.3.2.5 Liability instruments 
Raising civil liability on those who exploit the environment can provide an economic 
incentive for the management and control of risk, pollution and waste. Organisations 
are given an incentive to internalise externalities by the sheer threat that legal actions will 
be used to make up for environmental damages (Swanson, 1995). It is crucial to 
distinguish between inherent and practical problems of liability instruments. In 
comparison to most other economic instruments, liability systems have the ability to 
recover damages ex post even though the incentive effect is considered to be ex ante. 
This does not make them less effective, in theory, assuming that the liability system 
impacts upon the resources user in proportion to the harms that their uses are causing. 
However, in practice, many liability schemes are beset with problems that limit their 
potential role in environmental protection (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). A crucial factor in 
the viability of liability instruments is the timing of their introduction as prospective 
application is likely to be far more successful than retrospective application 
(Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). A current rather sad example is the BP oil spill 
where the immediate challenge to mitigate an ever-magnifying environmental 
catastrophe was missed due to highly complex venture to balance technology and 
regulation. 
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4.3.2.6 Performance bonds 
Performance bonds demand a security deposit from organisations which is redeemed 
upon satisfactory completion of a required task. In the case of non-performance, the 
deposit is forfeited (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). Performance bonds are equally 
applicable to pollution reduction and effluent control programmes and are best suited to 
situations where there is one source of potential environmental damage, and where that 
damage can be estimated to some extent. Performance bonds are generally considered 
to be socially acceptable, administratively simple and cost-effective, and incorporate 
both the polluter pays and precautionary principles Games, 1993). Nevertheless they are 
only adequate to address temporary threats. 
4.3.2.7 Deposit refund systems 
Deposit refund systems are conceptually similar to performance bonds as they provide 
individuals or organisations with financial incentives to manage their waste in an 
environmentally preferable way. The price then has to be sufficiently attractive to get 
waste brought to the collection points. 
The most common form of appearance of this type of instrument is the deposit refund 
systems for used beverage containers, but its potential application is much wider, 
extending to batteries, cars, and other forms of solid waste (Gunningham and 
Grabosky, 2004). There is an ongoing debate as to the administrative complexity and 
cost of implementing such systems (Ashford, 2007). The meaning of many possibly 
valuable incentive mechanisms may be lost by the existence of perverse incentives, also 
referred to as the "subsidising of environmental bads". These often emerge due to 
governmental interference in the market with the aim to secure social or economic 
purposes without having a sound understanding of their implications for environmental 
protection (Fung and O'Rourke, 2000) and by doing so fail to spur eco-innovation 
within the sectors. This applies in equal measure to all other reviewed instruments and 
therefore can be seen as a general drawback of economic instruments. 
4.3.3 The major strengths and weaknesses of economic instruments 
According to Gunningham and Grabosky (2004) economic instruments are in theory 
designed to: 
  Influence behaviour through price signals or property systems without the need for 
direct intervention in the affairs of individuals and organisations; 
91 
  Encourage individuals to seek out the most cost-effective as well as innovative 
solutions; 
  Decentralise decision-making to individuals and organisations who often have better 
information on how to solve a problem than regulators; 
" Reduce the government's enforcement costs as well as the resource user's 
compliance costs; and 
  To give resource users an ongoing incentive to develop better environmental 
approaches. 
Whether these characteristics are necessarily demonstrated in practice is questionable. 
Unfortunately economic instruments are in there nature not self-enforcing and may 
contain considerable control costs (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). When compared 
with other regulatory instruments, it is necessary to estimate total regulatory costs, that 
is the public administrative costs as well as the private costs initiated by industry. In the 
practical application of economic instruments potential shortcomings include: 
 A strong reliance on information (e. g., about the quantity or quality of emissions). In 
the case where those information is very difficult to gain, a technology-based 
approach may be more adequate; 
  The risk that markets themselves may fail and that organisations may not react 
sensibly to price signals; 
  The risk that subsidies will have an euthanizing effect which reinforces the status quo 
rather that spurs innovative pollution controls. 
Economic instruments can be used to generate incentives to meet or exceed standards. 
They can, however, abolish the enforcement and compliance costs but they cannot 
transform regulation in the way their original advocates believed. Most of these 
economic instruments need government to set standards. The distinction between 
economic instruments and command and control regulation is that incentives and 
markets were used to push organisations towards compliance while different levels of 
compliance were perhaps higher than those achieved with command and control 
regulation. Economic instruments still need public bureaucracies to observe and to 
enforce the standards (Cohen, 1996). After outlining the advantages and disadvantages 
of economic (market-based) instruments, it became apparent that the underlying 
principles are well-understood. Their ability to spur eco-innovation however, is not. 
Economic instruments provide, when used in isolation, weak driving forces for eco- 
innovation as such they should be combined with other instruments. 
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4.3.4 Voluntary (or Communicative) Regulation 
Voluntarism is generally initiated by government, and may result in government being 
the key coordinator and facilitator. At a general level, this comprises voluntary 
agreements between government and individual businesses in regard to non-mandatory 
contracts between equal partners, one of which is government, in which incentives for 
actions arise from mutual interests rather than from sanctions (OECD, 1994). The 
range of such agreements results in rather difficult price classification. The term "non- 
mandatory" is fundamental to the extent that those agreements contain a restricting 
element that might legitimately be considered as an innovative form of CaC regulation. 
However, these "soft" instruments involve the risk of government relinquishing its 
responsibility for the environment. Negotiated agreements made by the business 
community, like the pledges to develop so-called 3-litre cars21, to take back old cars or to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions, are therefore controversial from an ecological and 
economic point of view (Rennings, et al., 1997). 
However, what government does is more like showing the instruments of torture to the 
victim as a first step of torture. Comparable to what, in former times, torturers would 
do with their instruments, nowadays the Minister for the Environment presents a draft 
for an ordinance so as to achieve voluntary concessions (Murswiek, 1988). Hence, in 
principle such cooperative solutions can be interpreted as barter transactions in which 
the business community imposes an obligation on itself to act in a certain manner, and 
government in return refrains from enforcing the desired conduct. This description is 
only justified in the case of instruments that use the price mechanism. However only a 
few exceptional voluntary agreements which fall back on this fundamental free-market 
principle do exist. These include the "Green Dot", which in economic terms is mainly 
characterised as a tax helping to charge the costs that incurring by the disposal of 
packaging in accordance with the polluter pays principle (Wood and Johannson, 2008). 
Voluntary agreements play a key role in the prevailing EU's strategy to reduce CO2 
emissions from passenger vehicles and to generally improve fuel efficiency. According 
to those agreements the automobile industry committed to reduce total new passenger 
fleet average CO2 emissions according to specific targets and timetables. The voluntary 
21 The VW Lupo 3L TDI, the world's first serial production-made car capable of consuming only three litres of fuel per hundred 
kilometres, stands for the Volkswagen Group's determination to make a direct contribution towards sustainable mobility. The launch of the "three-litre car" in summer 1999 has been a major step in fulfilling Volkswagen's voluntary commitment to reduce the 
volume of CO2 emissions 
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agreements were in 1998 concluded with the European Automobile Manufacturers' 
Association (ACEA), the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association QAMA), and 
the Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association (KAMA). In the future these 
agreements will be known collectively as the ACEA Agreement. The aspired target for 
new passenger fleet average CO2 emissions was 140 g C02/km by 2008/9. The 
Community's target for 2012 is 120 g CO. /km. This longer-term target has not yet 
included in any formal agreement with the car industry (ACEA, 2003). However, given 
the nature of this agreement it has to be underlined the average CO2 emissions output is 
still beyond this very ambitious target. Once again the sheer threat of regulation, which 
emerged due to the non-compliance in 2007-2009, was the main incentive for 
manufactures to meet this target. These agreements therefore can almost be seen as a 
courtesy in order to avoid strict regulatory activities, which would be a logical 
consequence if this opportunity was not made use of. 
However, as a rule, negotiated agreements shrink from such strict economic instruments 
and do not touch the basis of relative prices; after all, negotiated agreements do not 
spring from the market system, but rather from political negotiations between 
government and trade associations (Wood and Johannson, 2008). Nevertheless, an 
approach that is essentially based on negotiated solutions should not be characterised as 
market-based, but as a corporatist approach (Holzhey and Tegner, 1996). The main 
difference is that consumers have little possibility to participate in the negotiation 
process, although the consumer is highly affected by the result of the negotiations and 
in many cases has to pay for the changes; nevertheless, there are wider social benefits. 
Voluntarism has the considerable advantage of being non-interventionist, having high 
industry acceptability and raising minimal equity concerns. Furthermore it can support 
an ethic of environmental stewardship. It greatest strength though is where regulatees 
perceive their self-interest as being to protect the environment (OECD, 1994). 
Unfortunately, in most cases, this does not work because of the gap between public 
interest in environmental protection and the private interest of individuals 
(Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). Nevertheless, voluntary agreements still have an 
important role to play here in particular where the threats to the environment require 
active participation to resolve. The challenge in designing voluntary agreements is to 
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create, rather then hamper, the development of a custodial ethic', and to make 
environmental protection part of the "community norm" (Gunningham and Grabosky, 
2004). When this can be achieved, voluntary agreements between government and 
businesses or other interest groups, both in respect of "green issues" and in an industrial 
context, have considerable attractions (Rennings, et al., 1997). Voluntary instruments, 
such as the EMAS scheme, can have a positive influence on eco-innovations as it can 
have a positive impact on the maturity of environmental management systems on 
environmental process innovations (Wood and Johannson, 2008). 
4.4 Environmental regulation's role in innovation 
The literature and cases that have been studied in this project strongly suggest that, in 
general, environmental regulation does not have a negative influence on the speed, 
direction and degree of innovation in industry. On the other hand, there is not much 
evidence for the opposite conclusion that environmental regulation is a major engine 
behind technological innovation, making industry investing more in R&D than they 
would otherwise do. There are cases, even though rare, where environmental regulation 
spurred the R&D departments of private organisations to avoid sanctions. A classical 
example here is the introduction of the catalytic converter in Germany where the 
political pressure forced industry to re-fit their vehicles with a converter, which was 
soon appreciated since it was an opportunity to lobby against speed limits alongside tax 
releases. As a matter of fact it appears that R&D resources are diverted to 
environmental technologies from conventional "normal" technologies to meet strict 
standards and targets. 
This suggests that environmental regulation's role in innovation is a steering one, rather 
than hampering or driving. In this respect, it is only one among many other factors 
(which will exhaustively discussed in the subsequent chapter) determining the direction 
of industry's innovation efforts. The relative importance of this role differs from case to 
case. These factors may (or may not) steer the innovation process in the same direction 
as policy makers have initially anticipated. Synergies and "autonomous" trends towards 
(cleaner) technology do occur, but are by no means guaranteed. Innovation-oriented 
environmental regulation will therefore remain vital for sustainable technologies to 
I Custodial ethic is generally achieved through repetitive action, such that gradually, over time, the ethic becomes the "norm". 
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develop. Such regulation affects two externalities simultaneously: the negative externality 
of pollution (and other environmental damage) and the positive externality of R&D 
(spillovers) (Kemp, 2000; Rennings, 1998; Hammelskamp, 1997; Horbach, 2005; 
Brunnermeier, et al., 2003). However, inducing innovation requires strong regulation: 
the objectives and instruments should make it clear that significant changes are needed 
as it is believed that weak regulation, whether in terms of weak standards, or insufficient 
financial incentives are unlikely to achieve it. Obviously, with globalising markets, there 
is no guarantee that the innovations induced by environmental regulation will be 
developed by industry itself. However, even the introduction of "imported" new 
technology implies an innovative, although less desirable, activity. The same is true for 
domestic innovation (developed in response to environmental regulation) which turned 
into successful export items as a result of similar regulations implemented abroad 
(Ashford, 2005; Oosterhuis, et al., 2006). 
In general there is enough evidence to predict that economic instruments are potentially 
powerful drivers of eco-innovation, but other instruments should not be entirely 
discarded. The appropriateness of particular instruments (or combined instruments) 
may depend on the purpose for which they are used (e. g. innovation or diffusion) and 
the specific context in which they are applied (see e. g. Kemp, 2000). A comprehensive 
analysis of the specific factors determining eco-innovation (barriers and drivers) is 
carried out in the following Chapter 5. 
However, "hard" instruments (regulatory and economic instruments) appeared, so far, 
the most efficient ones to spur innovation. These instruments (if designed and 
implemented appropriately) provide the clearest signals about the direction, rate and the 
magnitude of the environmental improvements that the innovations should produce. 
"Soft" instruments like voluntary agreements (also applied in education and information 
provision) can play a complementary part in spreading knowledge and expertise and in 
creating markets for innovations yielding environmental improvements. 
Voluntary agreements will normally only be effective if there are no severe barriers 
(meaning that the innovation would probably come about anyway), or if there is a 
credible threat of sanctions (e. g. regulations) in case of non-compliance. In practice, an 
appropriate instrument mix is often used, implying that the effects of interactions 
between these instruments also need to be accounted for. Furthermore, any regulatory 
instrument will only be useful in terms of achieving the underlying purpose if an 
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adequate monitoring as well as enforcement is applied (Oosterhuis, et al., 2006; 
Horbach, 2007) as implementation control is at least as important as instrument choice. 
When looking at standards which can be made compulsory (direct regulation), be used 
as a basis-layer for tax reduction or even public procurement (economic instruments) or 
applied as a criterion in eco-labelling or voluntary agreements ("soft" instruments). 
Standards can be made compulsory (direct regulation), be used as a basis for tax 
reduction or even public procurement (economic instruments), or applied as a criteria in 
eco-labelling or voluntary agreements ("soft" instruments). Policy-makers have to allow 
for a sensitive balance between ambition and realism, so as to guarantee that there are 
strong and lasting incentives for innovation but also achievable opportunities and 
sufficient competition (Kemp, 2000). Continuous improvements in best available 
techniques and other benchmarks could be consulted by introducing obligations to 
enable new technological opportunities, even when applied industry-overlapping. On 
the contrary, radical innovations may require strong direct support for emerging 
technologies (often developed outside the vested organisations) that pose a challenge to 
the existing "locked in" technology (Oosterhuis, et al., 2006). 
4.5 Innovation friendly Regulation 
So called "SMARTs23 regulations are presented as an alternative to both, the inherently 
limited "command and control" model of first-generation environmental regulation and 
the perceived excesses of neo-conservative deregulation Qänicke, 2007). Here "smart 
regulation" is an umbrella for efforts to make use of a greater variety of regulatory 
instruments, from taxes and emissions trading to corporate environmental disclosure 
and public participation rights towards better targeting of the regulation and better 
directing the organisations response. It seeks to stimulate self-reflection and self- 
correction by regulated actors in line with public goals, rather than dictating the details 
of permissible behaviour (Fiorino, 1999). Moreover, smart regulation need to account 
for cultural differences to provide a more solid basis for compliance (Ekler, 2009). 
According to Jänicke et al (2002) regulatory instruments are innovation friendly when 
they fulfil certain criteria: 
23 The word "SMART" is used here as an acronym for "Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Timely". 
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Table 7: Regulatory Instruments Criteria 
Regulation is innovation friendly if: Regulatory instruments are innovation 
friendly if-. 
4based on dialog and consensus 3 provide economic incentives 
-calculable, reliable, and has continuity -* act in combination 
4decisive, proactive, and demanding -* are based on strategic planning and 
-*open and flexible goal formulation 
4 support innovation as a process and 
take account of the different phases of 
innovation and its diffusion 
Much emphasis was also put by governments on high technology projects supported by 
state funds and supply rather than demand driven, such as the Minite124, as France tried 
to catch-up in its ability to produce and use information and communication 
technologies. The Minitel case is and interesting example in this respect as it shows that 
government can, by all means, hinder disruptive technologies by adhering to 
conventional technologies which then show a tendency to an ex parte controlled 
approach. To prevent this, market forces need a stronger control function which, on the 
other side allow for an equally balanced approach. On the contrary many governments 
have underpinned their rather remarkable ability to arrive unerringly at the wrong 
answer. Many governments are now committed to carbon trading, even though there is 
very little evidence that this can achieve much. Moreover, there are estimates that up to 
90% of carbon trades are fraudulent. 
Smart regulations are considered to play a crucial role in the political competition for 
eco-innovation and can be identified as a key driving force behind eco-innovation. A 
series of regulatory design principles were identified by Gunningham and Grabosky 
(2004, p. 376-377) which also outline factors of successful regulatory design. Policy- 
makers, by all means, should take advantage of a number of large unrecognised 
opportunities and strategies for designing efficient and effective regulation with the 
underlying feature to stimulate innovation. These include: 
24 In the late 1980s most OECD countries had introduced videotext (teletext) services either on a commercial or an experimental basis. These interactive services allowed users to communicate with databases through telecommunication networks. However, the 
rapid development of Internet access is leading to a rapid decline in Minitel usage. By 1997 more than half of Transpac's traffic in 1997 came from the Internet whereas in 1995 Transpac's Internet traffic was insignificant. In 2002 traffic decreased by 22.4% and 
the number of Minitel terminals rented for a fee decreased by' 11 `% (OECD, 2003). Supporters of the Minitel claim that it has paved 
the way for France in developing c-commerce and, by doing so, the diffusion of the Internet. But these claims are not supported by 
the evidence which shows France lagging in Internet diffusion and c-commerce applications. 
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" the desirability of complementary instrument mixes over single instrument 
approaches while avoiding the dangers of "smorgasbordism" (i. e. wrongly assuming 
that organisations can "pick and choose" and that all instruments should be used 
rather than the minimum number necessary to achieve the desired result); 
" the virtues of parsimony: less interventionist measures are preferred and how to 
achieve such outcomes; 
  the benefits of an escalating response up an instrument pyramid (utilising not only 
government but also business and third parties) so as to build in regulatory 
responsiveness, to increase dependability of outcomes through instrument 
sequencing, and to provide early warning of instrument failure through the use of 
triggers; 
" empowering third parties (both commercial and non-commercial) to act as surrogate 
regulators, thereby achieving not only better environmental outcomes at less cost but 
also freeing up scarce regulatory resources that can be redeployed in other 
circumstances; and 
  maximising opportunities for win-win outcomes, by expanding the boundaries within 
which such opportunities are available and encouraging business to go "beyond 
compliance" with existing legal requirements. 
Moreover, the role of mixed instruments is widely recognised as being the only rational 
way towards a more sustainable policy-making by (Gunningham and Grabosky, 2004). 
In recent years, policy-makers have started to investigate a much wider range of 
environmental policy instruments (Michwitz, et at, 2007). There has been, however, 
little systematic enquiry in regard to the nexus of available instruments that vary 
conceptually. Overall, the various policy instruments are treated as alternatives rather 
than as complementary mechanisms as policy-makers have tended to comprise specific 
regulatory approaches without regard to the virtue of others (Gunningham and 
Grabosky, 2004). 
It remains an exception rather than the rule, however, that a single regulatory 
instrument is likely to be the most effective means of addressing a specific 
environmental issue even though those circumstances certainly exist. However, in most 
cases individual instruments comprise of both strengths and weaknesses, none of which 
are flexible enough and elastic to be able to entirely address all environmental issues in 
all contexts Qänicke, 2005) and by doing so spur eco-innovation. 
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CaC regulation has the advantage of being highly depended and predictable (if 
adequately enforced), but commonly appears to be rigid and inefficient. In comparison, 
economic instruments have the tendency to be efficient but, in most cases, not 
dependable. Strategies grounded in knowledge among other approaches such as 
voluntarism, and self-regulation have the advantage of being not compulsory, discreet 
and in most cases cost-effective, but also appear not being very reliable when used in 
isolation. Whether those succeed also depends strongly on the extent of the gap 
between the public and private interest (Ashford, 2005; Jaffe, et al., 2004; Jänicke, 2007; 
Horbach, 2007). In order to analyse the impact of environmental regulation in both 
private and public sector sector-specific data is needed. The project gained deep insights 
from the questionnaire survey within the UK's private and public sector and was 
therefore able to investigate the impact of specific environmental regulation alongside 
the willingness to comply with these. 
4.5.1 Selected examples of policy-measures to spur eco-innovation 
The following section reviews selected examples of different forms of policy induced 
eco-innovation processes. The cases show an interesting, project-relevant, track record 
of successful, policy induced, measures to spur eco-innovation: The Japanese Top 
Runner Approach, The British National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP), The 
Austrian Programme on Technologies for Sustainable Development, EKU: The 
Swedish Tool for Ecologically Sustainable Procurement. 
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4.5.1.1 Japan's Top Runner programme 
Japan's Top Runner programme is a regulatory concept designed to spur the continuous 
improvement of the energy efficiency of products in use within chosen segments of 
markets for household and office appliances, vehicles, vending machines etc. The 
approach is an example of an approach adapted from a maximum standard value system 
with the clear target to search for the most energy efficient strategy in regard to 
electrical appliances on the market and then determines that the efficiency of this top 
runner model should become the rule within generally three to ten years depending on 
the product group (Kuik, 2006a). The government argues that the policy context of the 
approach was the delicate energy supply structure of Japan and commitments due to the 
Kyoto Protocol (METI, 2008). In 1998, the Parliament integrated the approach as a 
component of the Japanese Law Concerning the Rational Use of Energy (the Energy 
Conservation Law). The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy is the regulator on 
behalf of Japan's Ministry for Economy, Trade and Industry where the Top Runner 
standards are set by committees comprised of representatives from the manufacturing 
industry, universities, trade unions, and consumer organisations. Through its design, the 
Top Runner adopts and feedback processes steadily modify and improve its scope. In 
progressive cycles, it implements product-specific energy performance requirements, 
with pre-defined basis for the adoption of standards as the use phase energy 
performance of the best available technology on the market at the time of revision 
(Nordqvist, 2006; Naturvirdverket, 2005 Kuik, 2006b). 
In the target year, each manufacturer must guarantee that the weighted average in terms 
of the efficiency of all products in that specific category is at least equal to that of the 
top runner model. Organisations who fail to achieve these goals are not immediately 
penalised until the reasons of their underperformance is analysed (METI, 2008). The 
approach allows for a progression of sanctions to be applied, should manufacturers or 
importers fail to comply with the requirements that come into action at the end of 
commitment periods (Naturvardverket, 2005; Nordqvist, 2006). First, the government 
issues advice to the actor "at fault" where the information of such correspondence is 
treated confidential, so that counteractive measures may be taken without having to put 
an individual organisation into an uncomfortable situation. When organisations fail to 
respond to governmental advice a public proclamation will be held in which the violator 
is officially named and publicly shamed. As a final step, the regulator may explicitly 
command an organisation to comply, and raise a fine if it does not. Whether or not, the 
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sanctions have been imposed by the Japanese government as a result of non-compliance 
with Top Runner standards is not known Qänicke, 2007). In order to meet the 
consumer-side of the measures which were designed and initiated by government, 
however, manufacturers are forced to provide information on energy consumption 
efficiency for machinery and equipment respectively (METI, 2008). Another 
component of this strategy is an energy saving labelling scheme, which is entirely 
voluntary. The label includes four major elements such as the degree that energy saving 
standards had been achieved, energy saving standard achievement rate, energy 
consumption efficiency, and the target fiscal year. These labels are then displayed in 
product catalogues as well as on products themselves whereas products that do not 
meet the requirements will be labelled with an orange sticker, in contrast to a green 
sticker for the models, which comply with the top runner standard (ibid. ). 
Quantitative data on Top Runner implications has been unavailable until recently 
(Nordqvist 2006). In a recent METI publication (2008), the results for efficiency 
improvements for several product categories (e. g. TV sets, VCRs, computers etc. ) have 
been illustrated with results gained efficiency enhancements exceeding initial aims (see 
METI 2008 for details). One of the rather undesirable side effects of the approach may 
be an increase in prices of the final products (Nordqvist, 2006; Jänicke, 2007 METI, 
2008). However, when looking at cars, the government provides tax relief for the 
purchase of cars with outstanding standards (Naturvärdverket, 2005; Nordqvist, 2006). 
The government implemented energy efficiency labelling and plans illustrating 
programmes explaining financial benefits of purchasing more energy efficient products 
(METI 2008). Nordqvist (2006) underpins that the most scepticism towards the Top 
Runner in Japan is that the approach only encourages incremental technical change, 
while more radical innovation receives almost no incentives under the scheme. It 
therefore can be recognised that when standard-setting procedures do not properly 
account for the actual technological potential, the approach could be seen as being sub- 
optimal. This therefore leads to the conclusion that this approach is recommended for 
more stable technologies rather than those that induce radical change. On the contrary, 
the built-in flexibility of Japanese Top Runner cycles allows the approach to stress and 
correct such failures (Naturvirdverket, 2005). 
Jänicke (2007) argues that if European countries would consider implementing the Top 
Runner approach many of its defining features would need to be altered and adjusted. 
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Naturvirdverket (2005) points out that a standard-setting procedure in an EU Top 
Runner programme would have to allow for organisations performing under various 
national schemes to adjust rather than being subjected to conflicting requirements. 
Moreover, it is far from self-evident that European manufacturers would be as 
complacent as their Japanese counterparts in participating in the iterative, extensive, 
lengthy and resource-intensive standard-setting exercises that have proved successful in 
Japan (Milder, 2009). It needs to be analysed whether this or some other alternative 
approach for standard-setting may be more conducive in a European environment. The 
development of parallel policies to Top Runner in Japan should also be noted (e. g. 
labelling, green procurement law, green vehicle tax relief scheme etc). It might be 
effective to launch from the beginning a whole package of co-ordinated Top Runner 
instruments (Nordqvist 2006). 
4.5.1.2 The Swedish Tool for Ecologically Sustainable Procurement 
The Swedish government has worked on creating environmental requirements for 
public procurement and developed an online tool, also known as EKU5225, to assist 
private and public purchasers buying "greener" products and by doing so promote 
sustainability within industry. 
The EKU application (Internet-based resource for ecologically sustainable 
procurement) has been designed over 10 years and is presently managed by the Swedish 
Environmental Management Council (SEMCO). All actions have so far been funded by 
state subsidies. The EKU office is generally responsible for the quality control as well as 
for the corresponding database; the responsibility for available products is divided by 
local authorities, county councils and government agencies (ETAP, 2006). EKU offers 
material which can be immediately applied, such as encouragement for crucial 
requirements, award criteria, and contract clauses. For each criterion, suggestions are 
made as to what extent the purchaser can ask for, either during the procurement 
process or later under the contract period. The EKU tool provides public and private 
purchasers with sets of environmental criteria for 20 product groups that range from 
batteries to medical devices (ETAP, 2006). The underlying idea is to make it easier for 
purchasers to apply environmental requirements in order to provide suppliers and 
contractors with adequate information about the possibilities of environmental 
u This section is based on: ETAP, EKU: The Swedish Took for Ecologically Sustainable Procurement, ETAP note, June 2006; 
Bergman I. -M., Ecologically Sustainable Public Procurement in Sweden, PowerPoint presentation, December 2002; 
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requirements which might be applied in procurement processes. These elements are 
persistently maintained and reviewed whenever necessary, for example to adjust to a 
change in legislation. In April 2006, eight groups of criteria out of 20 went under review. 
The procurement criteria are developed through an extensive quality assurance process 
where key parties from both private and public sector have participated. The sum of 
those elements are then subject to negotiations within a appointed working group which 
enables a consensus discussion between various stakeholders - from industry, eco-label 
organisations, public purchasers, experts from Governmental agencies, scientists etc. 
Finally a decision committee reviews the resulting conclusions which are available on 
the EKU web site for any purchaser afterwards. 
The Swedish Environmental Management Council was able to design those criteria due 
to the existence of 16 national environmental quality targets, e. g. limited climatic effect, 
fresh air and pollution-free environment. Aspects that link to environmental targets can 
be covered if they are also linked with the environmental performance. Other crucial 
factors without existing links yet, such as quality, safety and ergonomics, are not 
included by the work on criteria. In terms of its affinity with the Nordic Swan or the 
European Eco Label, the EKU instrument does not challenge these eco-label 
organisations but aligns them to the market situation, to the wider scope of the 
procurement and to the procurement regulation (ETAP, 2006). 
For instance the EKU tool incorporates a balance between compelling requirements, 
award criteria and contracts clauses where every criterion comes with a suggested degree 
of verification. EKU also provides criteria for products and services not served by eco- 
label organisations (medical devices for instance). Furthermore, actions to activate 
public purchaser's educational courses are incorporated within the project in order to 
explain the conditions for environmental requirements in public procurements and to 
present the EKU tool. Finally, public procurers are asked to join certain networks in 
order to exchange tips or advices corresponding to environmental procurement within 
the country. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency's review of the EKU tool 
states that it had an impact in the direction of reduced environmental impact in most 
investigated cases but again in many cases the requirements were set too low as the 
corresponding requirement level is uneven, both within individual product groups and 
between different product groups. The EKU approach should eventually be considered 
by governments as a tool for specific suggestions that allow for high environmental 
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requirement, also known as "spearhead criteria". This would support the best products 
on the market in environmental terms, and it could also spur the design of 
environmental products and services. In this manner, public purchasers have a choice of 
which level of environmental requirements they wish to use (Bergman, 2002). 
The report, which addressed procurement managers at all Swedish municipalities, 
counties and state authorities shows amongst other things that: 
  60% of procurement managers always or frequently issue environmental 
requirements as part of their procurement processes (municipality 70%, county 80%, 
state 40%) (ETAP, 2006); 
  34% have given their personnel training in environmental public procurement 
(municipality 43%, county 86%, state 19%)(ETAP, 2006); 
  42% use the EKU tool (municipality 62%, county 86%, state 14%)(ETAP, 2006); 
" 32% work with some form of review of their procurement processes from an 
environmental perspective (municipality 34%, county 50%, state 29%)(ETAP, 2006); 
" 48% see the biggest obstacle to environmental public procurement as being a lack of 
knowledge about how to issue environmental requirements (ETAP, 2006); 
  64% would help with drafting environmental requirements (ETAP, 2006). 
These examples clearly demonstrate the progress which was achieved with 
environmental public procurement, followed by municipalities and finally state 
authorities. It furthermore shows that a lack of knowledge is a major issue and that 
those organisations where the personnel have undergone training have made more 
progress in their work on environmental public procurement. 
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4.5.1.3 The Austrian Programme on Technologies for Sustainable Development 
The "Building of Tomorrow" 26is part of the Austrian Programme on Technologies for 
Sustainable Development developed by the Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation 
and Technology. The programme's very aim is to improve the competitiveness of 
Austria's industry and research while at the same time enhancing the quality of life and 
the environment. The activities focus on three areas: 
" Sub-programme `Building of Tomorrow" 
  Sub-programme "Energy Systems of Tomorrow" 
" Sub-programme "Factory of Tomorrow" 
Each sub-programme has specific goals and a corresponding strategy to meet these. 
Exemplary pilot and demonstration cases ("beacons of innovation") are being 
developed through specific projects, each one tie in with the results of the previous. 
Basic research studies, cooperative research incorporating organisations and researchers 
as well as the development of elements and technologies that aim to lay out the 
foundation for these descriptive cases. Issue-related themes are being put out to 
demonstrate as the best projects are chosen to receive funding by an international jury. 
Support is provided by a thematic management ("umbrella management") both for 
suggestions and the projects resulting from the available bids. Additionally intrinsic 
accompanying measures will be undertaken such as project competitions, networking 
events and qualification and training programmes. The programme leans on the general 
principles of sustainability: 
  orientation towards benefit and need; 
  efficient use of resources; 
  use of renewable resources; 
  multiple use and recycling; 
  flexibility and adaptability; 
  fault tolerance and risk precaution; 
  securing employment, income and quality of life. 
' This section is based on "Building of Tomorrow" website: http: //www. hausderzukunft. at/english. htnn (visited in March 2009); 
ETAP, Austria reaches TOP Position in Passive House Technology thanks to the "Building of Tomorrow" Programme, ETAP 
note, October 2006. 
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The activities supported by the programme include: 
  generation of innovative approaches and project definitions 
" activities focusing on fundamental research 
  applied research and development 
" networking and cooperation between individual projects 
  support for implementation (promotion, trainings, etc. ) 
  pilot and demonstration projects 
The approach initiates and endorses trendsetting research from designing projects to the 
implementation of exemplary pilot projects. It pursues clearly specified targets, chooses 
projects by means of providing procedures and is characterised by networking activities 
between individual research projects and by accompanying project management. 
According to the Austrian Government, the major gain of the programme is the 
enhanced cooperative research in the field of environmental technology leading to 
exemplifying projects. The rate of projects submitted by individual organisations in 
funded projects increased substantially over the past years. 
4.5.1.4 The British National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) 
The National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) carried out in the United 
Kingdom is an innovative business opportunity programme that yield to provide 
"bottom line" benefits whilst creating positive effects for the environment and society. 
Being the very first industrial symbiosis venture in the world, implemented on a national 
scale it operates at the core of industrial symbiosis thinking and practice. The approach 
supports organisations willing to rethink the way they deal with their resources. NISP 
enables of significant amount of organisations to become more efficient with the 
disposal of waste resources. 
The programme was officially implemented in July 2005 and is partly subsidised by 
DEFRA's2' Business Resource Efficiency and Waste Programme. Membership to the 
programme is free. NISP consists in a network of 12 regionally based offices across 
England, Wales and Scotland, each with a team of dedicated practitioners who work 
closely with their members. By having a regionally delivered but linked national 
programme, business issues identified in one region can often spill over into other 
regions. The programme's strength over other resource efficiency schemes is that it is 
27 Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is a UK Government Department 
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driven by the demands of organisations it works with, responding to and helping to 
overcome genuine industry problems. In order to allow for efficacy each region is linked 
to a programme advisory group. This group consists of leading local industry and 
business representatives who help steer the scheme on a regional level. The 
Environment Agency employs a dedicated NISP Manager with the clear assignment to 
raise awareness of the programme amongst agency staff, and to work alongside the 
NISP teams, local authorities and businesses identifying opportunities and synergies. 
Following initiatives"a were undertaken when implementing the scheme: 
  NISP's partnership with the Resource Efficiency KTN (formerly Mini-Waste 
Faraday) ensures the programme taps into the UK's best technological expertise and 
innovation increasing the potential for industrial symbiosis through the 
implementation of new technologies and processes; 
  NISP employs a Local Government Liaison to work alongside the Local 
Government Association and local authorities to help businesses improve the 
management of their resources and identify potential new business and market 
opportunities. 
Such relationships are important and help to resolve issues that may restrict resource 
efficiency and link them to local policy on planning, transport and sustainable 
purchasing. NISP helps to create commercial opportunities through the exchange of all 
resources, including materials, energy and water and sharing assets, logistics and 
expertise by operating as independent facilitator. 
As of 2008, NISP has more than 8,000 industrial member organisations including 
multinationals, SMEs and single operators. Each of the 12 regions has output targets. 
These are recorded by a unique case study methodology that reports actual 
achievements as verified by the companies themselves. All programme outputs are 
externally verified. Since NISP was launched in April 2005, According to DEFRA, 
NISP has made the following significant impact on the UK economy (data as of 
February 2008): 
  helped to divert over 2.95m tons of industrial waste from landfill; 
" generated £119m in new sales for its members; 
  reduced C02 emissions by over 2.9m tonnes; 
Ze This section is based on the Resource Efficiency Network: http: //rcn. globalwatchonline. com/epicentric_portal/site/UKREN/ 
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  saved its members over £97m; 
  eliminated 338,000 tonnes of hazardous waste; 
  created 618 new jobs and safeguarded an additional 807; 
  saved 5.24m tonnes of virgin material being used in the UK; 
  attracted over ß, 75.1m in private investment in reprocessing and recycling; 
" saved over 2.54m tonnes of potable water. 
All four schemes, although entirely different, demonstrate how governments can 
interfere in business processes and by doing so exemplify why this is necessary when 
one wants to stimulate eco-innovation within a specific industry or sector. 
The previously discussed Top Runner programme is suggested as an example of a policy 
approach to induce major technological changes. It was emphasised, however, that 
efforts should be made to avoid possible negative side effects of standardisation and 
offer some structural support for companies from regions lagging behind. The Swedish 
EKU approach, however, aims to influence purchasers within the private and public 
sector towards "greener" products and services with the underlying idea to promote 
sustainability. By doing so it provides a greater flexibility in terms of the anticipated level 
of environmental procurement which in turn is a strong incentive for purchasers within 
both sectors to adopt this purchasing strategy. When compared to the Top Runner 
approach it appears that the incentive structure is slightly different as government will 
not reward organisations by acting more sustainable as they should act in their own 
interest. The Austrian programme on technologies for sustainable development aims to 
enhance competitiveness of industry while at the same time improving natural 
environment and the quality of life in general. 
Finally the National Industrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) yields to provide "bottom- 
line" benefits whilst accomplishing effects for the environment and society. The 
underlying intention is quite similar to the Austrian approach even though NISP is less 
flexible due to defined output targets. Both approaches, however, aim to create 
commercial opportunities through the endorsement of trendsetting research through 
projects which in turn enhances the research in the field of environmental technologies. 
All approaches aim, in one way or another, to influence the individual behaviour by 
creating incentives to act more sustainable. A government that creates sustainable 
incentives for organisations to comply with regulation also enhances the competitive 
edge of those early adopters on a national level. Given the underlying imperative for 
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governments to spur innovation within industry, the question to what extent regulation 
has an impact on innovation becomes more relevant than ever before. This challenge is 
equally relevant for the public and private sectors. The eco-innovation field is to a large 
extent policy-driven. When analysing the literature, it became apparent that the impact 
of regulation on eco-innovation is still very inconclusive especially in regard to finding 
and applying appropriate instruments to trigger this desired affect. The following shows 
the refined TPD Model V20 which allows for a better understanding how regulation 
affects the innovation process in terms of its degree (radicalness of applied innovation) 
and direction (diffusion process). 
4.6 Conclusion 
Research on the relationship between innovation and environmental regulation 
appreciates that environmental regulations create new constraints as well as incentives 
that both affect the process of innovation. 
By examining regulatory instruments the aim of this chapter was to identify innovation 
friendly regulation, designed to spur innovation as a compliance process. The main 
finding here, consistent with the literature, is the need for multiple rather than single 
regulatory instruments that allow for smarter and cleaner regulation. Those 
combinations of instruments tailored to meet environmental issues will lead to a more 
imaginative as well as flexible approach of environmental regulation that has, so far, 
been implemented and therefore build the very essence of innovation friendly 
regulation. The emergence of smart regulation is likely to aid more radical approach of 
innovation. Empirical testing carried out by Esty and Porter reveals that the strictness of 
regulatory enforcement is the most important factors for determining environmental 
performance (Esty and Porter, 2005, p. 412) while a technology-based standard will 
provide little incentive to innovate, a performance-based measure will provide strong 
incentives for innovation and diffusion of technologies which achieve given 
environmental standards at lower financial cost (Johnstone, 2005, p. 22). Regulation 
designed to spur innovation has to be different from a CaC type of regulation, which 
typically entails cumbersome application procedures or even prescribes some best 
available technology (BAT), which must be implemented (Hitchens, 2001). In certain 
cases, a CaC regulation may be inevitable, but scholars who have explored the effects of 
regulation on innovation normally favour performance standards, in contrast to BAT 
standards and procedural standards (Hemmelskamp, et al., 2000; Green, 2005). 
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The empirical evidence is generally consistent with theoretical findings that economic 
regulation (market-based instruments) for environmental protection are likely to have 
significantly greater and positive impacts over time than direct (command-and-control) 
approaches on the invention, innovation, and diffusion of desirable, environmentally- 
friendly technologies. The increased use of market-based instruments and performance- 
based standards brings with it hypotheses regarding the effects of regulation on eco- 
innovation and diffusion can be tested. 
The further developed version V2.0 of the TPD-Model (Figure 11) aims to test the 
impact of regulation in combination with other occurring diffusion drivers as an isolated 
emergence of regulation as major diffusion driver is highly unlikely which was 
underlined by the initial in depth expert's interviews. Due to this fact the model had to 
be refined from the previous TPD model V,. 0 in that respect as the illustrated 
diffusion 
circles comprise of various diffusion factors (drivers and barriers) interlocked. For this 
reason the refined model version V2.0 had to account for this by allocating the six most 
relevant diffusion factors to the according diffusion cycles. At this stage the order of 
these diffusion cycles does not matter as no sector-specific cases are applied yet. 
Findings, taken from 12 experts interviews (Appendix III), demonstrate that whether 
these factors drive or hamper innovation depend on the direction, speed and radicalness 
of innovation as well as the industry or sector. 
It appears the lower the complexity and radicalness the higher the likelihood of having a 
dominating driver within a circle that outweighs a given barrier. This phenomenon 
could describe a L, change where incremental or small, progressive improvements to 
existing products, processes or services that are mainly based on common sense or 
check lists occur. Even a L2 changes where major re-design of existing products, 
processes or services, which are limited by the level of improvement that is technically 
feasible, is conceivable. When looking at the other end of the scale, where a more 
complex and radical approach towards innovation will have to be applied, the barriers 
seem to outweigh the drivers unless some external forces such as strong financial 
incentives for instance will interfere with the circular flow which would allow the system 
to reconfigure and eventually balance which would make a successful diffusion more 
likely. This case would characterise an 4n. 6 case where functional or products 
alternatives lead to "Green"-Innovation. The three main factors that were initially 
predicted to induce the diffusion of innovation are as follows: 
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Factor Costs; 
Leadership; 
Regulation; 
Sustainability; 
Market Forces; 
Risk & Uncertainty; 
These factors can, depending on the sector and degree of innovation, drive or hamper 
innovation and therefore have to be analysed in a distinct way. Findings from the 
interviews particularly underlined the ambivalent characteristic of regulation being both 
a strong driver and as a strong obstacle. The project will account for this phenomenon 
and will provide case studies where both effects occurred and by doing so examine the 
importance of regulation within the innovation diffusion circle. The 4-Levels of change 
will then be discussed within the case studies namely (Royal Mail, Bristol City Council, 
Aurora International and British Telecom) in chapter 6. 
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Those organisations are particularly suitable as they represent different sectors and 
therefore evaluate the model for its overarching applicability. As a further consequence 
the model will reveal sector-specific innovation differences which serve as a basis for 
tailored "stimulation-packages" to spur the innovation in both private and public sector. 
Finally, the long-term nature of regulatory challenges especially those posed by the 
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threat of global climate change underlines the importance of a better understanding of 
the effects of environmental regulation on innovation and its subsequent diffusion. In 
order to amend the understanding of what really drives innovation on one side and what 
hampers it on the other in a sector specific context, the refined TPD Model V2.0 
illustrated the dependence of interlocked and repetitive innovation diffusion cycles to 
exemplify the existing "fine-line" that separates drivers from barriers. 
However, it is believed that many relevant issues cannot be resolved at a purely 
theoretical level or on the basis of aggregate empirical analysis alone. Deep 
investigations of innovation and its consequences for environmental regulation requires 
going beyond studies that examine whether or not such effects exist. The following 
chapter allows for this and by doing so presents a detailed analysis of innovation 
diffusion factors (drivers and barriers) in a variety of sectors in order to provide an 
applicable sector-specific framework. As with many other previous regulatory 
instruments, current instruments tend to present the Zeitgeist of the prevailing 
economic climate even though it involves critical aspects as "the winds of the zeitgeist 
blow here today and somewhere else tomorrow and one who will act upon this will be 
gone with the wind" (Helmut Kohl, former Chancellor or the Federal Republic of 
Germany). 
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CHAPTER 5: Drivers and Barriers of Eco-Innovation 
5.1 Introduction 
The necessity of re-investigating the nexus between eco-innovation and regulation 
appears to be important as well as timely, given the yet inconclusive status of what really 
drives eco-innovation, and in particular when and how regulation will have an affect on 
it. Among other major factors that influence innovation, regulation is the most 
important although least understood Qänicke, 2007), as it can be both a strong driver as 
well as a strong barrier depending on whether the incentives for compliance are 
appealing enough for businesses. Which are the factors that are mainly responsible for 
this phenomenon? This chapter will conclude with the final version of the TPD-Model 
version V3.0, depicting how regulation among other factors drive as well as hamper the 
diffusion of eco-innovation depending on the radicalness, rate and direction of the 
applied eco-innovation within the process. In order to allow for a more insightful model 
that mirrors current eco-innovation processes, one needs to disaggregate private and 
public sector eco-innovation due to entirely different underlying motivations to 
innovate. This fragmentation between public and private sector innovation is carried out 
in the subsequent Chapter 6 where case studies, taken from the "Greening Management 
Survey" examine the sector-specific innovation approach. 
However, the emphasis in this chapter is to analyse the emergence of eco-innovation in 
the UK's private and public sector and to re-investigate the importance of regulation 
within the process. In order to provide a consistent categorisation system in which 
different sectors and their approach towards eco-innovation can be analysed, the 2008 
SIC (UK Standard Industrial Classification of Economic Activities) system was applied. 
Since the project aims to yield clarity about the driving forces on one side as well as the 
barriers of eco-innovation on the other actual drivers and barriers must be empirical. 
Hence this chapter will draw on data as well as literature. 
As stated, the "Greening Management Survey" was conducted in cooperation with the 
Chartered Management Institute (CMI) and the Institution of Engineering and 
Technology (IET) with a total of 20 000 sent out to members of those two professional 
bodies. The questionnaire was distributed among 15 000 members of the CMI and 5000 
members of the IET with a result of 1 500 responses in total (please also refer to 
Chapter 2). 
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Figure 12: Organisations by Sectors 
The organisations, taken from the survey, were allocated to 15 sectors (Figure 12) 
according to the SIC codes 5 of which were very small (< 3 %) and were therefore 
reclassified as "other". This was to compare different sectors in regard to their 
innovation drive as well as their attitude towards regulation. The rather uneven 
distribution of organisation across sectors makes it difficult for general assumption in 
regard to specific sectors. For this reason, individual examples that show a statistical 
significance were chosen to analyse the underlying objective to which degree 
organisations in either public or private sector innovate or not. Before the analysis focus 
entirely on the differences between the UK's public and private sector approach 
towards eco-innovation, some general survey findings regarding drivers and barriers are 
illustrated below (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Drivers and Barriers of (Eco)-Innovation 
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Overall, none of the above factors are seen, on balance, as a strong barrier for eco- 
innovation. Some have, however, an overwhelming emphasis on being neither, for 
instance, cooperation with research institutions are stated by 59% of responding 
managers to be "neither barrier nor driver". 76% of managers suggested that regulation 
is either a driver or a strong driver, making this the most important influence driving 
innovation. The second and third most important influence on innovation are energy 
costs and management commitment, both at 75%. 
Interestingly, different aspects of similar influences are rated very differently: while 
regulation overall is ranked as the most important factor, "uncertainty about future 
regulation" is ranked second from last, with 43% suggesting this is neither a driver nor a 
barrier. A similar case can be made for technology advances, and the costs of 
technology, indicating that other factors are more dominant than either, including 
strategic consideration and leadership on where product policy in an organisation is to 
proceed. These examples support the underlying notion that drivers as well as barriers 
tend to appear in a different shape due to various degrees of applied radicalness of 
innovation. This is considered for and included in the TPD model V,,, to demonstrate 
the fine line between drivers and barriers of eco-innovation. 
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5.2 Sector-specific innovation approaches 
This section identifies the main drivers and barriers for innovation in different sectors 
and, by doing so, provides answers to the following research questions (of this research 
project) as mentioned in chapter 1. 
Q 2.1 What are the dt erences between the public and private sector approach towards eco- 
innovalion? 
,Q2.2 
What are the distinct drivers and barriers for eco-innovation within the public and private 
sector? 
To better understand what drives and what hampers eco-innovation, it is useful to 
allocate participating organisations into types that reflect their position within the 
innovation process. To do this, a factor analysis (PCA) was carried out to reduce the 
number of variables, which explain approach and attitudes to the innovation process, 
and to identify potential groups of innovators that share a strategy. A subsequent cluster 
analysis was performed on the PCA result to allocate organisations to specific clusters 
that present distinct strategies Qeswani, et al., 2008). The PCA analysis, on the 
innovation drivers and barriers extracted four factors with Eigenvalues greater than one 
(Please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-1). Those four extracted factors (energy costs, 
labour costs, material costs, technology costs) show a cumulative variance of 62.9 % of 
the data, which justifies a subsequent analysis. The loadings of each parameter (driver or 
barrier) are illustrated in the following (Table 8) whereas the correlation between those 
parameters is derived from their coefficient values for each factor. Within a group the 
parameters with higher coefficient values are considered more related to each other. 
(Table 8) shows that energy costs, labour costs, material costs, technology costs as well 
as technological advances achieved high coefficient values for Component 2 (Factor 
Costs) suggesting that there is a correlation amongst them. These parameters represent 
internal pressures for those organisations and therefore can be seen as the most 
influential factor in regard to whether an organisation decides to innovate or not. 
118 
Table 8: PCA Component Matrix 
Com onent 
1 2 3 4 
Energy Costs reversed . 783 
Labour costs reversed 
. 890 Material costs reversed . 917 Technology Costs 840 reversed 
TechnolAdvances 559 reversed 
Management 741 commitment 
Employee engagement -. 783 
New markets for 'green' 412 - 504 products . 
Concern for global - 578 sustainability . 
Availability of skilled staff . 506 
Corporate targets 
. 
617 
Regulation 
. 782 
Uncertainty about IUturs 744 regulation . 
Measurement tools 
. 429 . 485 
Cooperation with 782 research Institutions 
Cooperation with other 793 firms Including suppliers 
External benchmarking 
, 
874 
Competitors activities . 714 
Likewise there is a relationship amongst management commitment and employee 
engagement, new markets for "green" products, and a concern for global sustainability 
show higher factor loadings at the according variable for Component 3 (Internal 
Engagement). This group is more concerned about managerial related issues then 
internal factor costs. The same applies for the next group where strategic in 
combination with regulatory issues such as the availability of staff, corporate targets, 
regulation as well as uncertainty about future regulation and measurement tools 
achieved high factor loadings for Component 4 (Regulatory Driver) and by doing so 
clearly outweigh the remaining factors. The remaining variables within Component 1 
(External Engagement) like cooperation with both research institutes as well as firms 
including suppliers, external benchmarking and competitor activities form another 
group where the emphasis is clearly on the desire to cooperate and compete among 
other parameters. 
It could be observed that regulatory bodies impose pressure to implement incentives 
with the underlying idea to encourage organisations to comply with those while industry 
in general monitors their competitors' activities and responds either by imitating their 
competitors or implementing own initiatives to match results achieved by others which 
justifies their focus on external engagement. To test the accuracy and reliability of the 
scale, a reliability analysis (Alpha) provides an effective tool for measuring Cronbach's 
119 
alpha, which is a numerical coefficient of reliability. Computation of alpha is based on 
the reliability of a test relative to other tests with same number of items, and measuring 
the same construct of interest (Cronbach, 1951). The analysis resulted in alpha values of 
0.88,0.77,0.77 and 0.8129 for the previously mentioned factor costs, internal 
engagement, regulatory driver, external driver factors, respectively. These values suggest 
a very good internal consistency in each factor group. The factors of this PCA were 
then used for a cluster analysis to allocate organisations to specific groups (clusters). 
Here, a two cluster approach was found to be ideal as more clusters would not have 
been explicit enough to allocate the factors in order to get a clear picture of the 
emerging clusters. Two distinct types of clusters, with a clear distribution amongst the 
survey, have emerged and can be characterised as follows. This method was used by 
Jeswani, et al., (2008) and adds further robustness as the subsequent cluster analysis 
enhances the informational value of the produced factors. 
In the first cluster (Figure 14) (Strategic Innovators) 34% of managers perceive regulation 
as a strong driver alongside their internal as well as external engagement. In addition to 
corporate targets and organisation-specific strategic decisions to innovate, it is the 
increasing uncertainty about future regulation that acts as a stimulus for eco-innovation, 
according to this cluster. Further important attributes can be found in their 
internal/external engagement as they seek cooperation with other organisations 
including suppliers or even research institutions to drive innovation within their own 
organisations. External benchmarking and employee engagement underpinned by a 
highly committed management rum out to further drive eco-innovation in this cluster. 
' Please also refer to Appendices Table A-2; Table A-3; Table A-4; Table A-5 
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TwoStep Cluster Number =I 
Regii or 
Figure 14: Cluster 1 (Strategic Innovators) 
The second cluster (Figure 15) represents 66% of all responding managers Factor-Costs 
30are the vital consideration towards eco-innovation. In fact, they perceive those as the 
dominant (only? ) driver for their innovation processes, as opposed to regulation, 
internal/external drivers or strategic considerations. In their opinion, material-costs 
alongside labour, energy or technology costs are the crucial factors that start and direct 
innovation. Interestingly, they do not seem to be guided by regulatory pressures or 
external engagement. 
" The term "Factor Costs" is used here as the sum of following costs: Energy Costs, labour Costs, Material Costs and 
Technological Costs. 
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Figure 15: Cluster 2 (Factor-Costs Innovators) 
Thus, the data suggests that there are only two a priori motives for organisations to 
innovate, strategic reasons (Strategic Innovators) or factor costs (Factor Costs Innovators). 
These two distinct groups mark the beginning of any movement towards innovation for 
an organisation. Arguably, the main difference between those two distinct clusters is 
whether an organisation innovates due to reasons of factor costs, or because of strategic 
reasons. These innovation clusters therefore differ, by and large, in their perspective on 
non-economic stimuli. If innovation is driven (or at least triggered) by factors other than 
cost, organisations tend to follow the less frequent Strategic Innoiatorr, and vice versa. 
The following (Table 9) provides insight into other dimensions of the innovator types 
and allows for a better understanding of those two distinct types: 
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Table 9: Strategic Vs. Factor-Costs Innovators 
Strategic Innovators Factor Cost as Barrier 
Approach to Close Link to "regulation is Close link to "Regulation Causes 
Re tion Good" Problems" 
Carbon Highest proportion of "Carbon Most frequent amongst 
Management Managers" "Wafers" and "Climate Change 
Cynics" 
Organisation Highest amongst 250+ Highest amongst 1-50 
Size employees employees 
Organisation Highest amongst Public Limits Highest amongst Owner / sole 
Status and public sector trader, Partnerships and 
Charities 
Economic The more growth, the higher the Highest amongst declining or 
success proportion zero-growth organisations 
Sector Growth The less growth, the higher the 
proportion 
Industry Sector Highest in Mining, Local Highest in Consultancy, Central 
Government, Housing, Utilities, Government, Education, 
Construction, Health & Social Finance, Insurance, Hospitality 
care, Telecommunications & leisure, manufacturing, public 
sector 
The distribution among participating sectors is illustrated below (Table 10): Factor Cost 
Innovators are particularly well represented in Hospitality, Catering & Leisure as well as 
Legal & Accounting service; Sales, Marketing, Advertising; Consultancy; Business 
services. It seems that these sectors do not have a high financial scope, which allows 
them to invest in path-breaking innovations due to immense incurring energy, material, 
labour and technology (short factor costs). On the contrary, the relatively high 
proportion of strategic innovators in the Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery sector as well 
as in the Electricity, Gas & Water sector is mainly due to the fact that those sectors see 
regulation as a major enabler of eco-innovation whereas sectors with a high proportion 
of Factor-Cost innovators generally find it difficult to comply with regulation as those are 
believed to provide less till no incentives at all to comply with. 
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Table 10: Innovation Cluster over Sic Sectors 
Innovation Attitudes 
Innovation as Factor costs 
Strategy as Inn Barrier 
RowN% RowN% 
Sic Sector Codes Agriculture, Forestry & 
Fishery 50.0% 50.0% 
Mining & Extraction 43.8% 56.2% 
Manufacturing & 
Production 1 Engineering 31.5% 66.5% 
Electricity, Gas & Water 50.0% 50.0% 
Construction 45.5% 54.5% 
Wholesale & Retail 35.0% 65.0% 
Transport & Logistics 34.0% 66.0% 
Hospitatlfk Catering, 21 1% 78 9% Leisure &I ourlsm . . 
Creative & Media I 
Telecommunication & 35.2% 64.8% 
Post/ IT 
Finance & Insurance 27.0% 73.0% 
Housing & Real Estate 47.4% 52.6% 
Legal &Accounting 
Service 1 Sales, 
Marketing, Advertising 1 22.0% 78.0% 
Consultancy! Business 
Services 
Education 28.0% 72.0% 
Health & Social Care 37.8% 62.2% 
Central & Local 
0overmnst /Fire & 
Rescue ! Defense I 
Justice & Security f Police 
38.4% 61.6% 
With regard to statistically significant differences between industry sectors, the following 
(Table 11) illustrates the corresponding ANOVA for all sectors combined, which shows 
significant differences in the general perception about eco-innovation. The potential for 
change in consumer choices that might increase the risk of investing in eco-innovation 
did not show a high statistical significance whereas the belief that "market-pull" is more 
important for eco-innovation than "technology push" followed by "leadership" is a 
more important driver for eco-innovation than competition among the different sectors 
showed the highest statistical differences. The main distinction here is between 
technology pushing further innovation, and markets pulling new products and with it 
innovation. Within this field, 49% of managers indicated that "market pull" is more 
important for their eco-innovation than "technology push", again emphasising the 
importance of economic cases to be made before change can happen, be this in the 
areas of environmental management generally or eco-innovation. This group equally 
consists of both Strategic Innovators as well as Factor Costs Innovators, which both rely on 
market forces to indicate the need for innovation (Please also refer to Appendix II; 
Table A-6). Likewise, 73% of managers suggested that leadership is more important for 
eco-innovation than competition which could be predominately allotted to the group of 
Factor Cost Innovators (Please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-7). This, once again, 
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underpins the differences between those distinct approaches as both are motivated to 
innovate by completely opposite reasons. Moreover, this has again a corollary with 
environmental management, where the leadership function is, as shown earlier, pivotal 
for its success (or even the start). The central of role of having a strong leadership was 
once again underlined and in the context of eco-innovation seems to be a more 
important driver than activities of rival organisations. 
Table 11: ANOVA on Innovation Attitudes 
ANOVA 
Sum of 
Leadership is a more Between Groups 14.599 14 1.043 1.367 . 162 important driver for eco- 
innovation than Within Groups 1098.097 1439 . 763 competition Total 1112.696 1453 
Market pull' is more Between Groups 23.579 14 1.684 2.225 . 006 important for eco- 
innovation than Within Groups 1087.138 1436 . 757 technology push' Total 1110.717 1450 
The potential for changes Between Groups 7.624 14 . 545 . 814 . 655 in consumer choices 
increases the risk of Within Groups 959.027 1433 . 659 Investing in eco- Innovation Total 966.651 1447 
A plausible explanation for the potential changes in consumer choice, which may 
increase the risk of investing in eco-innovation, does certainly exist among private 
sector organisations. Uncertainty about future regulation, which will have an impact on 
consumer preferences, do not provide incentives for private sector organisations to 
invest in eco-innovation as this poses a risky and therefore unlikely venture. This is 
particularly true for the Manufacturing, Production and Engineering sector where 35°/, 
indicate that those potential changes in legislation will have an effect on their innovation 
process followed by Legal & Accounting Service / Sales, Marketing, Advertising / 
Consultancy / Business Services with 33% as well as the Education and Health & Social 
Care sectors with just about 30% respectively. 
The public sector, represented by Central & Local government / Fire & Rescue / 
Defence / Justice & Security / Police has an even stronger belief that uncertainly in 
consumer choices will have an impact on their eco-innovation activities which was 
supported by 48% of respondents. This was unexpected, as the public sector is known 
for its reluctance and laggardness to change. The public sector is obviously alarmed by 
the speed and impact of consumer change that has occurred in the last years. The 
existing lack of direct adjustment of incentive structures within the public sector at both 
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operational and strategic level shows the need for a comprehensive approach with an 
underlying long-term strategy, including formation of objectives and regulation. Hence, 
special attention will be given in this research project to regulation as a major enabler as 
well as barrier of innovation. This perception was supported by various private sector 
organisations as the Group Operations Director from Aurora International stated that 
"government should ideally stimulate innovation by incentivising organisations to take up a stance 
towards innovate long-term solutions rather than just telling them to do so in terms of strict regulation". 
The North Wales Police Force as well as Fujitsu generally shared this opinion as they 
note that "government has not found a way yet in order to spur environmental innovation by giving 
organisations the means and measures and last but not least the regulatory condition that is mandatory 
in order to allowfor innovation to emerge". 
A factor that hampers the study of the dynamics of innovation is the lack of simple and 
clear-cut relations between the private objectives of an organisation and its owners and 
incentives for and rewards from eco-innovation. These differences require the need of 
caution when analysing change and eco-innovation as this may lead to a different 
innovation dynamics. However, as Malerba (2002) points out, the underlying idea that 
the connection between an organisation's behaviour and pecuniary reward can be seen 
as the central dynamic of economic rationale and the enforcement of innovation has to 
be seen as trivial. Frost and Egri (1991) believe in the existence of a "rational myth of eco- 
innovation" that portrays organisations as "goal-directed" even though they do not 
address public-sector eco-innovation as such. Yet, they do question the role of 
profitability as an indicator for the emergence of eco-innovations. There is quite often a 
competition for resources among various individuals within an organisation, and the 
methods that achieve success here are indeed multifaceted - for instance, being able to 
influence who assesses costs and benefits, and how this is achieved. However, this is 
not because organisations are "goal-directed" or reward-maximisers (as to use a 
somehow more neutral and less aggressive term than profit-maximisers). 
Some major differences between public and private sector institutions with relevance 
for analyses of eco-innovation activities could also be identified. These differences also 
have some immediate implications for the so important incentive structures for eco- 
innovative activities, which is discussed further in Chapter 6. Apart from publicly owned 
organisations, most public institutions are part of a larger command and control chains 
where it is harder to draw a line between the different parts of the system - and where 
legal frameworks provide little help in this. For instance: public agencies and 
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professional bodies interact closely with ministries as well as subordinate institutions 
and users. The eco-innovation activities in these institutions are heavily influenced by 
decisions made by senior staff. It appears that without a clear management commitment 
any initiatives towards eco-innovation activities seem to be absurd according to the 
survey findings where 52% of the public sector organisations identify management 
commitment being the most important factor towards eco-innovations. The closest 
parallel in the private sector will be large conglomerates or multinational companies. 
The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) states that demand pull, 
technology push as well as regulation can all play a significant role for multinational 
organisations. To the extent that this matters, "getting the prices right" by 
internalisation of the social costs of environmental damages will provide incentives for 
eco-innovations in the right "directions". 
Another important difference between private and public sector eco-innovation is the 
political aspect which is more important in the public than in the private sector. Policy 
decisions normally affect organisations indirectly, through regulation as well as 
subsidies. The intimate link between this governance dimension and funding of current 
expenses of the activities implies a very strong link between ownership and control on 
the one hand and the growth strategies of the subsidiary organisations which is just as 
important as the differences in management incentives. Public sector managers are in 
general more likely to receive lower and less performance based material benefits, which 
may influence their willingness to take risk. 
It is likely that innovative private organisations are more likely to accept "failure" than 
public institutions whereas "failure" is here considered to be eco-innovation projects 
that were not able to diffuse (Publin Report, 2005). Private organisations may consider 
"failures" an integrated part of any risky enterprise, while the pressure to short term 
economising of public funds may imply a critical disincentive to eco-innovation. 
Overall, one would then expect to see public organisations being risk-averse relative to 
market-oriented organisations, essentially due to the different incentive systems facing 
the two kinds of organisations. Another important finding is that responses can be 
sector-specific for intrinsic reasons. Strategies for Cleaner Technology31 found that 
responses were related to the latent value in the waste stream of organisations. 
31 Strategies for Cleaner Technology (2002), First Edition, Lund University 
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To conclude: existing differences between public and private sectors in the level of eco- 
innovation activities may be caused by: 
 a stronger co-linearity of control and funding, restricting the space of potential eco- 
innovation strategies; 
 a weaker differentiation of organisational and individual change oriented incentives 
to long-term performance incentives; 
  greater disincentives to innovation, though stronger ex post penalties for operational 
or functional eco-innovation failures. 
However, no proof substantiating the proposition that the public sector is less 
innovative than the private sectors could be found in this research. On the contrary: 
The interviews reveal that the public sector is less willing to take risks as opposed to 
private sector organisations that do not shy away from a certain amount of risk. This 
would imply that risk is not necessarily hampering innovation as long as existing drivers 
outweigh this barrier. 
The Community Innovation Survey (CIS)32 published in 2008, which served as a basis 
for the Europe INNOVA Sectoral Innovation Watch project published the year before 
the CMI survey was conducted showed that the most significant barriers (Table 12) for 
organisations considered eco-innovators were too high costs of innovation activities. 
This survey underlines the importance of establishing eco-innovation processes. The 
most significant finding of the survey was that eco-innovation initiatives were generally 
introduced to reduce costs. An earlier study (ZEW 2001), entitled IMPRESS, showed 
that 34% of organisations decreased their energy costs due to eco-innovation. Arguably 
whether organisations may be not aware of the longer-term opportunities to cut the 
costs due to investment in eco-innovation process (most notably eco-efficiency) or they 
do not have sufficient financial means. The latter may be confirmed here by a high 
number of organisations indicating the lack of appropriate source of finance (23%), 
which is, generic to innovation activities in all sectors. 
32 The Sectoral Innovation Watch project, ran from November 2005 to May 2008, analysed the factors and institutions impacting on innovation performance, and the framework conditions influencing innovation potential in nine sectors. Sectoral Innovation Watch 
provides policy-makers and stakeholders with a comprehensive, holistic understanding of sectoral innovation performance and 
challenges across the EU25. 
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Table 12: CIS Innovation Barriers 
Innovation barrier (high) 
CIS -3 data 
Eco-innovation 
Innovative Non-innovative 
companies companies 
Innovation costs too high 29.6 25.6 
Lack of appropriate sources of finance 22.7 19.3 
Excessive perceived economic risks 20.4 16.8 
Lack of qualified personnel 14.1 12.7 
Insufficient flexibility of regulations or standards 12.0 8.1 
Lack of customer responsiveness to new goods or services 8.8 6.9 
Lack of information on markets 7.4 5.4 
Organisational rigidities iNithin the enterprise 6.8 5.9 
Lack of information on technology 6.1 4.2 
A recent report (Coogan, 2007) identified two major issues related to the financing of 
environmental technologies within the private sector. The first one lies in the 
anticipation between technology developers and private sector investors; and in the 
availability of funding for early-stage developers (notably at the proof of concept stage). 
Obstacles to raise funds mainly include: financial structure and scale that contains higher 
upfront capital costs and a higher external funds requirement than otherwise; incorrect 
perceptions of cost and long-term performance risk, compounded by a lack of timely 
and accurate information; problems in coordination and communication between the 
different actors involved; market distortion caused by high-carbon fuel pricing that does 
not reflect the environmental and social costs they impose. This provides most clean 
technologies with a competitive disadvantage as it makes them rather dependent on 
supportive regulatory scheme to be financially viable. Price and quality remain the 
prevailing competition indicators for organisations implementing eco-innovations 
(ZEW, 2001). When related to the innovation clusters it appears that Factor Costs 
Innovators have difficulties to provide financial means as hampered by the implication 
of factors costs whereas Strategic Innovators find it easier to raise capital for technological 
modernisation as market forces alongside environmental regulation would suggest so. 
According to the CIS study only 3% of the surveyed organisations, which introduced 
eco-innovation, mentioned environmentally friendly features as the most important 
competition factor. In the eco-innovation process of an organisation, environmental 
aspects are dominated by economic factors or by restrictions due to current or up- 
coming regulation (Rennings, 2000). Once again regulation was identified as being one 
of the most important factors with ambiguous effects on eco-innovation in both 
directions as argued earlier. Results from both surveys (Greening Management as well as 
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CIS) suggest that organisations innovate due to strategic reasons (competitive 
advantages) or due to cost related incentives (high factor costs) which, once again, 
underpins the two distinct innovator types Strategic Innovators and Factor-Cost Innovators 
that were identified by this research. 
5.3 Regulation as a major Driver/Barrier for Eco-Innovation 
This section addresses the first two research questions (of this research project) as 
mentioned in section (1.4). 
Q 1.1 What is the sector-specific approach towards environmental regulation? 
Q 1.2 What is the impact of regulation on the rate and direction of eco-innovation? 
The following discusses the role of regulation to drive or hamper eco-innovation in 
different sectors. Regulation, technology and changes in consumer behaviour are key 
drivers of change in any industry, any sector and any country. The drivers are 
interrelated, but regulation typically initiates change, often having a direct effect on an 
industry or sector and on the direction and speed of technology innovation as well as 
changes in consumer behaviour. The barriers regulation may pose can stem from the 
complexity of regulation, the sheer size and impact they may have, as well as 
communication voids between regulator and regulated (Kemp, et al, 2004; Leitner, et al., 
2010; Johnstone, 2005; Nordbeck, et al., 2002). They therefore deserve more focus, 
which is the very purpose of this chapter. 
And still, demand for regulation to protect the natural environment gets widespread but 
grudging acceptance: widespread because everyone wants a liveable planet, grudging 
because of the lingering belief that environmental regulations erode competitiveness 
(Porter, et al., 1995a). The prevailing view is that regulation supports an inherent and 
fixed trade-off: ecology versus the economy. On one side of the trade-off are the social 
benefits that arise from strict environmental standards, on the other are industry's 
private costs for prevention and cleanup - costs that lead to higher prices and reduced 
competitiveness. 
To study the motivation behind complying (or not) with regulation, it was necessary to 
allocate respondents into groups that reflect their opinion on regulatory compliance and 
the overall use of regulation towards eco-innovation. The SPSS two-step cluster 
analysis procedure was designed for such applications. It requires only one pass of data 
(which is important for very large data files such as this with approximately 500 000 data 
points in total), and it can produce solutions based on mixtures of continuous and 
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categorical variables and for varying numbers of clusters (Kinnear and Gray, 2009). The 
clustering algorithm is based on a distance measure that gives the best results if all 
variables are independent, continuous variables are normally distributed, and categorical 
variables have a multinomial distribution. This occurs rather seldom in practice, but the 
algorithm is thought to act reasonably well even when the assumptions are not met. As 
the cluster analysis does not involve hypothesis testing and calculation of observed 
significance levels, other than for descriptive follow-up, it is perfectly acceptable to 
cluster data that may not meet the assumptions for best performance (Kinnear and 
Gray, 2009). After the two-step cluster analysis was performed, two distinct clusters 
emerged that depict organisations' behaviour within both public and private sector 
towards regulatory compliance. In fact they could not have been more diverse in terms 
of their defining attributes as respondents within the first cluster generally believe that 
regulations are helpful in order to achieve their organisations strategic goals whereas 
respondents allocated to the second cluster perceive regulation generally as a problem 
and barrier. Interestingly, the clusters are about equally widespread in distribution, 
indicative of the divisive nature of regulation. 
Cluster 1: 46% of managers strongly believe that regulation is good and therefore drives 
higher standards of environmental practice and prevent illegal behaviour at the same 
time. They do not think that regulations increase bureaucracy for managers and they do 
not see why or how regulations create unnecessary costs. This cluster strongly disagrees 
that regulation restricts business growth and members of this group are certainly not 
convinced that regulation encourage a "tick-box" compliance culture. 
Cluster 2: This cluster, represented by 54%, strongly disagrees that regulation drives 
higher standards of environmental practice and managers within this do not think that 
regulation can (or does) prevent illegal behaviour. If any, regulation will encourage a 
"tick-box" compliance culture. They also believe that regulation increases bureaucracy 
for managers as well as create unnecessary costs. Business growth is perceived to be 
hampered by regulation. Overall, regulations are perceived to cause problems as it can 
be a substantial obstacle to innovation processes. Finally, they believe that regulations 
are not helpful in terms of creating new markets, which makes sense, as they do not 
believe in regulation being a potential driver for innovation in the first place. 
With regard to statistical significant differences in the general perception about 
regulation between industry sectors, Table 13 illustrates the corresponding ANOVA for 
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all sectors combined, which shows significant differences in perceptions about 
regulation in two groups. 
Table 13: ANOVA on regulation environmental regulation 
ANOVA 
Sum of Squares cif Mean Square F St 
Drives higher standards Between Groups 19,819 14 1,416 2,128 009 
of environmental practice Within Groups 945,902 1422 , 665 Total 965,722 1436 
Prevents illegal behaviour Between Groups 25,124 14 1,795 1,642 062 
Within Groups 1543,228 1412 1,093 
Total 156@ 352 1426 
Increases bureaucracyfor Between Groups 8,667 14 , 619 706 , 770 managers Within Groups 1236,094 1409 , 877 Total 1244 761 1423 
Creates unnecessary Between Groups 26,999 14 1,929 1,851 028 costs Within Groups 1468,926 1410 1,042 
Total 1495 926 1424 
Restricts business Between Groups 10,310 14 736 , 793 678 growth , Within Groups 1304,740 1405 , 929 Total 1315 050 1419 
Encourages a lick box' Between Groups 13 241 14 
, 
946 
, 
959 494 
compliance culture Within Groups , 1392,472 1412 , 996 Total 1405 713 1426 
Encourages Innovation Between Groups 19,894 14 1,421 1,644 1061 
Within Groups 1228,036 1421 , 
864 
Total 1247 930 1435 
Helps to create new Between Groups 15 160 14 1,083 1,198 , 270 markets Within Groups , 1257,673 1391 , 904 Total 1272 834 1405 
That regulation increases bureaucracy for managers as well as restricted business growth 
seem to be well accepted facts among the anticipated sectors whereas statements such as 
regulation drives higher standards of environmental best practice as well as creating 
unnecessary costs seems to differ over the sectors and therefore show highly significant 
differences. This, in turn, is rather intriguing, given that 63% of participating 
organisations agree that regulation increase bureaucracy for managers whereas it is 
unclear whether this imposes additional cost which are normally associated with an 
increase in bureaucracy. 
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The following (Table 14) depicts the differences of the two emerged regulation cluster 
in 15 sectors. 
Table 14: Effect of regulation cluster 
Effect of Reaulatlon (cluster) 
Regulation 
Regulation Is causes 
good problems 
SIC-Sac Agriculture, Forestry & 
Fishing 37.5% 62.5% 
Mining & Extraction (Inc. 57 1% 42.9% oil and gas) . 
Manufacturing, Production 46.6% 53.4% & Engineering 
Electricity, Gas & Water 43.9% 56.1% 
Construction 43.8% 56.2% 
Wholesale & Retail 56.5% 43 5% 
Transport & Logistics 36.5% 63.5% 
Hospitalit, Cateringy, 50 0% 50 0% Leisure & Tourism . . 
Telecommunication & 8% 48 51 2% Post; Creative & Media . . 
Finance & Insurance 40.9% 59.1 % 
Housing & Real Estate 37.5% 62.5% 
Consultancyý' Le al & 
A ccounting 
Sales/Marke Ingg/Advertisl 43.9% 56.1% 
ng 
Education 38.0% 62.0% 
Health & Social Care 45.0% 5% 
Local Government; Fire & 
Rescue' Police Defence; 
Justice. Security 
49.9% 50.1% 
ýý_ 
The above table shows that Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery, Transport & Logistics, 
Housing & Real Estate and the Education sector seem to struggle to comply with 
regulation, as they are perceived being too complex, increase bureaucracy for managers, 
create unnecessary costs and generally restrict business growth and therefore unlikely to 
support their organisational goals. Moreover, there may be less customer pressure in 
these specific sectors, which explains the profound aversion against regulation. A lack 
of resources and awareness among employees appear to be the second strongest barrier 
towards compliance whereas the volume of submission and the number of regulation 
do not seem to matter that much. 
On the contrary, the Mining & Extraction as well as Wholesale & Retail sector believes 
that regulation is generally helpful to achieve their organisational objectives as it drives 
higher standards of environmental practice, encourages eco-innovation and helps to 
create new markets. The remaining sectors not yet referred to show an equal 
distribution of the two clusters. The public sector here represented by Central & Local 
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Government, Fire & Rescue, Defence, Justice & Security, Police surprisingly shows an 
equal distribution of the clusters where one would have expected a clear position 
towards a plenary compliance. Against the obvious conclusion the public sector turned 
out to be in doubt whether regulation will allow them to achieve their strategic 
organisational objectives. Nevertheless it contradicts critics of the system by conducting 
a highly innovative strategy (also refer to the Bristol City Council-Case in chapter 6) 
which was obviously not driven by regulation in the first place. 
In conclusion, as argued before regulation can act as either a strong incentive or 
disincentive for organisations to embark on eco-innovative activities. The ambiguity of 
regulation (please also refer to Chapter 4) is the source of a heated academic debate 
about the impact of regulation on eco-innovation. The truth lies probably somewhere in 
between as both camps present empirical facts empirical, which are presented in the 
subsequent sub-chapter. 
5.3.1 The ambiguity of regulation 
The common view within the pro-regulation camp is that regulation directs eco- 
innovation towards more economically and socially desirable ends. Scholars that 
support this idea argue that government should therefore use regulation to stimulate 
organisations towards more socially beneficial innovation as both society and 
organisations can gain benefits from regulation (Rothwell, 1980; 1992; Porter, 1980; 
1991). The benefits arise as new market opportunities are opened up by regulation and 
the public sentiment that often supports regulation. However, critics argue that the 
majority of organisations see regulation as a burden or barrier, rather than an 
opportunity to gain competitive advantage (Freeman & Soete, 2000) which is also due 
to cultural differences that may appear in certain organisation. 
However, the survey data showed that the majority of organisations in both public and 
private sector were either neutral (35%) or disagreed (38%) when asked whether 
regulation restricts business growth as the following (Figure 16) illustrates. This, when 
related to the two previously introduced clusters, does, interestingly, suggests a different 
distribution where regulation is not seen as a dominant barrier towards growth, which 
underlines its ambiguity nature. 
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Figure 16: Regulation restricts business growth over sectors 
The agriculture, forestry & fishery sector is the exception here, as 33% of the 
respondent managers within that sector believe that regulation restricts business growth, 
which is certainly a sector-specific characteristic. This once again underlines the 
ambiguity of regulation and its rather different image among various industry sectors, 
which justifies a sector-specific approach of regulation as a major driver, or barrier of 
eco-innovation as a general statement would hardly do justice to this matter. 
Porter (1991) argues that countries adopting stricter regulations can achieve competitive 
advantage by stimulating socially desirable innovations and gaining first mover 
advantages for their organisations which can, in turn, be exploited in other markets, 
whereas the interesting and profoundly influential "win-win" hypothesis has been 
criticised as being difficult to test empirically and for being too anecdotal (Jaffe & 
Palmer, 1997). This project adds to this debate where, for instance a manager at 
Hyundai Europe stated that "competition rather than regulation stimulate eco-innovation within 
multinational corporations. Given that the demand for environmental goods and services become great 
and greater throughout the market organisations get more prepared to suit the demand'. Ec1uall}, 
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organisations should also be prepared to comply with regulation as regulations are a 
typical "threat factor" and whenever an organisation decides not to comply with a 
certain type of regulation there might be a chance that it will not be able to compete. 
It can be argued that there are indirect benefits from well thought out regulation as 
these can change the direction of research by promoting new areas which otherwise 
would remain underdeveloped. By creating a stable climate of expectation about the 
direction of technical change regulation can also reduce uncertainty for innovating 
organisations and encourage technological convergence (and therefore increased 
opportunity for learning) (Marcus and Weber, 1989). 
The survey findings suggest that public and private sectors broadly agree that regulation 
creates new markets for products and services which is underpinned by table (previous 
ANOVA, Figure 13). Within the mining & extraction sector, 78% of responding 
managers strongly believe that regulation can certainly cause that effect as opposed to 
the public sector with a majority of 36% (56% undecided). On the contrary it can also 
be argued that regulation stifles eco-innovation, and by implication should be relaxed as 
it diverts resources that otherwise might be used to fund innovative research. The 
argument here is that the share of investment that would otherwise be used for funding 
innovative projects will now be diverted towards regulatory compliance. As a matter of 
fact it is by all means possible that R&D investments, initially raised to spur 
groundbreaking technologies, are merely used to develop conventional technologies. 
Just 16% of the participating organisations confirm that the uncertainty about future 
regulation is a barrier for their eco-innovation activities. All these facts underline firstly 
the ambiguity of regulation and secondly the trend towards being a major driver as 
opposed to being a strong barrier of eco-innovation. The predictability of the latter case 
is, however, complex as it depends on the interplay of diffusion factors as shown in 
Chapter 6. Nevertheless it is possible to predict the direction of innovation within the 
TPD Model V3. o to a certain extent due to the diffusion cycles that provide a better 
transparency of possible outcomes. 
A further argument against regulation as a dominant driver is that regulation changes 
organisations' ability to calculate the returns to investments in R&D by increasing their 
perception of risk and uncertainty. This, in turn, will discourage organisations from 
engaging in innovative activities as R&D activities involve high levels of technical and 
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commercial risk. Regulation may change organisations' perception of R&D risks, by 
adding additional uncertainty about passing compliance tests which was described in 
Chapter 4. However, it was also found that those organisations with a more strategic, 
and thus constructive, attitude towards regulation had consistently a more positive 
approach towards all of the above questions, and vice versa. 
Equally, organisations with a more pro-active approach towards innovation as a 
strategic driver for their success, consistently saw greater relevance, and have 
implemented a greater number of activities, than those organisations that saw cost 
considerations hampering innovation impetus. There was also a size effect, with larger 
companies being more actively involved in this agenda, and smaller organisations seeing 
themselves much more at the receiving side of a carbon management agenda they see 
little chance of shaping. The result shows that organisations with greater economic 
success having a more positive outlook towards environmental management generally 
replicated itself here as well. For instance, whereas 43% of organisations with declining 
growth disagreed that carbon management will become more important in the future, 
only 8% of growing organisations did so, which is maybe a reflection of the short- 
termism where poor economic results tend to instil on business strategists throughout. 
Moreover, 62% of organisations with negative growth rates perceive "Regulations 
causes Problems", which, in turn, suggests the need to comply with regulation is 
imperative in regard to business growth. The notion that "Regulation is good" increases 
in prevalence with size: 38% of organisations with less than 50 employees hold this 
view, rising to almost 50 % for organisations above 1000 employees. 
A third anti-regulation argument lies in its differential effect upon different sizes of 
organisations, regulation may cause concentration. Any decrease in the number of 
"players" within an industry may, in turn, decrease of the number of innovations Gaffe 
and Palmer, 1997). For instance 15% of the responding organisations believe that the 
uncertainty about future regulation hampers their innovation processes in comparison 
to 35% SMEs and 15% of the big organisations. Almost half of the respondent 
organisations were undecided regardless of the size of organisation which suggests a 
prevailing uncertainty about future proceedings even though the results do not support 
this assumption. 
All these arguments tend to assume that a decrease in the number of innovations is bad 
for an industry, and that this is an irreversible process. And typically, the literature 
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argues that increasing regulatory compliance costs is the main factor decreasing 
industrial innovation (e. g. Milmo, 2001). Key findings show that the Lack of resources 
was seen by the largest group of managers - 23% - to be the biggest barrier they face 
towards greater environmental management whereas 21% stated complexity of 
regulation to be the single largest barrier. Further 41% of managers seeing different 
aspects of regulation to be significant barriers and last but not least 54% of managers 
saw different aspects of a lack of leadership and commitment. Figure 17 shows the 
interdependency of internal factors, which appear to be the most significant barriers 
towards more environmental management practice. Lack of organisational commitment 
(15%) is a contributing factor to the lack of resources (23%) as well as a lack of staff 
awareness (14%) - if the organisation has not taken the commitment towards 
environmental management at the highest level, then it is unlikely that an appropriate 
level of resources is being committed, and training programmes to raise awareness are 
not forthcoming. And yet, the lack of awareness is also a contributing factor to the lack 
of organisational commitment. 
ULack of resources 
UComplex of regs 
Lack of org 
commitment 
Lack of staff 
awareness 
Comm of new  legislation by 
regulators UNo of regulations 
QOther 
Figure 17: Barriers towards regulatory compliance 
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In addition, the complexity of regulations is perceived more problematic with rising age 
of the responding manager, with managers over 60 being twice as likely to have picked 
this option as those below 40. This is either due to length of service or absolute age, and 
it is unclear whether this is because older staff have better chances to compare 
contemporary with earlier regulation, or whether the perception of regulation itself is 
changing with age. However, this also relates to the importance and attitudes of 
Directors, who were shown earlier to be particularly sceptical towards Climate Change, 
and since this is also identified as the most important environmental issue managers 
face, the lack of leadership is compounded. 
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Figure 18: Barriers towards regulatory compliance over management functions 
The above (Figure 18) shows that respondents in engineering positions clearly 
differentiate themselves, as they seem to struggle with the complexity of regulations as 
well as a lack of staff awareness, which more than other skills, also depends on the age, 
and experience of the individual respondent. 
It appears that with increasing corporate size lack of awareness and lack of resources 
seem to grow in importance as a barrier: The following (Table 15) shows small 
organisations with up to 50 employees are particularly concerned about the complexity 
of regulation, with 27% of organisations with less than 50 employees stating this to be 
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Table 15: Biggest barrier for achieving compliance with regulation by company size 
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their most statistically significant barrier. But they appear less concerned by a lack of 
resources (18%), which suggests that special attention should be paid to ensure 
regulators explain regulatory change in ways commensurate to the organisational size. 
For medium sized organisations, lack of resources (24%) appears to be the single 
biggest barrier in achieving compliance with environmental regulation followed by the 
complexity of regulation (21%). In addition, lack of communication by regulators seems 
to be a problem that recedes with size. Looking at individual sectors, Agriculture, 
Forestry & Fishing, Consultancies, Justice / Security and Mining & Extraction perceive 
the complexity of regulation (56%) to be the single biggest barrier in achieving 
compliance with environmental regulation as opposed to the Housing and Real Estate 
sector which does not see the complexity of regulation as a barrier (5`Yo), which is 
probably a function of the regulatory drive in this area. Hospitality, Catering, Leisure & 
Tourists sector as well as Housing and Real Estate sector seem to be troubled by the 
number of regulation even though their biggest concerns are the lack of resources 
(27%) and the lack of commitment (29%). The Finance and Insurance sector believe 
that a lack of organisational commitment is a big obstacle in achieving compliance with 
regulation whereas on the other hand Electricity, Gas & Water sector (7%) does not 
have an issue with this (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-10). The two biggest 
advocates for regulations are Mining & Extraction followed by the Wholesale & Retail 
sector with (57%) respectively. On the contrary the Transport & Logistic (640/4) sectors 
followed by Housing & Real Estate (63%) sector appear to be the biggest antagonists of 
regulation(please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-8). This is just another finding 
which underlines the ambiguity of regulation being either a strong driver or barrier. This 
fact, however, is to handle with utmost care as regulation when interacting with other 
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diffusion factors is very likely to change its characteristics and consequently the sector- 
specific preconceptions about regulation which is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Looking at job functions it appears that the more regulated and the more strategic a job 
is, the greater the likelihood that regulation is seen as a barrier for change, whereas 
others see lack of commitment and lack of awareness as primary barriers. For instance, 
Facility Managers as well as Corporate Affairs/Public Relations managers are the biggest 
advocates in terms of regulations whereas on the other hand Knowledge/Learning 
Managers as well as Management Consultants are the biggest opponents of regulation 
(please also refer to Appendix II; A-9). 
5.4 Government's Role in Promoting Eco-Innovation 
This section addresses the last research questions (of this research project) as mentioned 
in chapter 1: Q 3.1 Which role should a government adopt in order to promote eco-innovation within 
industr, y? (fadlitator or inhibitor) 
5.4.1 Theoretical Context 
The following discusses the role of government to stimulate eco-innovation within the 
private and public sector (facilitator or inhibitor). Measures are discussed within public 
and private sector organisations in order to develop a basis for multi-level stimulus 
packages for governments to foster eco-innovations. 
As outlined in Chapter 3 eco-innovation is generally considered being a complex and 
multi-step process, by which initial ideas become products, processes and services, 
typically studied at the micro level, as a pursuit for entrepreneurs and smart 
organisations. Governments are increasingly influencing the innovation process, 
declaring eco-innovation agendas and appointing senior eco-innovation officials 
(OECD, 2007b; DTI, 2003). The impetus is a consequence of two developments. 
difficult challenges in areas like energy, the environment and health care that require the 
collaboration between public and private sectors; and shortcomings of traditional 
economic development and industrial regulation (ibid). The ability to design 
environmentally-friendly innovations, here called eco-innovations, is predominately seen 
to rest within the private sector, even though this project has shown it is misleading to 
assume a less innovative public sector as exemplified in the case studies. Regulation is 
one of many variables that can influence the rate and direction of eco-innovation even 
though differences in radicalness shape its role as drivers or barriers eco-innovation. 
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The European Union committed itself to drive eco-innovation in the Lisbon Strategy33, 
it is crucial when and how governments influence the innovation process. Therefore, as 
argued, diffusion factors have to be reconsidered as they alone influence the rate, 
direction and radicalness of eco-innovation. The analysis of the case studies 
demonstrates that not all diffusion factors must be met in order to allow for more 
radical eco-innovation to occur. The mix of diffusion factors when combined shapes 
the speed and direction of eco-innovation. 
To provide organisations in both public and private sector with incentives to innovate, 
organisations should develop a clear understanding of their environmental impacts and 
their current costs for managing those impacts. Historically, most organisations have 
not concentrated their innovative potential and resources on eco-innovation, instead 
absorbing pollution control costs as overhead and thinking of them as simply another 
cost of doing business. Organisations that have developed information about their 
environmental impacts and costs have identified and invested in many win-win 
opportunities, reducing pollution and costs simultaneously (Schmidheiny, 1992; Smart, 
1992; Ditz and Ranganathan et al., 1995). 
This mirrors the Zeitgeist of being green and sustainable to meet stakeholder concerns 
in order to maintain a competitive edge. Government can and therefore should play a 
significant role by either requiring or motivating organisations to develop more 
information about their emissions and opportunities for pollution prevention (Martinez, 
2006). This, in rum, sets government into the role of a facilitator, which is very desirable 
in this particular case as forward-looking and technologically oriented organisations 
(also identified as early adopters that usually pioneer in ground-breaking new 
technologies) may find information a strong stimulus to greater eco-innovation, 
particularly in "win-win" situations. But in cases where the pay-off is less certain or 
longer-term, organisations may need incentives that change their competitive 
environment, making it good for the bottom-line to innovate. Market forces, such as 
Pigovian taxes34, can hereby provide a direct economic incentive. 
Other regulation such as standards can restrict the use of the environment for the 
disposal of wastes and therefore provide penalties for non-compliance and programmes 
 The Lisbon Strategy had set the goal for Europe to become by 2010 "the most competitive, knowledge-based economy in the 
world" (Sapir, 2003). 
s' A Pigovian tax is viewed as an alternative to regulation having a higher cost to society because they raise revenue and respond 
automatically to changes in the market such as lowered cost of production or pollution mitigation. 
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that disseminate information which result in public pressure for environmental 
improvement and/or public demand for environmentally sound products, can also 
impact the competitiveness of organisations, and hence provide direct incentives for 
eco-innovation (Norberg-Bohm, 1999). In summary, both economic and political 
incentives can create a market for eco-innovation and should therefore be considered by 
governments to steer eco-innovation within industry. As innovations may take a long- 
time to diffuse, private investment in R&D for the environment will be enhanced by 
reducing long-term uncertainties in the demand for environmental improvement. 
Reducing uncertainty needs to be combined with a certain degree of flexibility when 
looking at the degree of environmental protection it has to be reduced while increasing 
flexibility in complying with environmental policies. The ability to innovate lies within 
private and public sector organisation, and governments do not have a track record of 
picking commercial technology winners and losers (Roessner, 1984: p. 245; Nelson, 
1993). These private and public sector organisations may abuse the trust and power of 
government to advance their own agenda and, by doing so, protect their investments to 
benefit from potentially occurring innovation. Knowing this, government may be more 
averse to supporting potentially successful innovation as organisation shift the 
responsibility on to governments, which then may slip into the role of an inhibitor in 
order to take control of a potential abuse. 
Consequently, an innovative regulation will allow organisations in both sectors to 
respond with technology change to meet environmental goals. A government can be in 
control of this situation once it is decided whether to get involved, to what extent and 
with which strategy. As a matter of fact, governments try to be as flexible as possible 
rather than getting pinned down by organisations, which are pushing for clear 
commitments towards a limited risk scenario. Flexibility is generally challenging for 
governments due to the complexity in enforcing flexible regulation, although there is 
evidence that it can be successfully done and, by doing so, provide an important 
stimulus for innovation (Becker and Ashford, 1995; EPA, 1993). 
5.4.2 Empirical Evidence 
Regulation was seen by most interviewed managers as an important driver for eco- 
innovation, or at least, as a catalyst to change their business strategy. 
A researcher in the Volvo R&D Centre located in California stated that "government 
should be prepared to pave the way for organisations in order to allow an early adoption 
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of regulation by providing industry with incentives that lead to competitive advantages. 
Government would ideally not interfere as competition by itself will provide 
organisations with the biggest incentive to innovate in order to stay competitive" which 
was endorsed by a BIS senior policy officer who stated that government should regulate 
towards competition as this in turn drives eco-innovation (please also refer to Appendix 
III). This statement endorses the idea of governments' being neither a facilitator nor an 
inhibitor. In fact, it suggests that government should rather be a vigilant observer then 
trying to influence the development in either way. 
For some organisations, a shift in their approach to environmental matters has been 
driven by regulation related to climate change mitigation, coupled with increased fossil 
fuel prices and concerns about energy security. In particular, GHG emission limits have 
been a catalyst for change for many organisations particularly within the UK (Norberg- 
Bohm, 1999). This explains the dominance of Factor-Cost Innovators with 65% of all 
organisations participating in the Greening Management Survey belonging to this 
distinct type. A manager at Hyundai Europe pointed out that the EURO 4 regulation 
turns out to be a good example where the EU decided to promote diesel vehicles. This 
demonstrates governments' clear intention to support this development by designing a 
policy to spur it which indicates governments' role as a facilitator. Organisations were 
forced to increase their R&D activities in order to meet those requirements as a 
consequence. Most interviewed organisations stated that stringency of domestic 
regulation (in the home country or in countries where they operate) is not considered to 
be a key issue whereas the absence of clear and predictable regulation certainly is. 
In this context, the survey asked what the single biggest barrier for organisation is in 
achieving compliance with environmental regulations. Results show that the complexity 
of regulation as well as a lack of resources (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-10) 
is considered to hamper the regulatory compliance most, whereas the number of 
regulation and volume of submissions do not really seem to matter that much for 
organisations in both public and private sectors. As a consequence, governments should 
focus on the predictability and consistency of regulations as well as setting challenging 
and at the same time realistic targets, a point that was also acknowledged by Turpeinen 
(2007). When government does not set clear environment objectives and allows for a 
regulatory framework to attain those objectives, organisations are unlikely to be 
motivated to innovate, which would advocate governments' role as a facilitator. On the 
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contrary, one of the defining features of globalisation is that markets are much more 
dynamic, and organisations do not focus on their home domestic market, but can 
produce for foreign markets where clearer regulatory frameworks exist and, by doing so, 
bypasses their domestic regulatory obligations (Porter, 1991). Here, government act as 
an inhibitor to bar organisations to bypass or substitute their regulation which are 
seeking an easier more convenient solution abroad rather than having to grapple with 
domestic regulation. 
However, globalisation is affecting, and to some extent, challenging government's 
traditional role, in particular in creating and framing markets through regulation. At the 
same time it also creates opportunities for governments to develop new approaches to 
promote eco-innovation in both domestic and global markets. Triggering innovation on 
a national scale requires a concerted effort from government at both a local and a 
national level, from businesses, and from wider society. The most successful 
innovations often combine technology, customer insight and new business models 
(Horbach, 2007). 
Co-operating with local governments and municipalities to support businesses and 
communities to provide incentives to innovate was suggested by the North Wales Police 
Force as an appropriate measure particularly to boost eco-innovation processes within 
local communities. The interviews showed that officials from environment ministries 
and those from industry or other ministries in charge of innovation policies often have 
different views on the links between eco-innovation and the opportunities of global 
markets. 
Normally, environment ministry officials tend to focus on the environmental benefits of 
their regulations and the environmental impacts of industry (and on how to reduce 
them). For them, eco-innovation is a means to an end; technologies are promoted if 
their environmental benefits are large enough to justify the costs of supporting the 
technology which was underlined by a manager within the sustainability department of 
EDF who pointed out the need to have a clear objective which is to reduce carbon as 
government regulates carbon rather than regulate the need to reduce carbon. 
Government's role therefore has, once again, converted from a strictly speaking active 
(facilitator/inhibitor) role towards a more passive role as it merely monitors industry 
and if required counteracts with appropriate measures as opposed to imposing strict 
regulation as an incentive to innovate. The former President of the United States 
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George W. Bush argued that point when he suggested that the role of governments is 
not to create wealth rather than to create an environment in which the entrepreneur can 
flourish, in which minds can expand, in which technologies can reach new frontiers35 
This would suggest governments becoming a facilitator within clear defined limits. 
Ministries in charge of technology have a different approach toward eco-innovation 
than others as its overarching goal is to increase competitiveness, and to contribute to 
economic growth as well as job creation. For this reason, the use of global markets as an 
opportunity for eco-innovation is often more the result of initiatives undertaken by 
ministries of industry and technology than by ministries of environment. Co-ordination 
and concerted action between ministries therefore is an important step for governments 
in ensuring that eco-innovation policies adequately respond to the challenges of global 
markets, and in developing strategies that can contribute both to achieving the countries 
environmental objectives and to strengthening the capacity of domestic innovators to 
compete in global markets. The survey found that 54% of the responding organisations 
strongly believe that regulation helps to create new markets whereas almost a quarter of 
these argue that regulation restricts business growth, which appears to contradict the 
previous finding that regulation can help to create new markets. This has to be 
considered at a sector level where regulation can achieve different outcomes according 
to sector-specific eco-innovation diffusion-factors as outlined in the previous case 
studies. 
Governments have a very important role to play within the eco-innovation process even 
though a sensitive approach is important to allow for sector-specific regulation, which 
steers rather than triggers eco-innovation and by doing so promises competitive 
advantages for early adopters. The results suggest that strict regulations regarded to be 
the remedy for a less innovate industry (Porter et al., 1995) are unsuitable as existing 
uncertainties and risks involved do not lead to a higher level of eco-innovation. 
However, the usefulness of present regulations and therefore governments' ability to 
spur innovation should not be underestimated, as these are likely to be an effective 
means for capturing the win-win potential of technological change for the environment, 
i. e. the opportunity to amend both environmental and economic performance at the 
same time. More precisely these reforms allow organisations to develop the required 
3' President George W. Bush, Technology Agenda, November, 2002 
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information basis and to have a freedom of action that will both motivate and make it 
possible for organisations to engage in technological change for the environment when 
it has clear and relatively short-term profit potential. Thus, governments are able to 
minimise the risk and consequently uncertainty in investing in those ventures. 
Nevertheless, there remains considerable uncertainty about the potential for profits in 
pollution prevention. For many industry sectors, there is no currently commercialised 
technology, which can gainfully shift a particular sector towards minimal waste 
production (OECD, 2007b). In these situations, innovation in the longer run result in 
gains for the environment and possibly for economic efficiency as well. Under these 
circumstances private sector investments in eco-innovation are considered to be quite 
risky. However, to yet spur innovation here will require reductions in long-term 
uncertainty coupled with stronger incentives. This could take the form of longer-range 
goals for continued environmental improvement, thus sending a message to 
organisations to take on technological change for the environment as an integral part of 
their core business strategy. Under these circumstances, governments may have a role in 
both supply push as well as demand-pull. The analysis showed that whether 
governments' facilitate or inhibit, the diffusion of innovation depends on the 
transparency of the particular case. Moreover, governments have to rely on the ability, 
willingness and efforts of private and public sector organisations to innovate and, by 
doing so, comply with domestic regulation that, in turn, involve strong incentives to do 
SO. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided evidence of current eco-innovation scenarios within the UK's 
public and private sector. It has shown evidence of a sector specific approach towards 
eco-innovation activities and by doing so disproved the prevailing belief of an 
innovating private sector as opposed to a less innovating public sector. Further, it has 
presented some of the reasons for this rather unexpected finding and has attempted to 
provide a coherent argument towards further improvement and more initiatives in this 
field, which, from a sustainability perspective, is very much needed. 
From an organisational perspective, changes towards a more proactive approach in 
terms of eco-innovation were found to be meaningful, practical, and beneficial to 
organisations within all sectors and its employees. The evidence presented in this 
chapter strongly suggests that eco-innovation as an instrument of environmental 
management has become "mainstream" even though there is still considerable 
ambiguity of when and how to innovate as well as what really drives innovation as 
opposed to what hampers it. Environmental regulation and its impact on the rate, 
speed and direction of eco-innovation within the UK's private and public sector was 
examined. The ambiguity of regulation was shown to be both a strong driver and a 
strong barrier, which makes it rather difficult for organisations as the undisputed 
uncertainty within the innovation process makes this a rather risky venture for 
organisations to undertake. Consequently it is mandatory to design sector-specific 
tailored stimulus-packages to provide organisations with incentives to innovate by 
seeing this as an opportunity rather than an obligation. 
The corporate management responses to eco-innovation, once again, underlined the 
existing willingness to innovate which allows for radical change. On the side of 
managers, the willingness could be detected and documented, however individuals as 
employees often saw the limits of their scope for change being constrained by 
organisational priorities. In addition, the evidence is strong that directors in particular 
are quite cynical about the necessity of implementing green innovation strategies at all, 
and only if the economic bottom line is maintained. Once again Josef Schumpeter 
(1942) stated that economic downturns are "a good cold shower for the economic system. " So in 
other words the recession can have positive effects as it forces organisations to increase 
their efficiency, cut waste, and strive to do things in smarter ways. In short, driving eco- 
innovation - the very process it is argued here needed to further integrate the 
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environmental concerns with the economic interests of the quarterly bottom line. The 
final version of the TPD-Model includes the two identified innovation clusters which 
contain the four levels of eco-innovation ranging from small incremental steps until 
radical, fundamental change. This arrangement finally allows organisations to position 
themselves by evaluating diffusion factors (drivers/barriers) in the innovation chain to 
strategically plan further steps and innovative pathways if intended to. The four selected 
case studies (Chapter 6) aim to reveal the differences of public and private sector eco- 
innovation by applying the organisations-specific approach to the TPD model V3.0 (see 
Figure 19) to highlight when and how these organisations innovate, if at all. The model 
aims to unveil specific characteristics depending on which innovation strategy was 
chosen by each organisation. By doing so, it allows shedding light on the still 
inconclusive debate when and why organisations innovate. 
A general observation, however, is the more radical the innovation process becomes the 
more likely it is for Factor-Cost Innovators to withdraw from the process as the rather 
unpredictable factor costs (energy, labour, material and technology costs) will 
considerably hamper to the point of entirely block their innovation processes. This 
specific observation entirely applies to a micro-level perspective whereas a macro-level 
perspective may lead to similar findings since the cost of production for instance would 
not allow private organisations to innovate. By contrast strategic innovators, as the term 
already implies, are more likely to embrace this opportunity as radical innovation 
promises long term financial returns once the diffusion process has started. 
By contrast the transfer of resources from a manufacturer to e. g. suppliers may well 
pose a cost to manufacturers, but is the supplier operating in the same economy, it does 
not pose a net loss to the economy. In the event of having a foreign manufacturer and a 
domestic supplier potential gain can be achieved. From a regulator's perspective (i. e. 
government) this may be relevant since costs are generally only contemplated from one 
point of view. 
The exception proves the rule when looking into sector-specific examples where 
organisations were clearly allocated to one of the two innovation clusters but did not act 
cluster-specific in certain situations. This phenomenon will be further explained in 
Chapter 6 where four case studies are analysed on what drives (hampers) eco- 
innovation, using the TPD model version V3.0. 
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Figure 19: TPD-Model V3. o 
The diffusion factors have, depending on the specific sector and level of innovation, 
different loadings. The diffusion factors are not yet ranked or ordered, again, this 
depends on the specific case. The diffusion cycles shed light on the rate and direction of 
the applied factors respectively and therefore provide transparency for policy makers to 
interfere with appropriate measures. The impact of each diffusion factor varies on the 
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applied level and in what combination they occur. Therefore, it is important to compare 
each diffusion factor to study the interdependency as well as potential synergy effects as 
the emergence of just one factor is highly unlikely. When interpreting these factors it is 
then possible to indicate the direction regulation is pushing in either a driving force or a 
barrier and therefore strategically plan the diffusion process of eco-innovations which 
allows organisations to reduce the initial risk and resulting uncertainty of investing in 
novel products, processes and services. Further, it simplifies the complex process of 
diffusion by applying the core principles in a more realistic way with the underlying 
intention to enable diffusion as the classical diffusion process, described by Rogers 
(2003) and discussed in Chapter 3, is less practical for organisations to implement. The 
survey clearly shows a lack of understanding of how to trigger the diffusion of eco- 
innovation among the participating organisations in both private and public sector and 
therefore underlines the importance of a more practical framework. 
The third and final version of the TPD model V3.0 was introduced to account for this 
development. It differs from previous versions as it allocates the prevailing diffusion 
factors, taken from the Greening Management Survey, to four levels of eco-innovation 
which are subdivided into strategic and factor cost innovators. This arrangement allows 
a deeper understanding of the reasons due to which both innovator types innovate (or 
not) and therefore aims to serve as an assessment basis for organisations to evaluate 
when and how to innovate. In the following chapter the model will be applied to four 
case studies that represent the UK's public and private sector respectively to evaluate 
and validate the model. 
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CHAPTER 6: Case Studies - Eco Innovation in the 
Public and Private Sector 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to build upon the previous discussion (Chapter 5) about the diffusion 
factors of eco-innovation. The chapter aims to test the TPD model by applying it to 
four case studies to highlight the dynamics of sector specific eco-innovation. The cases 
chosen to represent the UK's public sector are the Royal Mail (RM) and Bristol City 
Council (BCC), those cases chosen to represent the private sector are Aurora 
International (AI) and British Telecom (BT). 
The data was, once again, taken from the "Greening Management Survey" 
questionnaire, which was designed in cooperation with the Chartered Management 
Institute (CMI) and the Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET). Further 
evidence was taken from follow-up interviews with managers working for the chosen 
organisations to add further robustness to the statistical significance. As a consequence 
of the case studies, the final research question on government's role within the eco- 
innovation process is discussed. 
6.2 Royal Mail - Case Study 
The following is a brief overview based on the "Lean and Green Report"' of the Royal 
Mail and their steps to implement environmental best practice. It also illustrates the 
Royal Mail's core strategy to reduce their organisational environmental impact. This is 
crucial to better understand the subsequent analysis of the Royal Mails approach 
towards eco-innovation. The Royal Mail primarily operates in the postal sector with 
some additional activities in logistics and communications and will be regulated in 
addition to its current set up within the communications sector in the near future. Royal 
Mail employs 165,000 staff across the UK, with 33,000 vehicles operating across 3,000 
sites. 
Royal Mail has had a carbon management strategy in place for several years, with a 
programme of activity looking at how the organisation can effectively reduce its carbon 
consumption over periods of five to ten years. Given the nature of the business, the 
' Please also refer to (Wehrmeyer, et a)., 2009) 
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main areas of focus are on fuel and transport, alongside energy use, particularly in 
buildings. Additional sustainability targets on waste, landfill and water consumption 
feature prominently in the strategy. Royal Mail is committed to a series of targets 
including reducing its total carbon dioxide transport emissions by 20% by 2010, 
reducing solid waste sent to landfill by 25%, reducing fresh water consumption by 5% 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from building energy use by 10%. It has an 
overall "stretch" target of reducing total carbon dioxide emissions by 50% by 2015 
(Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
The CSR team determines the organisation's environmental objectives and is 
responsible for both developing and implementing the carbon management programme. 
Development of these objectives was carried out in conjunction with the Carbon Trust. 
A CSR committee made up of managing directors across Royal Mail Group's brands 
and chaired by the chief executive, leads implementation of the strategy. This council 
provides high-level visibility across the organisation and approval at this senior level 
helps to remove obstacles further down the organisational chain. Essentially, success in 
this area is about "making sune that the drive is there for the business to adopt these nein strategie? ', 
according to the Head of Environmental Solutions of Royal Mail. 
Royal Mail is working towards developing formal internal networks with local 
champions to support the business in driving through change (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
Additionally, there is increased emphasis on creating accountability by looking at how 
environmental aspects can be built into business targets for senior managers. 
Environmental aspects are also incorporated into all business case submissions, so that 
there is a "green consideration" in everything the organisation does. A carbon 
management board, with representation from senior leaders covering each of the 
directorates, was recently set up to ensure that sustainability targets were embedded and 
monitored, and as a means to avoid barriers to implementation. 
The organisation is conscious of the need to deliver better communications to help 
drive employee engagement. One of the most effective initiatives in the organisation's 
carbon management strategy has been the transport review, which looked to model 
different ways to run the fleet of vehicles. Following remodelling, the Royal Mail was 
able to reduce its overall carbon footprint by approximately 120,000 tons per year. 
Other initiatives include looking at training staff to drive in a more environmentally 
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friendly way and rewarding customers for producing "sustainable mailings" that reduce 
waste through better targeting and are easy to recycle (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
Comparatively, the International Post Corporation's assessment of carbon management 
programmes in postal organisations around the world ranked Royal Mail fairly high in 
2008 (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). This process has helped to demonstrate the 
achievements of the organisation, as well as increasing awareness of other sustainability 
agendas, which has led to shared understanding of best practice across the sector. Given 
the "island position" of Royal Mail within the UK it is to some extent questionable how 
Royal Mail allows for best practice due to a lack of adequate competition. 
Royal Mail views a highly successful carbon management programme as integral to its 
future and to capitalising on potential new commercial opportunities. It is crucial, 
therefore, to establish credibility by practising green management within the 
organisation itself. In terms of the present economic climate, Royal Mail accepts that it 
will have to get "very creative" at how it delivers carbon reduction (Wehrmeyer, et al., 
2009). 
Equally, the future regulatory context is likely to heavily shape the organisational 
response: "And of course there are things coming that are in the pipeline. So Apri12010, the Carbon 
Reduction Commitment is being introduced which will potentially put some interesting financial penalties 
on companies ... That is going to drive peoples' views on bow they use eneej within their 
organisations. " The notion of sustainable development may appear less glamorous than 
other aspects of the business operation. Yet it is arguably both an important and urgent 
agenda for organisations to come to terms with: `7 can't imagine there are too may 
organisations that would actually put their hands up in the air and say `'yes" to the idea that the future 
longevity of their organisation is based on being unsustainable' This statement implies a clear 
commitment towards a sustainable long term innovation strategy that allows Royal Mail 
to build its future capabilities especially in respect to its global positioning in the logistic 
sector. Royal Mail has a variety of very ambitious plans, as previously outlined, to set the 
course for a more sustainable future by concentrating on developing its ability to initiate 
and implement eco-innovation in their business processes. 
The TPD-model shows the organisation specific approach towards eco-innovation by 
means of the survey data which leads to the following model-arrangement. " The bars 
(Figure 20) aim to demonstrate the pathway and direction of eco-innovation that occurs 
3' The data used in the model consists of the questionnaire response in combination with a follow-up interview held with the Head 
of Environmental Solutions of Royal Mail 
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on the particular level due to level-specific diffusion-factors that drive and hamper it 
accordingly. The Royal Mail data shows a tendency to a factor-cost driven innovation 
strategy (please also refer Appendix II; Table A-11) which mainly takes place on Level 
L, and L2 where incremental improvements alongside a potential limited redesign of 
existing products and processes occurred. 
Royal Mail believes that regulations are helpful in terms of creating new markets (please 
also refer to Appendix II; Table A-13), which is surprising as they do not believe in 
regulation being a potential driver for eco-innovation in the first place. Yet a more 
strategic approach towards eco-innovation is not applied given the strong averseness to 
regulation at any eco-innovation level. According to the Head of Environmental 
Solutions it is crucial to create market pressures in terms of competitors and commercial 
advantage as this is likely to have the biggest impact in terms of innovation which 
underlines the antipathy to regulation. Royal Mail further believes that leadership is a 
more important driver for eco-innovation than competition, as can be seen at L, and L2 
where strong leadership drives eco-innovation. This suggests that internal factors rank 
higher for this organisation than external factors, which matches the rationale of the 
Royal Mail's carbon management programme. Accordingly, Royal Mail acknowledges 
market forces to be more important than a technological pull effect which, once again, 
underlines their aversion of undertaking any risk (please also refer to Appendix II; Table 
A-14; Table A-6). Moreover, this explains why Royal Mail does not push more radical 
eco-innovation as this would involve a certain mount of uncertainty which occurs to be 
the most dominant barrier when looking at Level3n_b eco-innovation. The belief that 
regulation hampers their innovation processes alongside the lack of concern for global 
sustainability present the most dominant barriers, which when used in combination 
makes Level3, _b eco-innovation unlikely to evolve. 
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TPD-Model V3.0 
Royal Mail 
(Factor-Cost Innovator) 
Risk & Uncertainty 
Market Forces 
Regulation 
1ýý 
4 Levels of . hand Arrangement of Organisation- 
Innovation Toe 
Lt Incremental Improvements Specific Diffusion Factors Si Strategic-Innorator, 
L2 Redesign or "Green-Limits" FI IF: utor Costs PCt Factor Costs-Innovators 
L3 Functional or Product Alternatives Pu Leadership 
Lab System Innovation: Design for the Fm Regulation 
Sustainable Society F i% Sustainability 
L L(b 0 RP... Regulatory Pressures Ftt Market Forces 
A DP... Diffusion Potential Fvt Risk & Uncertainty 
Figure 20: TPD-Model Royal Mail (Factor-Costs Innovator) 
On the other hand, Royal Mail does also not push radical innovation due to substantial 
cost cutting pressures which are underpinned by external regulatory frameworks which, 
in turn, are so tight that long-tem strategic innovation is highly unlikely to evolve. 
However, Royal Mail strongly believes that a potential change in consumer choices will 
increase their risk of investing in eco-innovation even though they recognise 
Factor Costs 
I.. 
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sustainability as a major driver for eco-innovation although not strong enough to drive 
their own innovation process (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-15). So far, this 
case seems to support the prevailing belief that the public sector is not very innovative 
as it just innovates when forced to and then solely in an incremental less risky way. 
However, when looking into Royal Mail's operation it appears that this case is not really 
typical for the public sector as Royal Mail competes with private sector organisations 
and by doing so has cost effectiveness and competition on price as success factors, as 
opposed to value-for-money considerations commonly associated with the public 
sector. 
Nevertheless, Royal Mail tends to drift away from a more strategic and radical 
innovation approach towards a purely factor-cost driven strategy which one would have 
expected without having delved into the causation of public sector eco-innovation. The 
following (Table 16) explains the Royal Mails eco-innovation approach by identifying 
the major diffusion factors and allocating those to the applied levels of eco-innovations. 
Table 16: Royal Mail's diffusion factors 
Strategic Innovators Factor-Costs Innovators 
In Ia Li Lm L1 I. t Ia. 14b 
S/mu Driver Barrier 
Factor-Costs Medium Driver Barrier 
Weak 
S/mu Driver Driver Barrier 
Leadership Medium Barrier 
Weak 
S/mu Barrier Barrier 
Regulation Medium Barrier 
Weak N/A Barrier 
Stroa 
Sustainability Medium Driver Driver 
Weak Driver Driver 
Strop Driver 
Market-Forces Medium Driver 
Weak Driver Driver 
Risk & Stro Barrier 
Barrier 
Uncertaint Medium Barrier y Weak Barrier 
The TPD model illustrates the interaction of diffusion factors that are to some extent 
typical for a public sector organisation even though they are not caused by the same 
motivation that normally drives public sector organisations. Still, Royal Mail is an 
exceptional case due to the fact that they are competition orientated and therefore 
should adopt a more strategic approach towards innovation as opposed to being a Factor 
Cost Innovator. What regulation, according to the Head of Environmental Solutions at 
Royal Mail, does is to provide a level playing field or apply a consistent set of standards 
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against which organisations can be measured. This, once again, indicates the trend 
towards benchmarking and by doing so underlines the need for a more strategic 
innovation approach. The model helps Royal Mail to reconsider their innovation 
strategy towards a more strategic innovation approach which would support their 
aspired future targets. Moreover, the model demonstrates that a more proactive 
approach towards regulation is needed to allow for long-term innovation to occur. The 
following case (Bristol City Council) will demonstrate another distinct eco-innovation 
approach for a public sector organisation and therefore challenges the prevailing belief 
of a less innovative as well as less strategic public sector. 
6.3 Bristol City Council (BCC) 
The following briefly summarises recent activities by the Bristol City Council (BCC) 
based on the "Lean and Green Report' . 3B It provides evidence of implementing 
environmental best practice as well as illustrates BCC's core strategy to reduce their 
organisational environmental impact. This is important as it provided the basis to better 
understand the subsequent analysis of the BCC's approach towards eco-innovation. 
BCC is a local authority with approximately 18,000 employees. At BCC, the 
environmental strategy is interwoven with the organisation's overall strategic goals. This 
encapsulates the idea of not merely being seen to be green, but actually taking decisive 
action to demonstrate the Council's commitment to a greener way of life by 
implementing schemes such as opening up old railway lines as cycle ways etc. It is the 
aim of the Council to endorse a policy for Bristol as a whole, to become a better, more 
environmentally friendly place for people to live and work. There is an Energy 
Management Unit oversees the Council's strategy on carbon management, energy usage, 
and environmental certification. The broad strategic aim is currently to work towards 
achieving a carbon neutral base, and this incorporates large scale, radical projects such 
as the introduction of a wind farm. Bristol City Council is, at present, actively installing a 
number of biomass boilers, including sourcing the raw fuel locally through the Council's 
Parks department. 
The Council's strategy also features more generic activities aimed at reducing 
transportation costs, as well as minimising energy consumption, particularly through 
street lighting. Energy awareness is a core message of the Council and it is striving to 
38 Please also refer to (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009) 
158 
make sure this is communicated widely to achieve maximum impact. Energy saving 
discussions have taken place in schools and elsewhere, promoting "energy 
ambassadors" to raise awareness especially within an educational environment and how 
simple actions like automatically switching lights off when they are not required can 
ultimately have a significant impact. The Council readily recognises that education and 
energy awareness is only a small part of the overall picture, and that individuals and 
organisations react much more to change than to information on its own. The strategy, 
therefore, deliberately focused on excessive energy consumption where the Council had 
some direct control. The Council is in the process of replacing all its electricity meters 
with smart meters that records information on usage, and transmits it back every half an 
hour. This information access means that consumption, variance and excessive usage 
can be easily monitored and red-flagged as necessary, enabling appropriate action to be 
taken. At Bristol City Council, the strategy required addressing the political, financial 
and practical motives of key stakeholders and reconciling the different priorities and 
objectives of these groups (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
The Head of the Building Practice states that the introduction of regulations covering 
the use of energy, and the proposals to reduce the carbon footprint are necessary in 
order to raise awareness and by doing so demonstrating why those changes are 
mandatory. A key part of this process was to clearly outline the payback period of 
proposed investments and demonstrating how resources can be utilised to maximum 
effect. Being able to lead on green issues locally, as well as achieving financial savings, 
has provided positive exposure, especially given the current economic climate according 
to the Head of the Building Practice. On this note it is important choosing a proactive, 
strategic approach toward innovation which, in turn, implies regulatory compliance. All 
those activities demonstrate BCC's efforts to strategically achieve environmental best 
practice and by doing to enhance their reputation (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
The ideas and processes central to the strategy were communicated through the website 
and various newsletters, including the Energy Echo. Posters and notice boards were also 
regularly updated to reflect key actions and notable rewards. As members of the Mid 
West Energy Group, the Avon and Somerset Area Energy Group and the Government 
Office of the South West, BCC benefits from benchmarking its activities and comparing 
results with others. In this way it is possible for everyone to benefit from the ideas and 
initiatives that constituent members are implementing. 
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The following TPD-model (see Figure 21) application shows the organisation-specific 
approach towards eco-innovation using the Greening Management Survey questionnaire 
response in combination with results from a follow-up interview which was held with 
the Head of the Building Practice. The bars in the model aim to demonstrate the 
pathway of eco-innovation that occurs on the particular level due to level-specific 
diffusion-factors that drive or hamper. BCC perceives regulation as a strong driver 
alongside their internal as well as external engagement (please also refer to Appendix II; 
Table A-12). Corporate targets alongside an organisation-specific innovation strategy 
drive the BCC's eco-innovation at Level L, (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A- 
17). At Level LZ BCC shows a strategic approach, probably because of regulation that 
spurs a redesign of existing services. Interestingly, data from the survey and interviews 
show that BCC (as well as the Royal Mail) believe that leadership drives their eco- 
innovation more than market-forces, which underlines the importance on internal rather 
than external factors here (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-18). 
BCC's strategic orientation which is manifested in a generally positive atti tude towards 
regulation alongside strong leadership certainly meets the requirements for Level L3. -b. 
The absence of barriers with the potential to "outweigh" existing drivers further 
explains the emergence of Level L3a. b eco-innovation. BCC is in two minds about the 
likelihood of changes in consumer choices that affects the investment in eco-innovation 
(please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-15). This shows as they agree that 
investments to meet customer requirements are indispensable whereas being in doubt 
whether a change of consumer behaviour and therefore choice is going to happen. This 
also shows in the establishment of an "energy-ambassador" to raise awareness as 
previously mentioned. This explains why long-term eco-innovation at Level L3, _b 
has not 
happened yet even though the preconditions are given. 
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Figure 21: TPD-Model BCC (Strategic Innovator) 
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The following (Table 17) demonstrates the interplay of diffusion-factors on every level 
which is driving or hampering eco-innovation within BCC. When comparing BCC with 
Royal Mail, which was, as argued before, an exception rather than the rule for the public 
sector BCC shows a certainly atypical approach due to the willingness to innovate in a 
more strategic way as opposed to be purely driven by factor costs. 
Table 17: BCC's diffusion factors 
Strate 'c Innovators Factor-Costs Innovators 
Lt Ia L3. Lw In I. s Ia. Lm 
Stroh 
Factor-Costs Medium Bartier Barrier Battier 
Weak Barrier 
Strv, yg Driver Driver Driver 
Leadership Medium Driver 
Weak 
Stroh Driver Driver 
Regulation Medium Driver 
Weak Driver NAL 
Stma 
Sustainability Medium Driver Driver 
Weak Driver Driver 
Stroh 
Market-Forces Medium Driver Driver 
Weak Driver Driver 
Ri k& S/m s 
Uncert int 
Medium Barrier 
a y weak Driver Drives Barrier 
Royal Mail and BCC could probably not have been more diverse as Royal Mail 
represent the purely Factor-cost driven organisation, which, after all, accounts for 62% 
(please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-20) in the public sector. BCC, however, 
shows a highly strategy driven approach, which certainly disproves the prevailing belief 
of a less innovative and less "strategic" public sector. This preconception was partly 
confirmed by Royal Mail, where a clear cost structure alongside a critical attitude 
towards regulation does not allow a more strategic approach. BCC does not show any 
of these rather typical cluster attributes and therefore cannot show any Factor Costs 
Innovator qualities on any Level. Another deciding feature of BCC's strategy is 
comparing and benchmarking their achievements against other public sector 
organisations. BCC is pretty much on the forefront as member of the Mid West Energy 
Group, the Avon and Somerset area energy groups, and also the Government Office of 
the South West according to Head of the Building Practice. This rather competitive 
attitude, once again, underpins BCC's distinct strategic approach, which underlines why 
BCC was chosen to disprove the prevailing belief of a less innovative and less strategic 
public sector. The two chosen cases representing the UK's public sector could not have 
been more diverse as they present two distinct innovation approaches. The following 
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two cases representing the UK's private sector and aim to highlight private sector 
innovation processes. 
6.4 Case Study -Aurora International 
The following provides a brief overview of recent activities by Aurora International 
based on the "Lean and Green Report". 39 Aurora, a private sector organisation, is 
analysed in terms of their environmental best practice as well as core strategy to reduce 
their organisational environmental impact. This sets the basis for the subsequent 
analysis of the Aurora's approach towards eco-innovation. Aurora International is a 
global hotel chain with sites in Greater London and Manchester, employing 
approximately 1,000 staff in the UK. The underlying view at Aurora International, as 
commonly shared by many other organisations within the UK's private sector, is that 
these are troubling times, with an uncertain future due to a global economic crisis to the 
fore. Aurora's response to these challenges, however, is to see sustainability as an even 
more critical issue to the organisation. Committing to sustainability is seen by the 
organisation as a means to not only staying profitable, but also to drive customer 
satisfaction (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). Environmental projects and green audits, 
particularly monitoring and rationalising utility consumption, are integral to the overall 
strategy of how Aurora manages its business. Aurora International's approach has 
recognised that going green can be a source of cost saving. It understands that in tough 
times, organisations need to focus on their bottom lines and cut costs - and ideally this 
needs to be done sooner rather than later. Its experience, though, is that reducing 
energy and utility use, can save a great deal of money: `The single most important tangible 
evidence is that in the five comparable hotels when we have been running this programme of Green 
Team actrvity for the last threeyears almost, we have seen a reduction of about 15 or 16 percent in our 
total utility costs. " A number of Aurora International's savings have been achieved at 
minimal expense (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
A key to these rewards has been organisational commitment, particularly at senior 
management level. The Chairman was heavily consulted on the organisation's green 
strategy and was absolutely delighted that low-carbon initiatives were being introduced. 
Whilst the strategy was developed by the Group Chief Engineer in co-operation with 
the Group Operations Director, the organisation also has a "green team" with 
representatives from each department to further raise awareness and promote the 
39 Please also refer to (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009) 
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results of green schemes. For instance the organisation is also in the process of installing 
Variable Speed Drive Inverters to all water and air handling pumps across all its hotels. 
This will achieve savings of up to 50% energy consumption from the pumps and builds 
on the many other initiatives Aurora has taken to improve energy efficiency. To date, 
the inverters have been installed into two hotels already, with immediate and noticeable 
savings. The return on investment is very satisfactory. The savings achieved by green 
schemes have driven awareness amongst Aurora staff of the need to conserve energy 
and resources. These tangible outcomes also appear to influence a wider cultural shift in 
the organisation, with a belief that "employees have taken these green messages to their homes as 
well' according to the Group Operations Director. It is clear that benefit derived both 
inside and outside the business has encouraged a "positive feeling" within the 
organisation (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
At Aurora International, the critical distinction between costs and investments has not 
been overlooked and the short-term availability of capital expenditure to facilitate 
improvements remains a going concern. Human resource has also been committed to 
the cause as the General Managers of each hotel are given responsibility for utility 
consumption. Performance is reviewed on a monthly basis with senior management: 
"EVe look at utility costs and consumption. If it is out of line I want to know why. If there is a good 
reason, that is fine; if there is a bad reason then we work on it to eliminate that reason; and if there is 
no reason then we have to find a reason. "Addressing simple house-keeping matters has led to 
"small actions totalling up to being a lot". This included actions that it was 
acknowledged could be perceived as "nitpicking", but once implemented, have provided 
a notable return. Such examples were stipulating that employees switch off the pilot 
light on their computer and turning lights off in rooms not being used. The logic behind 
Aurora International's decision to go green is ostensibly no different from the logic for 
pursuing other business strategies. It is looking to drive profitability, customer loyalty, 
employee engagement and innovation: "If it is in our interests to do something, because it is good 
for our customers and for our business, then we will do it. " This statement underpins Aurora's 
commitment to drive change and by doing so allow for long-term eco-innovation to 
evolve. The consensus within the senior management team of Aurora International is 
that, where beneficial, the organisation wants to accelerate and broaden its sustainability 
work. Overall, the evidence does not point to an organisation slowing down its green 
efforts because of a recession which can be seen by the effort Aurora puts into 
environmental best practice. 
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The following TPD-model (see Figure 22) application shows the organisation-specific 
approach towards eco-innovation using the Greening Management Survey questionnaire 
response in combination with results from a follow-up interview which was held with 
the Group Chief Engineer in co-operation with the Group Operations Director. The 
bars in the model aim to demonstrate the pathways and direction of eco-innovation that 
occurs on the particular level due to level-specific diffusion-factors driving or 
hampering it accordingly. 
It appears that Aurora tends to follow a strategic approach towards eco-innovation 
(please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-11), which was rather unexpected, given 79% 
of the responding hotels and restaurants tended towards Factor-cost Innovators (please also 
refer to Appendix II; Table A-20). On Level L,, regulation certainly does drive Aurora's 
eco-innovation even though the lack of communication of new legislation by regulators 
causes general problems in terms of compliance. A strong management commitment 
alongside (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-19; Table A-13) the desire to 
provide more "green" services are the main driving factors that characterise Level L2 
and therefore still justify the belonging to the Strategic Innovators. However, this is not 
apparent, given the lack of confidence in regulation when applied to a more radical way 
of eco-innovation as regulation was merely seen as a slight driver of eco- 
innovation(please also refer to Appendix M. However, that more radical approach to 
eco-innovation did not happen (yet) due to the uncertainty about future regulation and 
the consequential risk as well as the fact that the concern for global sustainability was 
not very pronounced (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-16) even though a part 
of the organisational strategy. The general desire to meet customer requirements by 
providing a high standard service does not always comply with an ambitious 
environmental best practice agenda according to Group Operations Director. 
Government should therefore create incentives, which will in turn stimulate innovation 
rather than just plain regulation in particular when targeting radical, long-term, 
innovation (Leitner, et al., 2010). Drivers for a potential LU_b eco-innovation, such as 
strong leadership alongside the concern for global sustainability and the development of 
new markets for green products were not perceived as such within Aurora. On the 
other side the barriers stay roughly the same, comparing to Level L2, which was pivotal 
that no Level L3a_b eco-innovation could take place. Thus, Lý, _b eco-innovation 
designs 
new products, processes or services alternatives based on life cycle assessment (LCA) to 
serve a sustainable society. 
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Figure 22: TPD-Model Aurora (Strategic Innovator) 
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In order for more radical eco-innovation to achieve long-term sustainability Aurora 
needs to adopt a positive attitude towards the compliance of regulation. A strong 
leadership which acknowledges the need for global sustainability as the underlying crux 
of their organisational strategy that is prepared to radically reconsider their daily 
business processes is required to initiate this change. The following (Table 18) illustrates 
Aurora's diffusion factors. 
Table 18: Aurora's diffusion factors 
Strategic Innovators Factor-Costs Innovators 
Lt 14 Ia. Lab In Ia La. Ims 
Strmr 
Factor-Costs Medium 
Weak Driver Driver Barrier Barrier 
Strom Driver Driver 
Leadership Medium Driver 
Weals Driver 
DIV 
Regulation Medium Driver Barrier 
Weak Driver Barrier N A 
Stmm . . 
Sustainability Medium Driver 
Weak Driver Barrier Driver 
Strox 
Market-Forces Medium Driver 
Weak Driver Driver Driver 
Ri k& Stmx Barrier Barrier s 
Uncertaint Medium Barrier y L-- I Weak Barrier 
6.5 British Telecom (BT) 
A brief overview of recent activities by the British Telecom (BT) is provided, based on 
the "Lean and Green Reports40, in order to highlight environmental best practice within 
BT. It further illustrates BT's core strategy to reduce their organisational environmental 
impact. This, once again, is pivotal to better understand the subsequent analysis of the 
BT's approach towards eco-innovation. 
BT is a telecommunications operator, with worldwide approximately 100,000 
employees. At BT, the carbon management strategy is underpinned by a central aim of 
reducing costs and maximising efficiencies. The organisation's directors were involved 
in setting the objectives of the carbon strategy, but implementation is led by a specialist 
team. The strategy has received consistent backing from the directors, vital to reduce 
British Telecom's environmental footprint further. The biggest benefit to date that the 
40 Please also refer to (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009) 
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organisation has derived from its carbon management strategy has been a reduction in 
the cost of its electrical services (Wehrmeyer, et al., 2009). 
Updates and progress on the strategy is communicated via the organisation's intranet, 
with global emails sent out to encourage awareness of the work and its impact. Within 
the overall organisation strategy, the focus on a reduction in electrical costs, is closely 
linked to a reduction in overall operating costs. At British Telecom, regulation serves as 
a tool for information and guidance, rather than as a primer to innovate according to a 
BT Senior Engineer. This fact was pivotal for picking BT as a cased to apply and test 
the TPD model V3.0. Looking forward, the organisation does not envisage dropping any 
of its environmental management plans. Climate change, however, and the notable 
change in weather conditions in the UK are anticipated to present significant challenges 
in the long term. 
The following TPD-model (see Figure 23) exemplifies the organisation-specific 
approach towards eco-innovation using, once again, the Greening Management Survey 
questionnaire response in combination with results from a follow-up interview which 
was held with a Senior Engineer which leads to the following model-arrangement. The 
bars in the model aim to illustrate the degree of eco-innovation that occurs on the 
particular level due to level-specific diffusion-factors that drive or hamper it accordingly. 
British Telecom (BT) applies a mixed innovation strategy, which is strategically 
interesting even though risky due to the likelihood of former drivers turning into future 
barriers. When looking at Level Ll BT has a strategic approach towards eco-innovation, 
which is driven by a strong leadership and market forces. At Level L2, Factor Costs 
(Energy, Labour, Material and Technological Costs) outweigh the more strategic drivers 
like market forces, strong leadership as well as a concern for global sustainability at 
Level L2, which diverts the previously Strategy driven eco-innovation approach to a 
more Factor-Costs strategy. For instance, according to a Senior Engineer at BT any sort 
of savings related to carbon foot printing is price-driven. BT therefore mainly focuses 
on the reduction of its electrical cost as this is a reduction in its operating costs, which 
further underpins the redirection towards a Factor-Costs strategy. 
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TPD-Model V3.0 
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According to a Senior Engineer within BT there is no direct comparison between 
regulation and a stimulus to innovate. Regulation should encourage innovation, but at 
this moment in time, regulation is a tool to obtain information, and obtain results, not 
to innovate. This underlines the change in attitude to regulation from a strong driver at 
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I 
Market Forces 
Level L, and LZ into a strong barrier for potential Level L3, _b where regulatory 
compliance alongside other drivers are needed to push for more radical eco-innovation 
(please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-12). BT applies a mixed innovation strategy 
which does not show a clear tendency to either of those two distinct approaches which 
makes predictions for Levels L3A. b rather difficult. However, the current mixed strategy is 
certainly not adequate for radical eco-innovation strategies. If BT therefore decides to 
innovate more radically it would have to implement a strategy driven innovation 
approach with a strong willingness to comply with current and future regulation rather 
than seeking a short-term solution by trying to bypass those. The following (Table 19) 
highlights the diffusion factors, which drive or hamper BT's innovation process. 
Table 19: BT's diffusion factors 
Strategic Innovators Factor-Costs Innovators 
Ia Ia Ia. I, w 14 Ia L3. I, w 
Stroh 
Factor-Costs Medium Barrier 
Weak Driver 
Sim Driver 
Leadership Medlam Driver 
Weak 
Sto7 
Regulation Medium Driver Driver 
Weak A A N Stma . N. . . 
Sustainability Median, 
Weak Driver Driver 
Shnx 
Market-Forces Medium Driver 
Weak Driver 
Risk & 
Spa 
Uncertaint Medium y Weak Barrier Barrier 
When comparing BT with Aurora it shows that both private sector organisations have a 
fairly similar eco-innovation strategy at the bottom (Level L) as both share the same 
diffusion factors which justify the affiliation to the strategic innovators. At Level L2 BT 
undertook a strategy change to a more factor cost driven approach, which made a 
strategy inevitable. This is a case where a driver converts into a barrier (or) which, once 
again, demonstrates the fine line between drivers and barriers. Depending on the overall 
organisational strategy a changed innovation strategy can be desirable particularly by 
organisations that struggle to comply with regulation. Comparing Royal Mail and BCC it 
shows that even though they both represent the UK's public sector they have distinct 
eco-innovation approaches. Royal Mail seems to be a typical Factor-Cost innovator at first 
glace but then turns out to have a rather . strategy 
driven business approach with 
ambitious targets to become one of the most sustainable global logistic organisations. 
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This is in fact necessary, considering that Royal Mail is primarily competing with the 
private sector. The fact that Royal Mail does not trust regulation to drive their eco- 
innovation as well as the dependency on the energy, technological, labour and a material 
cost still justifies the belonging to the Factor-Carts innovators. 
BCC does not show typical characteristics of public sector organisations either as they 
chose a very strategic innovation approach, which is the exception given the 62% Factor- 
Costs innovator in the public sector (please also refer to Appendix II; Table A-20). BCC, 
however, is the only case among the four that meets all the requirements for Level L3, _b 
even though it does not take the opportunity due to the still existing uncertainty as a 
main barrier that outweighs a strong management commitment and the willingness to 
comply with regulation. 
The data further showed that Factor Cost Innovators (FC1) have generally no drivers for 
Lu_, changes, which is mainly due to the increased cost and associated uncertainty of a 
higher level of innovation as well as the sheer absence of incentives that would 
otherwise allow to induce drivers. It can be observed that an increasing radicalness due 
to a higher level of innovation is directly proportional to snowballing barriers. Drivers 
for Strategic Innovators (SI) stay roughly the same as this type is aiming for their corporate 
targets and organisation-specific strategic decisions to innovate even though a higher- 
level innovation is perceived being very complex as barriers grow in importance. Hence, 
if innovation occurs at different levels, then the mix of diffusion factors need to change 
accordingly in order to eventually balance the system to enable barriers transforming 
into drivers. 
As a wider conclusion, it appears that eco-innovation is a conflation of organisation- 
specific as well as constitutional factors. Looking at different levels of eco-innovation, 
the contrasting factors are logically disparate between the four levels. The organisation- 
specific factors are crystallised in the strategic orientation, which were initially derived 
from the Cluster Analysis. Whether an organisation innovates or not therefore clearly 
depends on the emphasis and perceived importance of those individual factors, which 
as already mentioned reflect on the level of eco-innovation and the degree of radicalness 
(Leitner, et al., 2010). However, an organisation can change its innovation strategy with 
increasing eco-innovation, which causes a transformation of diffusion factors. Which 
factor changes due to what reason is case-specific and therefore cannot be determined 
as a general rule (Leitner, et al., 2010). 
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Nevertheless the model provides a clear attribution of innovator-types to the 
organisation under study, which allows a better understanding of the initial situation due 
to which organisation innovate or not. As a wider application of the TPD model V3.0 the 
following strategies were identified to speed up the diffusion process and use of eco- 
innovations for private and public sector organisations: 
" Change the perceived attributes of eco-innovations for both private and public sector 
organisations. The relative advantage of a preventive innovation needs to be stressed 
(Lock & Kaner, 2000). 
  Utilise champions to promote innovations. A champion is an individual who devotes 
his/her personal influence to encourage adoption of an innovation (Lock & Kaner, 
2000). 
  Change the norms and values of the system regarding innovations through peer 
support. Changing norms on prevention is a gradual process over time, but can be 
accomplished (Kaner, et al., 1999; Keller & Galanter, 1999). 
  Use entertainment-education to promote innovations. Entertainment-education is 
the process of placing educational ideas (such as on prevention) in entertainment 
messages (Singhal & Rogers, 1999). 
  Activate peer networks to diffuse preventive innovations. As previously mentioned 
(Chapter 3), diffusion is a social process of people talking about the new idea, giving 
it meaning for themselves, and then adopting. Anything that can be done to 
encourage peer communication about an idea, such as training addiction counsellors 
in new addiction treatment techniques, thus encourages adoption (Martin et al., 
1998). 
These strategies will, when implemented, change the dynamics of the TPD model V3"0 as 
they will cause a reallocation of diffusion factors that, when applied to the model, form 
strong and assertive diffusion factors. These factors then can outweigh remaining 
barriers and allow for more long-term and radical (eco)-innovation to happen. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter the final version of the TPD model V3.0 was applied to four case studies 
to highlight specific eco-innovation characteristics due to the changing loadings of the 
diffusion factors. This was done to find out whether the model works at the level of an 
individual organisation, to shed light on the innovation dynamics in the four selected 
organisations and to provide further insights into the relationship between regulation 
and (eco)-innovation. Moreover, the model underlines the necessity for a sector-specific 
eco-innovation regulation as an overarching approach would be unable to provide the 
specific mix of incentives and pressures to spur innovation effectively. 
Earlier lack of governmental guidance and governance caused widespread cynicism. 
This presents a barrier towards immediate and effective actions to initiate sustaining 
strategies in order to meet future challenges. It appears that the innovation paradigm has 
been altered radically. This change is similar in scope to the industrial revolution, but at 
a vastly increased pace41. Anti-regulation supporters typically point out the decreasing 
rate of eco-innovation to underline their arguments for the negative effects of 
regulation. Meanwhile pro regulation supporters use the concept of the direction of 
innovation as the main support for their arguments for the positive impact of regulation 
on eco-innovation. Persistent success in these challenging times will depend on the 
responsiveness and the ability to recognise and realign innovation strategies in order to 
maximise competitive advantage over time. 
The final research question on the role governments within the eco-innovation process 
was discussed and came to the conclusions that a "fine" feeling is necessary to trigger 
eco-innovation with a sector-specific strategy that creates strong incentives. For most 
organisations and governments, simply intensifying current strategies and policies will 
clearly not meet those requirements. Further success will depend on the ability to close 
quickly the gap between the generation of an idea and the subsequent creation of its 
value along with higher levels of investment in building effective collaborative 
innovation ecosystems. Whether in the public or private domain, the core messages of 
the last few years have focused on globalisation, increased competition and the ever 
more complex business environments in which we all operate. Organisations will have 
to react quickly to safeguard or enhance their positions by investing in eco-innovation. 
" Bror Salmelin (Adviser European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate-General) published in the INSEAD 
Report (2009) Are you innovation ready? Plotting your journey on the Innovation Readiness Model 
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This is especially true in context of rapid (regulatory or technology) change. 
Furthermore they need to recognise that collaboration is required if they are to keep up 
- survey respondents are actively seeking out partners to deliver eco-innovation; from 
ideas to execution. These changes in business culture are relatively new; it will take time 
for organisations and institutions to move from awareness to competence. The survey 
results show some of the difficulties that organisations are facing to make eco- 
innovation "business as usual". Surprisingly the positive changes in attitudes and goals 
are yet to be supported. This indicates elements crucial to success, such as leadership, 
cultural change, measurement and even implementation. The study underpins that 
organisations are spending precious resources on eco-innovation without the processes 
and structures in place to take full advantage of the investment and effort they have 
invested. This, in fact, would endorse a more strategic rather than factor-cost driven 
response toward (eco)-innovation or even a mixed strategy as shown in the BT case. 
Forward thinking and a constantly driven change allow public and private sector 
organisation to face and sustain current and future challenges. 
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter summarises findings of the research and draws further conclusions, 
which will lead to tailored recommendations for policy makers in the public and private 
sector. The chapter also explains the contribution of this research and identifies areas 
for future research. 
7.1.1 Main Conclusions 
This research investigated the impact of regulation on eco-innovation to answer the 
specific research objectives (detailed in chapter 1): 1) to identify where regulators made 
a significant contribution in order to promote eco-innovation; (2) To specify the main 
drivers and barriers for eco-innovation; and (3) To clarify which role government 
should adopt to promote eco-innovation within these sectors. To achieve those 
objectives a comprehensive literature review (Chapter 3 and 4) has been conducted, 
which argued that many aspects of the chosen research domain still remain inconclusive, 
particularly to which degree governments should get involved in the innovation process, 
when, and with which measures. 
The Technology Policy Diffusion (TPD) model V10 (Chapter 3) was developed to 
reflect the literature, in particular the highly dynamic interactions of eco-innovation and 
regulation. This model (Chapter 4) was revised to reflect the insights gained from the 
following 12 expert interviews that demonstrate how various diffusion factors influence 
the degree and direction of eco-innovation (TPD model Va). The final version TPD 
model V3.0 (Chapter 5) sheds light on the motivation behind eco-innovation activities 
and, by doing so, clusters organisations in two distinct types of innovators. These three 
model iterations (TPD model V10 V20, V3, ß reflect the genesis of evolving ideas 
throughout the project and are integral for the subsequently derived conclusions. 
These findings characterise specific innovator-types that occur in the UK's public and 
private sector which can be used as a model to understand innovation dynamics in 
specific context scenarios. They are also useful as a foundation when designing future 
regulation to stimulate eco-innovation in both public and private sector. The empirical 
data was collected by employing three main data sources: a questionnaire survey and 
two sets of interviews. The questionnaire data was collected from 1500 organisations 
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within the UK's private and public sector (cf. Chapter five and six). These findings were 
further explored with the help of interviews ex ante (from governmental departments, 
consultancies and multi national enterprises) as well as follow-up interviews with 
organisations in both private and public sector that participated in the survey. The main 
conclusions of the research project are outlined as follows, corresponding to the 
research objectives: 
The literature reviews (Chapter 3 and 4) identified the important role innovation has to 
play towards a more sustainable future. The significant role of eco-innovation has been 
underpinned as well as clearly distinguished from the characteristics of traditional 
product or process innovation due to the fact that eco-innovation is decisively 
influenced by its attempt to contribute to a reduction of environmental burdens or to 
ecologically specified sustainability targets. Traditional "normal" innovation is certainly 
different from eco-innovation by its aim, focus and content but not necessarily by its 
process as both can entail environmental improvements. The literature helped to 
understand the role of innovation in long-tem economic scenarios as well as to initiate 
socio-technical change. Should the "innovation-hype" dry up, the economy will settle 
down in a "stationary state" with little or no growth (Metcalfe, 1998). Thus, (eco)- 
innovation is mandatory for long-run economic growth. 
The research then found that innovation is likely to cluster in certain industry sectors 
(Chapter 5), which consequently grow faster, leading to structural changes in production 
and demand and, eventually, organisational and institutional change. The capacity to 
undertake the latter is important for the ability to benefit from innovation. The existing 
literature that specifically focuses on public sector innovation per se is rather limited. 
Hence it was timely to investigate how eco-innovation is initiated and developed within 
the public sector and how it may (or may not) differ from the processes, normally 
referred to that occur in the private sector. It is often assumed that the public sector is 
necessarily less innovative than the private sector, lacking the drive provided by market 
forces and competition (e. g. Tan, 2004). This assumption was carefully examined 
(Chapter 5 and 6) and to some extent rejected, given the empirical evidence from the 
survey that discovered a progressive and innovative public sector. 
When analysing the drivers and barriers for eco-innovation, the questionnaire results 
show that none of the factors commonly attributed as a driver or barrier are seen, on 
balance, as a barrier for eco-innovation. Some have, however, an overwhelming 
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emphasis on being neither, for instance, cooperation with research institutions are stated 
by 59% of responding managers to be "neither barrier nor driver". This gives reason to 
believe that there are no distinct, a priori, drivers and barriers for innovation as existing 
as these are in a condition of equilibrium and therefore do not impact the diffusion in 
either direction. Nevertheless, there are diffusion factors, which depending on the 
radicalness, speed and direction of the applied innovation, tend to act as driver or 
barrier in that specific context. This demonstrates that organisations need to be sensible 
in order to understand and control this "fine-line" between drivers and barriers 
accordingly. Therefore, the internal factors of an organisation shape whether these 
diffusion factors act as a driver or barrier and the resulting "next frontier" in the 
research agenda is how this "choice" comes about in terms of what diffusion factors 
lead an organisation to go for one or another. 
This approach is, indeed, novel as the existing literature does neither highlight the 
importance of diffusion factors as such nor the modality in which they interact. These 
findings provide more transparency in the already very complex innovation process and, 
by doing so, allows policy makers to better plan and design future regulation that spur 
innovation on every level. Those findings were reflected in the TPD model versions Va, o 
as well as V,, a where the clear borderline between drivers and barriers of innovation 
which rotate in concentric interlocked diffusion cycles demonstrate the previously 
mentioned "fine-line", which must be known in order to affect the direction, level and 
speed of innovation. The model was applied by testing it within four case studies from 
the UK's private and public sector, which are believed to provide a solid even though 
not sufficient basis. Choosing two cases representing each sector respectively was 
regarded to be appropriate given the scope of the research. 
The analysis of the questionnaire survey data identified two types of innovators. The 
first (Strategic Innovators) perceives regulation as a strong driver alongside their internal as 
well as external engagement. In addition to corporate targets and organisation-specific 
strategic decisions to innovate, it is increasing uncertainty about future regulation that 
acts as a strong stimulus for eco-innovation, according to this type. These innovators 
also seek cooperation with other firms including suppliers or even research institutions 
to drive innovation within their own organisations. External benchmarking as well as 
employee engagement and a committed and supportive management turn out to further 
eco-innovation in this type. 
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In the second type, Factor-Costs are the vital consideration towards eco-innovation. In 
fact, this group perceives those as the dominant and probably only driver for their 
innovation processes, as opposed to regulation, internal/external drivers or strategic 
considerations. In their opinion, material-costs alongside labour, energy or technology 
costs are the crucial factors that initiate and direct innovation. They do not seem to be 
guided by regulatory pressures or external engagement. Strategic Innovators constantly try 
to improve their products, processes and services and by doing so innovate whereas 
Factor-Costs Innovators solely innovate if factor costs allow them to do so. These 
innovation types therefore differ by and large in their perspective on non-economic 
stimuli. If innovation is driven (or at least triggered) by factors other than cost, 
organisations follow the less frequent "Strategic Innovatory", and vice versa. 
The identification of these two distinct types provides a solid basis to answer the 
Research Objective 2 about the differences between the public and private sector 
approach towards eco-innovation. The two identified types demonstrate how a private 
or public sector organisation innovates, if they innovate and, by doing so, highlights the 
ability of organisations to change their innovation strategy within the process. After 
studying the diffusion factors the distinct drivers and barriers for eco-innovation with 
the public and private sectors could consequently be identified. 
In addition, two distinct clusters emerged that depict organisations' behaviour towards 
regulatory compliance. In fact they could not have been more diverse in terms of their 
defining attributes as respondents within the first cluster (Strategic Innovators) generally 
believe that regulations are helpful in order to achieve their organisations strategic goals 
whereas respondents allocated to the second cluster (Factor-Costs Innovators) perceive 
regulation generally as a problem and barrier. Interestingly, the clusters are about equally 
distributed overall, indicative of the divisive nature of regulation although there are 
substantial differences by industry sectors. 
Regulatory confusion - with the majority of managers voicing negative views on the 
role of regulation in this field - relates to the number and complexity of regulation, as 
well as difficulties in the communication between regulators and regulated. This is 
particularly pronounced amongst companies of smaller size, and the resulting regulation 
clusters show little regional variation in line with variations in local approaches from 
local regulatory agencies towards engaging with local businesses, notably small ones. 
This is policy relevant, as it works against the current trend of increasing the scope of 
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regulation and decreasing the frequency of strict regulation, and it points at greater need 
for regulators to engage and support businesses in their regulatory duties. Nevertheless, 
the research found out that "strictness" matters less than uncertainty about future 
regulation for most of the responding public and private sector organisations. 
In the regulatory dilemma, the role of government - organisation interactions, whether 
they are cooperative or confrontational, depends on how governments accomplishes 
regulations and how organisations respond to them (Scholz, 1991). Although 
cooperative regulatory enforcement may be beneficial for both sides, both organisations 
and governments have powerful "short-run" incentives to choose conflict (Rothwell, 
1992). While the distinction between deterrence and cooperation is not necessarily a 
strict dichotomy, from a government's point of view, the dilemma can be 
conceptualised as a choice between deterrence or a flexible approach to regulatory 
enforcement, whereas from an organisations' point of view, the dilemma lies in making 
a choice between evasion and self-policing (Scholz, 1991). 
Regulation are not (or at least should not be) designed in isolation, and implementation 
of regulation will generally involve interaction between regulatory bodies and labour 
unions, industry representatives and the public. Depending upon the pattern of 
interaction between regulatory bodies and these other interest groups a number of 
fundamental issues according to Rothwell (1992) can arise. The probably two most 
important of these are: 
(a) public scepticism if the regulators and industry are seen to be in collusion with 
each other and; 
(b) adverse reaction from industry if the regulatory agency has failed to consult it 
sufficiently in the formulation of regulation and the establishment of meaningful 
standards. 
However, the findings also support the earlier conclusion that the external pressures and 
incentives on an organisation are broadly similar between organisations, but the way this 
was to be interpreted and acted upon is largely internally shaped. The "why" varies little 
between companies, the "what" can differ dramatically, but is often hampered by an 
internal lack of strategic vision to engage. The research underlined the ambiguity of 
regulation in terms of its innovation driving or hampering characteristics. A general 
assumption which would clearly characterise regulation and its effect on innovation is 
therefore not advisable. The different approaches towards environmental regulations 
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within the UK's private and public sector were examined and underlined to answer 
Research Objective 1. Consequently, the need for sector specific regulation was 
highlighted as critically important. The TPD model V3.0 provides a detailed and realistic 
picture of public and private sector eco-innovation as it highlights the interplay of 
diffusion factors and, by doing so, sheds light on the underlying dynamics of eco- 
innovation. The model is deliberately flexible and can be applied globally, in any private 
or public organisation. Its greatest merit, however, is its transparency, which in turn 
allows policy makers to design more appropriate regulation to spur eco-innovation. 
Another important finding of this research is the differences between public and private 
sectors eco-innovation activities which are mainly caused by a stronger co-linearity of 
control and funding which in turn restrict the space of potential eco-innovation 
strategies as well as a weaker differentiation of organisational and individual change 
oriented incentives to long-term performance incentives. Further this supports the 
sector specific approach towards eco-innovation activities and disproved the prevailing 
belief of an innovative private sector as opposed to a necessarily less innovative public 
sector. The latter surprised with a tendency to a Level L3a_b innovation strategy, which 
could not be observed within the chosen private sector case studies. The corporate 
management responses to environmental issues mirrored the willingness to induce 
radical change. When considering managers, the willingness could be detected and 
documented, but employees saw often the limits of their scope for change being 
constrained by organisational priorities. In addition, the evidence is strong that 
Directors are particularly cynical about the necessity of implementing green strategies, 
which will in turn allow for eco-innovation and puts the viability of radical change into a 
limited context. 
The research further analysed governments' role within the innovation process and, by 
doing so, compared two possible scenarios: Government as facilitator or inhibitor of 
eco-innovation. It became apparent that both cases occurred in public and private 
sector organisations for different reasons. Government acts as a facilitator to drive 
specific innovations which are believed to be eligible. Organisations generally do not 
like to be domineered over by government and therefore do not appreciate 
governments' interference. Rather than designing strict regulations that force 
organisations towards compliance, the survey data showed that organisations would 
prefer strong incentives to gain competitive advantages. On the contrary, government 
acts like an inhibitor to hinder organisations to go abroad and, by doing so, bypass 
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domestic regulation. This, once again, poses a problem for organisations as they 
consider themselves in a less favourable position due to the opportunity costs caused by 
the lack of ability to compete with their global competitors. This has consequently led to 
the conclusion (Research Objective 3) that governments' should "ideally" act as an 
observer of the innovation process providing clarity and certainty followed by strict and 
transparent regulation. 
In many respects, British environmental policy is still characterised by continuous 
change rather than the radical change that is arguably necessary to address many of the 
serious environmental issues. There has been little significant shift in regard to the 
regulatory substance, with the possible exception of transport policy. This is the realm 
of the regulators and the political system, but professional bodies, non-governmental 
organisations in the private and public sector alike have a role to play in this process as 
well. And this role lies in contributing to the evolving debate, and constructively 
exploring opportunities in which service delivery can be improved and environmental 
and social problems can be avoided - in short, innovating. 
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7.2 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are offered for organisations to improve their (eco)- 
innovation activities. 
  Organisations should develop and adopt an (Eco)-Innovation strategy in 
accordance with their product strategy, which appears to not happen yet. This, in 
turn, reduces the risk and uncertainty typically associated with the innovation 
process. 
" Product innovation should meet or exceed customer expectation by offering an 
improved service, be this through a changed physical artefact or a delivery of 
service in a new form or format. 
' The implementation costs of technology should specifically include set-up costs, 
installation costs, an estimation of the management uncertainty, the predictability of 
product delivery and the costs of non-change. Those steps provide a greater 
transparency and subsequently allow organisations to better plan a potential 
modernisation. 
  Organisations need to define and measure success as this is the first step to 
improvement, leading to experience, consistency and effective innovation. Without 
measures implementation has to rely on estimates. Short term priorities should also 
not be allowed to crowd out strategic longer term investments in innovation 
' The innovation message needs to be delivered and well communicated to all levels 
of the organisation, along with the concrete ways employees can make innovation a 
part of their everyday activities. Leaders, however, need to ensure that the 
commitments made at the highest levels are actionable through the organisation, as 
a normal part of business activity. 
" Organisations must be both more effective in arranging and prioritising innovation 
efforts and designed for collaboration, which, in turn, will allow them to keep up 
with competitors and customers. 
" Organisations should reflect on how external technology diffusion factors shape 
their internal strategy, which, in turn, would make a successful innovation process 
much more likely. 
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The following recommendations are offered for government to consider their regulatory 
design principles to improve (eco)-innovation in both public and private sectors. 
  Regulators should appreciate that the best way to achieve regulatory compliance is 
by ensuring innovation stimuli are provided in the design, intention and 
implementation of policy, guidelines and regulatory tools. 
  Government should consider designing sector-specific regulation in accordance 
with the typical innovation behaviour of that specific sector (please also refer to 
Chapter 6). In addition, these regulations should also consider the event of cross- 
sectoral innovation activities as this would encourage organisations to build 
networks to allow the mapping of science and knowledge flows. 
" Government should seek to regulate more "smartly" by giving incentives to comply 
with regulation rather than threatening organisations with sanctions, which may 
lead organisations to bypass domestic regulation by going abroad where they may 
find more convenient terms. 
  Government should direct a financial stimulus package explicitly towards growth 
industries, including the use of preferential loans and easier borrowing terms 
" Government should seek to support entrepreneurship in micro businesses to create 
jobs, particularly in growth sectors and in social enterprises, which, in turn, would 
have a positive impact on the innovation behaviour within this specific sector. 
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  The policy design process should consist of several steps to allow a suitable policy 
mix to address the desired policy outcome. A sound assessment of the policy 
principles should include an understanding of superior policy goals, an 
identification as well as clarification of the steps and features of various 
environmental circumstances, and a consideration of the full range of potential 
regulatory actors. In addition a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) with the clear 
goal to optimise policies to maximise benefits on one side as well as minimise costs 
on the other with clear incentives to innovate is very much needed. 
  Regulation should provide certainty and clarity by setting strict but realistic targets, 
which provide strong incentives for organisations to comply with. Moreover, 
regulators should figure out where those regulations interfere in different sectors 
and, by doing so, allow for cross-sectoral innovation to happen. 
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7.3 Research Contribution 
By examining the divergence and context of innovation strategies in the UK's private 
and public sector, the research identified two distinct corporate innovation strategies. 
The research further identified key drivers and barriers of innovation within sectors 
according to the applied degree of innovation and by doing so disproved the prevailing 
understanding of a less innovative and less strategic public sector. 
A model based on theory, refined successively through in-depth interviews and 
validated in case studies highlighted the existence of eco-innovation diffusion factors as 
opposed to conventional drivers and barriers of innovation. These context factors shape 
the initial posture towards eco-innovation by turning either into drivers or barriers, 
which then specifies the direction, speed and radicalness of the subsequent diffusion. 
The existence of interlocking concentric diffusion cycles, consisting of interacting 
diffusion factors represents a new aspect of innovation diffusion theory, which provides 
greater transparency in a highly complex process. In addition, the research contributes a 
deeper understanding about the interaction between regulation and innovation and, by 
doing so, highlights the ambiguity of regulation. The research identified two distinct 
clusters and under which circumstances innovation is driven or hampered by regulation 
and how regulation interacts with other dominant drivers of innovation which may 
appear in one and the same diffusion cycle. 
This interaction of diffusion factors (drivers/barriers) in the respective concentric 
diffusion cycles provides the basis for a more realistic innovation diffusion model which 
was exemplified in the TPD model. The research did shed light on sector-specific 
approaches towards environmental regulation and highlighted how they differ which 
allows policy-makers to customise regulations by using appropriate instrument mixes. 
Further, the research investigated government's role in the innovation process and 
provided a discussion on when and how government should interfere to spur 
innovation in both private and public sector. 
The research showed that there are reasons to believe that there are no distinct, a priori, 
drivers and barriers for (eco)-innovation as existing as these are in a condition of 
equilibrium and therefore do not impact the diffusion in either direction. Nevertheless, 
there are diffusion factors, which depending on the radicalness, speed and direction of 
the applied innovation, tend to act as driver or barrier in that specific context. This 
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demonstrates that organisations need to be sensible in order to understand and control 
this "fine-line" between drivers and barriers accordingly. Moreover, the internal factors 
of an organisation decide whether these diffusion factors act as a driver or barrier. 
The research further found out that in order to spur (eco)-innovation, the strictness of 
regulation matters less than the removal of uncertainty, which, once again, underpins 
the need for designing and implementing regulation that provide clarity and certainty 
and, by doing so, strong incentives to comply with. 
7.4 Directions for Future Research 
There are many more issues in terms of the interaction of regulation and innovation to 
be explored. Given the strict and finite scope of the project, related aspects and side 
effects emerging throughout the research could therefore not been considered. 
However, aspects which became apparent and are believed to be of great importance to 
bring forward the current state of innovation research are as follows: 
  Further research on how to stimulate and predict the direction and rate of diffusion 
factors (drivers and barriers) of innovation is needed which explores a sector-specific 
strategy for organisations to implement. Particularly, more research is needed to 
better understand the interactions of the interlocked diffusion factors and how these 
develop over the course of the applied levels of innovation. 
  Research on how to design "Smarter" sector specific regulation as a means to 
stimulate innovation is needed. Further research in the evolution of policy 
instruments and their individual characteristics that may or may not spur innovation 
is therefore crucial to allow a better understanding of how to design regulation that 
drives innovation. 
  Considering the different approaches towards innovation within the examined 
sectors more research is needed to explore to what extent organisations consider 
innovation being a part of their core strategy. The research showed that the 
importance of internal factors such as leadership and management commitment play 
an immensely important role in the innovation process. Future research should 
explore those diffusion factors further in particular the relationship to regulation. 
  Future studies should also compare regulations among the EU-member states to 
explore their compatibility as organisations in the UK, among others, still seek to by- 
186 
pass their domestic regulatory obligations by outsourcing core parts of their 
businesses activities in order to gain a competitive advantage. 
  Similarly, the influence of climate change regulations, which have a wider implication 
in regard to their global impact than domestic regulation on organisations innovation 
strategy should be examined to provide more incentives for organisations to integrate 
those aspects in their core strategy. By doing so the research should explore the 
compatibility of those strategies with corporate social responsibility as well as 
corporate sustainability strategies. 
  Considering the huge diversity among EU member states in terms of innovation 
incentives, future research should focus on a cross-national policy to spur innovation 
in alignment with Lisbon Innovation Strategy. Specifically, future research should 
examine country-specific characteristics that can be identified as a core strength and 
major driver to innovate to allow for a transnational ventures and corporations. 
  Given the different sector-specific approaches towards innovation, future research 
should examine where public and private sector approaches overlap and by doing so 
examine regulatory instruments with the underlying aim to spur collaborations from 
which both sectors will benefit. Specifically, the need for cross-sector innovation has 
to be acknowledged and accounted for with appropriate regulatory measures. Cross- 
sector innovation has the advantage of combining the core innovation strength of 
each sector, which will in turn compensate for the weaknesses respectively. 
" The rather unexpected innovative-friendly public sector shows potential to induce 
radical innovation which was not observed within the private sector here. This would 
justify further research into the pivotal indicators decisively accountable for this 
rather unexpected finding and would allow to further investigate how the public 
sector can maintain the Zeitgeist auf being innovative and by doing so sustainable. 
The above research suggestions are, to a greater or lesser extent, linked to the objectives 
this research concentrated on answering. To investigate the wider application of the 
previously outlined findings they have to be brought in to context of these suggested 
areas to allow for the "bigger picture" to emerge. 
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Appendix I- Greening Management 
Survey, December 2008 
chartered 
management 
institute 
inspiring leaderi 
1. How far do you agree or disagree with the following general statements about the 
environment? 
Neither 
Strongly agree nor 
disagree Disagree disagree 
Personally, I try to do my bit to 
protect the environment 
Human causes of climate change 
have been over-stated 
I am proud of the environmental 
performance of my organisation 
I would not want to work for a 
company with a bad 
environmental reputation 
At work, green concerns get 
squeezed out by other priorities 
The green agenda will become 
less important for my 
organisation because of the 
recession 
I have a clear understanding of 
my organisation's environmental 
impact 
Environmental issues are 
important drivers of 
organisational innovation 
My organisation's main 
environmental concern is to 
avoid breaking the law 
Strongly 
Agree agree 
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2. Compared with two years ago, do you do more or less of these activities in your 
personal (as opposed to working) life? 
About the 
Less same More Don't do 
Recycle waste 
Use energy efficient lightbulbs 
Use smart metering 
Use renewable energy sources 
Use energy efficient housing 
materials 
Off-set carbon emissions 
Travel by public transport 
Vehicle fuel consumption 
Section 2- Creating Energy Efficient Workplaces 
3. Which of the following possible actions to reduce energy usage in the workplace... 
a) has your organisation already introduced? 
b) is your organisation likely to do in the next 3 years? 
c) would not be considered by your organisation? 
[Please tick ONE box in each row only] 
b) Is likely 
to do 
a) within the c) Would 
Introduced next 3 not d) Don't e) Not 
already years consider know applicable 
An environmental policy 
Energy efficient lightbulbs 
Energy efficient air conditioning 
Energy efficient IT 
Switching to renewable energy 
Fuel efficiency measures for car 
fleet 
Retrofitting/ replacement of high 
energy-consuming equipment 
Recycling of waste materials 
Greater use of public transport 
More remote working 
Greater use of video- 
conferencing 
Less international travel 
'Lights-out' policy 
Changed process technology or 
process modifications 
Change in product/service 
specification 
Initiatives to encourage 
employees to be more 
environmentally friendly 
Any other actions (please specify 
below) 
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4. How important are the following concerns to your organisation? 
[Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1= Not at all important and 5= Very 
important] 
1- Not 5- Very 
at all im importa Don't 
portant 234 nt know 
Energy usage 
Vehicle fuel usage 
Water usage 
Waste levels 
Carbon dioxide emissions 
Other greenhouse gas emissions 
Corporate social responsibility 
Other [please specify below] 
3.7% 
Section Drivers and Barriers " Environmental Practices 
5. How important are the following internal factors as drivers of your organisation's 
environmental practices? 
[Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1= Not at all important and 5= Very 
important] 
1-Not at 
all 5- Very 
important 234 important 
Senior management 
commitment 
Corporate targets 
Consumer brand 
Customer engagement 
Competitive advantage 
Cost savings 
Employer brand (ie ability to 
recruit) 
Employee engagement 
Ethical responsibility 
Regulatory compliance 
Product/service design 
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6. How important are the following external factors as drivers of your organisation's 
environmental practices? 
[Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1= Not at all important and 5= Very 
important] 
1- Not at 
all 5- Very 
important 234 important 
Existing customers 
Potential customers 
Competitors 
Suppliers 
Regulation 
Government 
Insurers 
Investors/shareholders/funding 
bodies 
Media 
NGOs 
Cost of carbon 
Energy costs 
Benchmarking comparisons 
7. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
environmental innovation? 
Neither 
Strongly agree nor 
disagree Disagree disagree 
Leadership is a more important 
driver for eco-innovation than 
competition 
'Market pull' is more important 
for eco-innovation than 
'technology push' 
The potential for changes in 
consumer choices increases the 
risk of investing in eco- 
innovation 
Strongly 
Agree agree 
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8. To what extent are the following factors barriers or drivers of your organisation's 
approach to environmental innovation? 
Neither 
a driver 
Strong Slight nor a Slight Strong Don't 
barrier barrier barrier driver driver know 
Energy costs 
Labour costs 
Material costs 
Technological costs 
Technological advances 
Management commitment 
Employee engagement 
New markets for'green' products 
Concern for global sustainability 
Availability of skilled staff 
Corporate targets 
Regulation 
Uncertainty about future 
regulation 
Measurement tools 
Cooperation with research 
institutions 
Cooperation with other firms 
including suppliers 
External benchmarking 
Competitors activities 
Section 5- Environmental Regulation 
9. How far do you agree that environmental regulation has the following effects? 
[Please tick all that apply] 
Neither 
agree 
Strongly nor 
disagree Disagree disagree 
Drives higher standards of 
environmental practice 
Prevents illegal behaviour 
increases bureaucracy for 
managers 
Creates unnecessary costs 
Restricts business growth 
Encourages a 'tick-box' 
compliance culture 
Encourages innovation 
Helps to create new markets 
Strongly Don't 
Agree agree know 
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10. What is the single biggest barrier for your organisation in achieving compliance with 
environmental regulations? 
[Please tick ONE box only] 
Number of regulations 
Complexity of regulations 
Volume of submissions 
Communication of new legislation by 
regulatory bodies 
Lack of awareness among employees 
Lack of organisational commitment 
Lack of resources 
Don't know 
Other [please specify below] 
Section_6 - Managing Your Organisation's Carbon Footprint 
ii. How far do you agree or disagree with the following statements about managing 
your organisation's 'carbon footprint'? 
Neither 
agree 
Strongly nor 
disagree Disagree disagree 
We have clear measures for 
calculating our carbon footprint 
We actively manage our carbon 
footprint in all our activities 
There is little my organisation 
can do to reduce its carbon 
footprint 
Carbon management will become 
much more important for our 
organisation in the next three 
years 
Carbon management is not much 
more than 'greenwash' 
We use energy efficiency as a 
criteria in 
purchasing/ procurement 
decisions 
Carbon management will not be 
adopted unless required by 
regulation 
Strongly Don't 
Agree Agree know 
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12. Does your organisation use any of the following measures? 
[Please tick all that apply] 
Energy usage in buildings 
Fuel usage in transport 
C02 emissions from buildings 
C02 emissions from transport 
C02 emissions from products/services 
C02 emissions along the supply chain 
Volume of waste materials 
Greenhouse gas inventory 
Other [please specify below] 
13. Has your organisation done any of the following to help reduce its carbon footprint? 
[Please tick all that apply] 
Encouraged employees to reduce their Voluntary agreements with regulatory 
energy use bodies 
Encouraged consumers to reduce impacts Agreements with advisory bodies (e. g. 
from products Carbon Trust) 
Carbon offsetting Agreements with other organisations to use 
waste as a fuel 
Entered voluntary programme with sector Don't know 
partners 
14. 
15. 
Is your organisation included in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS)? 
Yes No Don't know 
Will your organisation be participating in the new UK-wide Carbon Reduction 
Commitment? 
Yes No Don't know 
16. Does your organisation accredit itself against any of the following standards? 
[Please tick all that apply] 
PAS 2050 ISO 14001 
BS EN ISO 14040 None 
BS EN ISO 14044 Don't know 
ISO 9001 Other [please specify be/ow] 
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17. 
18. 
19. 
Has your organisation adopted any specific targets for cutting its overall carbon 
emissions? 
[If so, please specify briefly] 
Which of the following potential sources of information about your environmental 
impact at work have you used in the last 2 years? 
[Please tick all that apply] 
Professional body 
Trade association/Chamber of commerce 
External consultants 
Insurers 
Local authorities 
Central Government 
Devolved Administrations 
Business Link 
Environment Agency 
Carbon Trust 
Energy Saving Trust 
Envirowise 
Other specialist environmental bodies 
Internal sources 
What additional information about green management would you find useful? 
[Please tick all that apply] 
Guidance on green assessment 
The business case for green management 
Guidance on creating a 'Green Strategy' 
Understanding and complying with 
environmental and energy legislation 
Advice on overcoming potential barriers 
Case studies 
Guidance on measuring your organisation's 
carbon footprint 
Suggestions about how to cut your 
organisation's carbon footprint 
Other [please specify below] 
Section 8- Best Practice Examples 
20. And finally... what single initiative has had the biggest impact on improving your 
organisation's environmental performance? 
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21. Are you? 
Male Female 
22. What is your age? 
Under 30 50 - 59 
30-39 60-65 
40 - 49 Over 65 
23. How would you best describe your job level in your organisation? 
Director Junior manager 
Senior manager Senior engineer 
Middle manager Junior engineer 
24. How many employees does your organisation have in the UK? 
None (i. e. sole trader) 251-1,000 
1-50 Over 1,000 
51-250 
25. What is the status of your organisation? 
Charity/not for profit Public limited company 
Partnership Public sector 
Private limited company owner managed/sole trader 
26. How would you describe a) your organisation and b) the environment in which it 
operates? 
Declining 
rapidly Declining Stable 
a) Your organisation 
b) Operating environment 
Growing 
Growing rapidly 
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27. Which sector do you work in? 
[Please tick one box only] 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing Hospitality, catering, leisure & tourism 
Business services Housing and real estate 
Central government IT 
Construction justice/security 
Consultancy Legal & accounting services 
Creative/media Local Government 
Defence Manufacturing & production 
Education Mining & extraction (inc oil and gas) 
Electricity, gas and water Police 
Engineering Sales/marketing/advertising 
Finance, insurance Telecommunications & post 
Fire and rescue Transport & logistics 
Health & social care Wholesale & retail 
28. What is your management function? 
[Please tick one box only] 
Administration/management services Marketing/sales 
Business development Personnel/HR 
Corporate affairs/public relations Production/ operations 
Engineering management Project management 
Facilities management Purchasing/ contracting 
Finance/accounting Research and development 
IT/computing General management 
Knowledge/ learning Not a manager 
Management consultancy 
29. Where is your principal place of work? 
[Please tick one box only] 
East of England North West 
London Yorkshire & the Humber 
East Midlands Northern Ireland 
West Midlands Scotland 
South East Wales 
South West Other 
North East 
30. And what is the first part of the postcode of your principal place of work? 
[This will be used in geographical mapping only - it will n be used to identify you 
or your organisation] 
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31. Which Institute are you a member of? 
Chartered Management Institution of Engineering Both 
Institute and Technology 
32. Finally, if you would be willing to take part in a follow-up interview as a 
leading and innovative example of environmental management, please give 
your name, organisation, telephone number and email address below. 
These details will not be used for any purposes of analysis. 
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Appendix II - Additional Statistical Analysis 
Initial Ei envalues Extraction Sums of S uared Loadin s 
Rotation 
Sums of 
Squared 
Loadin s' 
Cnmnnnp. nt Total % of Variance Cumulative Variance Cumulative Total 
1 6.647 36.929 36.929 6.647 36.929 36.929 4.454 
2 2.247 12.482 49.411 2.247 12.482 49.411 4.461 
3 1.305 7.251 56.661 1.305 7.251 56.661 3.539 
4 1.119 6.214 62.876 1.119 6.214 62.876 3.845 
5 
. 861 4.782 67.657 6 
. 728 4.044 71.701 7 
. 674 3.747 75.449 
8 
. 
629 3.493 78.942 
9 
. 605 3.361 82.303 10 
. 492 2.736 85.039 11 
. 445 2.470 87.509 
12 
. 
416 2.309 89.818 
13 
. 381 2.115 91.933 14 
. 370 2.053 93.986 
15 
. 336 1.866 95.852 16 
. 327 1.817 97.669 
17 
. 239 1.327 98.995 18 
. 181 1.005 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Table A-1: Eigenvalues Table (PCA) 
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Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Energy costs 14,64 17,392 
, 
622 
. 
875 
Labour costs 15,15 16,028 773 
, 
840 
Material costs 15,14 15,155 
, 
820 
. 
828 
Technological costs 15,28 15,334 
, 
782 
, 
837 
Technological advances 14.96 18,417 576 884 
Table A-2: Cronbach's Alpha Values -1 
Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Management 
commitment 11,46 5,398 576 , 
706 
Employee engagement 11,66 5,602 
, 
653 
, 
660 
New markets for'green' 
products 11,91 6,451 , 497 743 
Concern for global 
sustain abili 
11,73 6,276 
, 
542 
, 
721 
Table A-3: Cronbach's Alpha Values -2 
Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Availability of skilled staff 14,93 8,765 1505 , 
739 
Corporate targets 14,42 8,683 . 
570 
. 
715 
Regulation 14,20 8,957 
, 
530 
, 
729 
Uncertainty about future 
regulation 14,99 8,896 . 
540 726 
Measurement tools 14,96 9,102 553 722 
Table A-4: Cronbach's Alpha Values -3 
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Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Corrected Cronbach's 
Scale Mean if Variance if Item-Total Alpha if Item 
Item Deleted Item Deleted Correlation Deleted 
Cooperation with 
research institutions 10,79 5,029 632 , 
763 
Cooperation with other 
firms including suppliers 
10,68 4,644 694 733 
External benchmarking 10,47 4,683 
, 
656 
, 
751 
Competitors activities 10,53 5,089 543 804 
Table A-5: Cronbach's Alpha Values -4 
Crosstab 
Innovation Attitudes 
Innovation as Factor costs 
Strategy as Inn Barrier Total 
'Market pull' is more Str disagree Count 5 10 15 important for eco 
innovation than % within 'Market pull is 
technology push' more important for eco 33 3% 66 7% 100 0% innovation than . . . technology push' 
Disagree Count 46 92 138 
% within 'Market pull' is 
more important for eco- 33 3% 66 7% 100 0% innovation than . . . 
'technology push' 
Neutral Count 108 269 377 
% within 'Market pull' is 
more important for eco- 28 6% 71 4% 100 0% innovation than . . . 
technology push' 
Agree Count 179 295 474 
% within 'Market pull' is 
more important for eco- 37 8% 62.2% 100 0% innovation than . . 
technology push' 
Str agree Count 35 67 102 
% within 'Market pull' is 
more important for eco- 34 3% 65 7% 100 0% innovation than . . . 
'technology push' 
Total Count 373 733 1106 
% within 'Market pull' is 
more important for eco- 33.7% 66.3% 100.0% innovation than 
technoloav push' 
Table A-6: Crosstab on Innovation Attitudes -I 
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Crosstab 
Innovation Attitudes 
Innovation as Factor costs 
Strategy as Inn Barrier Total 
Leadership is a more Str disagree Count 2 11 13 important driver for eco- 
innovation than % within Leadership is a 
competition more important driver for 15 4% 84 6% 100 0% eco-innovation than . . . 
competition 
Disagree Count 18 45 63 
% within Leadership is a 
more important driver for 28.6% 71.4% 100.0% 
Neutral Count 62 158 220 
% within Leadership is a 
more important driver for 28 2% 71 8% 100 0% eco-innovation than . . 
competition 
Agree Count 193 351 544 
% within Leadership is a 
more important driver for 35 5% 64 5% 100 0% 
eco-innovation than . . . 
competition 
Str agree Count 98 168 266 
% within Leadership is a 
more important driver for 36 8% 63 2% 100 0% eco-innovation than . . . 
competition 
Total Count 373 733 1106 
% within Leadership is a 
more important driver for 33.7% 66.3% 100.0% 
eco-innovation than 
competition 
Table A-7: Crosstab on Innovation Attitudes -2 
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Sic Sector Codes ' Effect of Regulation (cluster) Crosstabulation 
Effect of Regulation (cluster) 
Regulation 
Regulation is causes 
good problems Total 
Sic Sector Codes Agriculture, Forestry & Count 3 5 8 
Fishery 
d n Sic Sector 62 5% 100.0% es Codes Codes . 
Mining & Extraction Count 12 9 21 
% within Sic Sector 57 1% 42 9% 100 0% Codes . . . 
Manufacturing & Count 96 110 206 
Production / Engineering %within Sic Sector 
Codes 46.6% 53.4% 100.0% 
Electricity, Gas & Water Count 25 32 57 
% within Sic Sector 43 9% 56.1% 100.0% Codes . 
Construction Count 21 27 48 
% within Sic Sector 43 8% 56 2% 100.0% Codes . . 
Wholesale & Retail Count 13 10 23 
% within Sic Sector 56 5% 43.5% 100.0% Codes . 
Transport & Logistics Count 19 33 52 
% within Sic Sector 36 5% 63 5% 100.0% Codes . . 
Hospitatlity Catering, Count 11 11 22 
Leisure &fourism 
% within Sic Sector 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% Codes 
Creative & Media J Count 39 41 80 
Telecommunication & 
Post/ IT % within Sic Sector 48 8% 51 2% 100 0% Codes . . . 
Finance & Insurance Count 18 26 44 
% within Sic Sector 40 9% 59 1% 100 0% Codes . . . 
Housing & Real Estate Count 9 15 24 
% within Sic Sector 37 5% 62.5% 100 0% Codes . . 
Legal &Accounting Count 72 92 164 Service / Sales, 
Marketing, Advertising 
Consultancy! Business %within Sic Sector 43 9% 56 1% 100 0% Services Codes . . . 
Education Count 49 80 129 
% within Sic Sector 0% 38 62.0% 100.0% Codes . 
Health & Social Care Count 50 61 111 
% within Sic Sector 45 0% 55.0% 100.0% Codes . 
Central & Local Count 174 175 349 
GovermnetI Fire & 
Rescue I Defense! 
Justice & Secu it !P li 
% within Sic Sector 49.9% 50.1% 100.0% r y ce o Codes 
Total Count 611 727 1338 
% within Sic Sector 45 7% 54.3% 100.0% Codes . 
Table A-8: Effect of Regulation over Industry Sectors 
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What is your management function? " Effect of Regulation (cluster) Crosslabulation 
Effect of Regulation clus ter 
Regulation 
Regulation is causes 
good problems Total 
What is your Administrationlmanagem Count 57 65 122 
management function? ent services % within What is your 
management function? 46.7% 53.3% 1000% 
Business development Count 39 43 82 
% within What is your 
management function? 47.6% 52.4% 100.0% 
Corporate affairs/public Count 8 3 11 
relations % within What is your 
management function? 727% 27.3% 100.0% 
Engineering Count 57 82 139 
management % within What is your 
management function? 41.0% 59.0% 100.0% 
Facilities management Count 23 12 35 
% within What is your 
management function? 65.7% 
34.3% 100.0% 
Financefaccounting Count 17 15 32 
% within What is your 
management function? 
53.1 % 46.9% 100.0% 
IT/computing Count 20 30 50 
% within What is your 
management function? 40.0% 60.0% 1 D0.0% 
Knowledgeflearning Count 23 40 63 
% within What is your 
management function? 36.5% 63.5% 100.0% 
Management consultancy Count 27 42 69 
% within What is your 
management function? 39.1 % 
60.9% 100.0% 
Marketingfsales Count 17 22 39 
% within What is your 
management function? 43 
6% 56.4% 100.0% 
Personnel/HR Count 27 27 54 
% within What is your 
management function? 50.0% 50.0% 
100.0% 
Productionfoperations Count 58 60 118 
% within What Is your 
management function? 49.2% 50.8% 100.0% 
Project management Count 70 69 139 
% within What is your 
management function? 50.4% 49.6% 1000% 
Purchasing/contracting Count 11 11 22 
% within What is your 
management function? 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Research and Count 15 19 34 
development % within What Is your 44 1% 55 9% 1000% management function? . . 
General management Count 112 161 273 
% within What is your 
management function? 41.0% 59.0% 100 0% 
Not a manager Count 28 26 54 
% within What is your 9% 51 48 1% 100 0% 
management function? . . 
Total Count 609 727 1336 
% within What is your 
management function? 45.6% 54.4% 100.0% 
Table A-9: Effect of Regulation on Management Function 
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AS ORIGINAL 
ID * Innovation Attitudes Crosstabulation 
Innovation Attitudes 
Innovation as Factor costs 
Strategy as inn Barrier Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 0 1 1 
% within ID 
. 
0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 1 0 1 
% within ID 100.0% . 
0% 100.0% 
BT Count 1 0 1 
% within ID 100.0% . 
0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 101 
% within ID 100.0% . 0% 100.0% 
Total Count 314 
% within ID 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Table A-11: Crosstab on innovation attitudes over case studies 
ID ` Effect of Regulation (cluster) Crosstabulation 
Effect of Regulation (cluster) 
Regulation 
Regulation is causes 
good problems Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 011 
% within ID . 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 011 
% within ID . 0% 100.0% 
100.0% 
BT Count 011 
% within ID 
. 
0% 100.0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 101 
% within ID 100.0% . 0% 
100.0% 
Total Count 134 
% within ID 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Table A-12: Crosstab on regulation attitudes over case studies 
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Crosstab 
New markets for'green' products 
Neither a 
driver nor a 
barrier Slight driver Strong driver Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 0011 
%within ID 
. 0% . 
0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 0101 
% within ID 
. 
0% 100.0% . 0% 100.0% 
BT Count 1001 
% within ID 100.0% 
. 0% . 0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 0 1 0 1 
% within ID . 0% 100.0% . 
0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 2 1 4 
% within ID 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Table A-13: Crosstab on new markets for green products over case studies 
Crosstab 
'Market pull' is more important for eco-innovation than 'technology 
push' 
Disagree Agree Str agree Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 0011 
% within ID 
. 0% . 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 
% within ID 
0 
. 0% 
1 
100.0% 
0 
. 0% 
1 
100.0% 
BT Count 1 0 0 1 
% within ID 100.0% 
. 
0% 
. 
0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 0 1 0 1 
% within ID . 0% 100.0% . 0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1214 
% within ID 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Table A-14: Crosstab on market-pull vs. techno-push over case studies 
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Crosstab 
The potential for changes in consumer choices increases the risk 
of investing in eco-innovation 
Neutral Agree Str agree Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 0 01 1 
% within ID 
. 0% . 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 0 10 1 
% within ID 
. 0% 100.0% . 0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 1 00 1 
% within ID 100.0% 
. 0% . 0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 11 3 
% within ID 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 
Table A-15: Crosstab on consumer choice increasing risk to invest in eco-innovation 
over case studies 
Crosstab 
Concern for global sustainability 
Neither a 
driver nor a 
barrier Slight driver Strong driver Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 1001 
% within ID 100.0% 
. 
0% 
. 
0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 0101 
% within ID 
. 
0% 100.0% 
. 
0% 100.0% 
BT Count 1 0 0 1 
% within ID 100.0% . 
0% 
. 
0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 0 0 1 1 
% within ID 
. 
0% 
. 
0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 2114 
% within ID 50.0% 25.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
Table A-16: Crosstab on concern for global sustainability 
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Crosstab 
Corporate targets 
Slight driver Strong driver Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 101 
% within ID 100.0% . 0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 101 
%within ID 100.0% 
. 
0% 100.0% 
BT Count 
% within ID 
0 
. 
0% 
1 
100.0% 
1 
100.0% 
BCC Count 0 1 1 
%within ID 
. 
0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 2 2 4 
% within ID 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Table A-17: Crosstab on corporate targets over case studies 
Crosstab 
Leadership is a more important driver for eco-innovation than 
competition 
Neutral Agree Str agree Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 0 01 1 
% within ID . 0% . 
0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 1 00 1 
% within ID 100.0% . 
0% . 0% 100.0% 
BT Count 0 10 1 
%within ID 
. 
0% 100.0% . 0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 0 01 1 
%within ID 
. 0% . 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 1 12 4 
% within ID 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
Table A-18: Crosstab on leadership vs. competition over case studies 
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Crosstab 
Management commitment 
Slight driver Strong driver Total 
ID Royal Mail Count 011 
% within ID 
. 0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Aurora Count 
%within ID 
0 
. 0% 
1 
100.0% 
1 
100.0% 
BT Count 1 0 1 
% within ID 100.0% 
. 
0% 100.0% 
BCC Count 0 1 1 
% within ID 
. 
0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Total Count 134 
% within ID 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Table A-19: Crosstab on management commitment over case studies 
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Sic Sector Codes ' Innovation Attitudes Crosstabulatlon 
Innovation Attitudes 
Innovation as Factor costs 
Strateav as Inn Barrier Total 
Sic Sector Codes Agriculture, Forestry & Count 3 3 6 
Fishery 
% within Sic Sector 50 0% 50 0% 100.0% Codes . . 
Mining & Extraction Count 7 9 16 
% within Sic Sector 8% 43 56.2% 100.0% Codes . 
Manufacturing & Count 56 122 178 
Production 1 Engineering 
% within Sic Sector 31 5% 68.5% 100.0% Codes . 
Electricity, Gas & Water Count 23 23 46 
% within Sic Sector 0% 50 50.0% 100.0% Codes . 
Construction Count 15 18 33 
% within Sic Sector 45 5% 54.5% 100.0% Codes . 
Wholesale & Retail Count 7 13 20 
% within Sic Sector 35.0% 65.0% 100.0% 
Codes 
Transport & Logistics Count 16 31 47 
% within Sic Sector 34 0% 66 0% 100.0% Codes . . 
Hospitatlity Catering, Count 4 15 19 
Leisure &fourism 
% within Sic Sector 21 1% 78.9% 100.0% Codes . 
Creative & Media I Count 25 46 71 
Telecommunication & 
Post/ IT %within Sic Sector 2% 35 64.8% 100.0% Codes . 
Finance & Insurance Count 10 27 37 
% within Sic Sector 
Codes 27.0% 
73.0% 100.0% 
Housing & Real Estate Count 9 10 19 
% within Sic Sector 47.4% 52.6% 100.0% Codes 
Legal &Accounting Count 31 110 141 Service f Sales, 
Marketing, Advertising! 
ConsultancylBusiness %within Sic Sector 0% 22 78.0% 100.0% 
Services Codes . 
Education Count 
% within Sic Sector 
Codes 
28 
28.0% 
72 
72.0% 
100 
100.0% 
Health & Social Care Count 37 61 98 
% within Sic Sector 37 8% 62.2% 100.0% Codes . 
Central & Local Count 106 170 276 Govermnetf Fire & 
Rescue 1 Defense J 
Justice & Security f Police 
% within Sic Sector 
Codes 38.4% 61.6% 100.0% 
Total Count 377 730 1107 
%within Sic Sector 34.1% 65.9% 100.0% 
Codes 
Table A-20: Innovation attitudes over sic sectors 
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Appendix III - Summary of Interview Set I 
To what degree she 
licy focus explicitly 
mulcting innovation 
rich may or may not 
it desired effect'? 
1 Which role should a 
vernment ideally have in 
der to promote 
vironmental innovation 
thin industry? (facilitator 
inhibitor) 
Multinational 
Oreanisations 
In Oidcr Ioo Iaun. li ;tl, lii_ (Iml 
N ill have an inllucnce on 
innovation within organisations it 
is imperative that this regulation 
will not try changing costumer 
preferences from a regulatory 
perspective. Organisations have 
plenty of environmental 
innovations in the pipe-line but 
they will not launch them as long 
as they will not get incentives to 
do so as otherwise that would 
mean a high investment. 
Consultancies/ 
Professional Bodies 
In Irrinti il thr I0 ntl ruli\rnrti ul 
the industry it is necessary to 
encourage the performance at a 
rate which: 
a) they can afford and 
b) results in products that are 
perceived to be an improvement 
in the eyes of potential consumers. 
Industry is likely to be pushed into 
massive changes that reduce their 
short term ability to compete and 
therefore other nations with less 
social goals will have a 
competitive advantage. 
Industry should have a "levelled 
playing field" by knowing what 
the roles are ideally in advance. 
Technology shouldn't be forced 
beyond its capabilities or in a sub- 
optimum manner. The Us-Cafe 
laws were a good example for this 
development. In general it needs a 
realistic pace and incentives that 
are considered to be smart mean 
just good business if proper 
regulation in an adequate time- 
frame to meet those it is likely that 
companies that embrace those 
coals and develop the appropriate 
response tend to he well off 
financially provided the time- 
frame has not burden so. In terms 
of fuel efficiency it is quite 
obvious that consumers are aware 
of' recent developments but not 
willing to pay the difference in 
order to purchase a more fuel 
efficient car. This is way it is 
really necessary to have a balance 
as industry can not wait until 
consumers can actually afford 
Governmental 
Derartments 
II il\\J\, ICI rnd, \ý 11,11 OW 
wants to achieve. 
Climate Change Policy 4 Reduce 
CO, which is due to a clear market 
failure as people did not 
internalise the cost of carbon 
emissions. So there is space for 
rational regulation and it is 
certainly different in the way they 
are designed whether they should 
regard to innovation which should 
increase competition in first case! 
Competition is therefore the 
dominant driver of innovation! 
The pressure for eco-innovation 
clearly is due to Climate Change! 
Regulators should be prepared to 
pave the way for organisations in 
order to early adopt regulation by 
giving them incentives like 
competitive advantages. 
Ideally the government would not 
interfere at all as competition will 
give organisations the biggest 
incentive to innovate in order to 
stay alive. 
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towards competition (should 
support competition) as this in turn 
drives innovation. 
Industry had a working group on 
those issues about 15 years ago 
which was when the EU 
legislation was proposed and this 
working group among others came 
up with their own solid proposals 
on addressing these issues. So it 
needed that THREAT of 
legislation before these issues 
would he properly addressed. 
The point at which industry put 
forward those hard proposals was 
too late the EU legislation 
happened anyway. So it could he 
argued that it would not have 
happened without the EU making 
those requirements. 
i Did the government 
create economic 
: entives to achieve th 
ns or were they perce 
too ambitious or too 
Which Instrument type 
her Command-and- 
mtrol (CaC) or Market 
sed (MB) regulation 
ght be more appropriate 
achieve these ambitious 
als? 
Where have European 
alators, made a 
iificant contribution in 
er to promote 
ironmental innovation'? 
'ES... how significant 
e they? 
Back in 1998 ACEA and JAMA 
and KAMA all three associations 
a«reed to meet the voluntary 
agreement by 2008. Over the time 
it turned out that those goals 
weren't achievable as the accrued 
costs due to higher production 
costs that would have to be carried 
over to the customers were 
perceived as too high. Especially 
the European automobile industry 
wwas incentivised by the 
government to develop 
technologies that would have been 
able to meet those requirements. 
The market and the consumer 
within that market is the top 
priority so in order to get the 
desired affect from a regulation 
the government needs to convince 
the markets first as they decide 
Nýhethcr an innovation will diffuse. 
The EURO 4 regulation turns out 
to he good example where the 
European government decided to 
promote diesel vehicles. So 
companies were forced to increase 
their R&D activities in order to 
nice( those requirements. 
There was some progress over the 
last years in terms of those 
voluntary agreements. Further is 
has to be made clear that some 
other characteristics (apart from 
the efficiency) like the weight and 
engine power has increased as 
well. Particularly those two 
elements have offset the 
improvements that have been 
realised in efficiency which in turn 
is responsible to the little progress 
that has been achieved in meeting 
the voluntary agreement. T&E did 
not believe in the voluntary 
agreements from the very 
beginning. We believe that just by 
the imposition of efficiency 
standards one would achieve the 
desired results! 
Both types of instruments are 
applied in order to achieve those 
goals. CaC was mainly applied in 
the US and in Europe whereas in 
Europe it was left up to the 
member states and most of them 
did little of even nothing at all. It 
needs definitely both instruments. 
The Tesla roadster is perceived to 
be a toy rather than a serious threat 
to the car industry. 
Government set the standards and 
goal. European Regulators have 
challenged the industry to become 
more efficient whether it was 
really affective is highly arguable. 
By setting the standards by saying 
what should be done or by 
encouraging/incentivising should 
he the role of government to move 
society in a direction that is best 
for everybody. Markets tend move 
in directions that are best for 
collective view of the individuals. 
Nobody questions governments 
role to regulate it's just a question 
of how SMART those regulation 
are going to be. 
This much depends on the 
credibility of the regulations. 
Voluntary agreements are 
obviously much more flexible as 
strict governmental regulation. 
If the aims is to have an immediate 
initiative than CaC appears to he 
the better approach whereas MB 
instruments would he more 
suitable for long term goals. 
There is a case for some subsidies 
for R&D, etc., given the positive 
spillovers related to new 
invention, etc., - as those who 
make an invention do not reap all 
the benefits this invention can 
cause. The "better" the price 
structure of the economy, 
the less will the need for subsidies 
be. 
The policies to support 
development of new technologies 
should be broad-based, targeted at 
the environmental problem areas 
at hand, but not at specific 
technological solutions. 
The case for subsidies to stimulate 
diffusion of existing technologies 
seems weaker than the case for 
supporting R&D - as there 
generally are fewer positive 
spillovers and less risk involved. 
Those who start applying an 
existing technology will reap most 
of the benefits for themselves. 
"Correct pricing" can again play 
an important role. 
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What are therefore the 
in drivers for 
ironmental innovation 
.) As a result of this whe 
nd where does technology 
of need a (policy) driver 
rder to diffuse? 
1 Would you agree that 
riet environmental 
yulation will have a 
sitive effect on 
novation and therefore 
mulate the process also 
own as Porters 
Ypothesis'? 
Issues like toxic chemical, 
recycling and tail pipe emission 
are problems that need to be dealt 
ww ith in order to provide a 
. u, tainable business. Otherwise 
husinesses will not be able to 
operate in the "Global-Arena"! 
Given the fact of increasing traffic 
congestion and oil prices 
skyrocketing an energy-saving 
technology that will be applied 
within the automobile industry is 
an appropriate example to 
demonstrate this scenario. 
In ýceneral it is believed that 
competition rather than regulation 
. stimulate 
innovation within 
multination corporations. Given 
that the demand for environmental 
goods and services become great 
and greater throughout the market 
companies get more prepared to 
suit the demands. On the other 
hand corporate should also be 
prepared to comply with 
regulation as regulation are typical 
threat factors and whenever a 
company decides not to comply 
with a certain type of regulation 
there might be a chance that it will 
not he able to compete on its target 
market. 
Leadership and competition is the 
main driver for environmental 
innovation. Governments can 
move markets and can change the 
social consciousness. It is not 
necessarily required to push 
innovation via regulation. If those 
things are done well with 
sufficient lead-time regulation 
would not be necessary. 
That would depend of how the 
market defines the value-added 
process in the final product. In the 
car-industry the value added 
process is defined as having more 
space, power and functionality. 
Efficiency hasn't been an element 
of that definition yet! The Term 
Efficiency need to be added in the 
general definition of value-added 
processes! 
The "real" question is HOW will 
regulation stimulate innovation'? It 
happens that companies innovate 
itself out of business as nobody 
needs their products as by the end 
of the day those innovative 
products need to be sold and if 
they turn out to be too expensive 
and therefore not affordable by a 
lot of people those companies face 
a difficult situation. 
The Hypothesis is true if the 
market, that is to be regulated, 
turns out to be important enough 
in terms of the car industry that 
would mean that the market that 
want to grow need to export to 
Europe (Europe has the largest 
market for new cars) in order to 
Brow and therefore has to comply 
Demand pull, technology push and 
regulation push can all play a role. 
Prospects of making money can 
often be an important motivation. 
To the extent that this matters, 
"getting the prices right" by 
internalisation of the social costs 
of environmental damages will 
provide incentives for innovations 
in the right "directions". 
This depends how the market 
defines the "Value-added" process 
in products. When looking at the 
car industry improved engine 
efficiency is regarded to be an 
improvement and therefore adds 
value to the product. Consequently 
no regulation is needed in order to 
induce the diffusion process. 
-i Regulation should focus on 
outcomes not output 
-*Regulation should include 
market incentives where possible 
-4 Industry standards or voluntary 
agreement are preferred over state 
regulation 
-* Preference of global over 
European over national regulation 
Analysis of possible unintended 
consequences 
4 Policy officials should test their 
presumption by liaising with 
market participants (baring in 
mind the maturity of the market) 
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